Antini v. Antini

• Decision Date: 09 April 2019
• Docket Number: No. 115,002,115,002
• Citation: 440 P.3d 57
• Parties: In re the Marriage of: Matthew L. ANTINI, Appellee, v. Angela M. ANTINI, Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

440 P.3d 57

In re the Marriage of: Matthew L. ANTINI, Appellee,

v.Angela M. ANTINI, Appellant.

No. 115,002

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

FILED APRIL 9, 2019

Kade A. McClure, Richard J. Goralewicz, Legal Aid Services of Oklahoma, Inc., Oklahoma City, for Appellant.

Joe K. White, Duncan, OK, for Appellee.

Colbert, J.

¶ 1 At issue is whether Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-312 of the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act ("UCCJEA") requires a court to award prevailing party attorney fees to entities rendering legal services to clients at no cost. We answer in the affirmative.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 Appellant, Angela M. Antini, and Appellee, Matthew L. Antini, are the biological parents of two minor children. In November 2013, the parties were granted a Judgment of Divorce in the State of New York. In it, the court awarded Appellant physical custody over the children with the parties sharing joint legal custody. Appellee was granted visitation rights and ordered to pay child support.

¶ 3 In 2013, prior to the entry of the Judgment of Divorce, Appellant moved with the children from New York to Maine. In April 2014, Appellee picked the children up in Maine for visitation but transported them to Oklahoma and, despite Appellant's requests and her subsequent trip to Oklahoma to recover the children, Appellee refused to return them. On May 19, 2014, after it became apparent that Appellee was not going to return the children, Appellant registered the New York divorce decree as a foreign judgment in a Maine court and filed a motion for contempt against Appellee on May 21, 2014. The court ordered Appellee to appear with the children. However, Appellee did not do so and the Maine court found Appellee in contempt on September 24, 2014. Appellee ignored an offer to purge his contempt by returning both children by September 26, 2014, and Appellee never returned the children to Maine. Because of this failure to return the children, the Maine court issued a bench warrant for Appellee.

¶ 4 On December 16, 2014, Appellee filed a petition in the District Court of Stephens County, State of Oklahoma, to register the New York divorce decree in Oklahoma and asked the court to assume custody jurisdiction. Appellee's petition did not reference the registration of the New York Decree in Maine nor the contempt proceedings in Maine. In response, Appellant filed a special appearance in the trial court objecting to the registration of the New York final judgment of divorce and also filed a petition and application for a writ of habeas corpus requesting custody of the minor children. On March 17, 2015, the court found that "pursuant to the Oklahoma Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, 43 O.S. §§ 551-201 et.seq. the [S]tate of Oklahoma has no jurisdiction in this matter and that this action should be dismissed." Maine retained child custody jurisdiction and ordered the return of the children to Appellant. The Oklahoma court also denied and dismissed the petition to register the New York decree in Oklahoma.

¶ 5 On April 21, 2015, Appellant filed a pro se motion to modify custody in the Maine court, requesting sole custody of the children and granting Appellee supervised visitation. Appellee responded with an answer and counterclaim on May 7, 2015, but then failed to appear before the Maine court. The Maine court then granted Appellant's motion and ruled it had exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the children. No appeal of the Maine court's decision was entered and the decision is now final under Maine law.

¶ 6 On April 29, 2015, Appellee filed in the Oklahoma court a Motion to Reconsider the March 17, 2015, decision, denying and dismissing Appellee's motion to register the New York judgment in Oklahoma and granting custody of the minor children to Appellant. That motion was heard on April 14, 2016, and the court issued its decision denying the motion and dismissing the petition.

¶ 7 Subsequently, Appellant filed a Motion for Costs and Attorney's Fees pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-312, a fee-shifting statute within the UCCJEA. That section mandates that a court award to the prevailing party

necessary and reasonable expenses incurred by or on behalf of the party, including costs, communication expenses, attorney's fees, investigative fees, expenses for witnesses, travel expenses, and child care during the course of the proceedings, unless the party from whom fees or expenses are sought establishes that the award would be clearly inappropriate.

In the motion, counsel sought payment of prevailing party attorney fees and reimbursement of costs for transcripts. The court denied her motion, finding, as a matter of law, that attorney fees can only be awarded under the UCCJEA to a party who has retained counsel and personally paid for their services. That is, Appellant's counsel was not entitled to a reasonable attorney fee merely because Appellant was represented by Legal Aid Services of Oklahoma, Inc. The court further denied Appellant's request for transcription costs reasoning that the issue of costs for transcription of a default modification of divorce decree hearing in Maine should be decided in Maine.

¶ 8 Appellant appealed. On appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed the district court as to the claim for attorney's fees but reversed and remanded on the issue of transcription costs. In so doing, the court held that "[w]ithout ... guidance, either from the Legislature or the Oklahoma Supreme Court, Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-312 (2011) does not statutorily mandate attorney fee awards to prevailing parties when the prevailing party receives free legal services." But, the court further held that because the transcription of the hearing in Maine was vital to the Oklahoma trial court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction, Appellant should be awarded the transcription cost pursuant to § 551-312. Appellant sought certiorari review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 9 The issue presented in this case is one of statutory interpretation. Statutory interpretation presents a question of law which this Court reviews under a de novo standard. Corbeil v. Emricks Van & Storage, 2017 OK 71, ¶ 10, 404 P.3d 856, 858 ; Brown v. Claims Mgmt. Res. Inc., 2017 OK 13, ¶ 10, 391 P.3d 111, 115. In conducting de novo review, this Court possesses plenary, independent, and non-deferential authority to examine the lower tribunal's legal rulings. Corbeil, 2017 OK 71, ¶ 10, 404 P.3d at 858.

¶ 10 At issue is whether Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-312 (2011) excepts a class of attorneys from recovering prevailing party attorney fees for services rendered at no cost to their client. To answer this question, this Court must interpret and give ordinary meaning to the plain language of a statute while balancing the Legislature's intent. Statutory interpretation and ascertaining Legislative intent present questions of law which this Court reviews de novo. See Samman v. Multiple Injury Trust Fund, 2001 OK 71, ¶ 8, 33 P.3d 302, 305 ; see also Baptist Med. Ctr. v. Pruett, 1999 OK CIV APP 39, ¶ 11, 978 P.2d 1005, 1008 ("Matters involving legislative intent present questions of law which are examined independently and without deference to the trial court's ruling.").

III. DISCUSSION

A. The plain language of Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-312 (2011) requires the trial court to award to a prevailing party a reasonable attorney fee, without regard to whether or not the cost of the representation was passed onto the client.

¶ 11 Oklahoma follows the "American Rule" which states generally that the cost of litigation is borne distinctly by each litigant and that the court is without authority to assess attorney fee awards without statutory authority to do so. Fulsom v. Fulsom, 2003 OK 96, ¶ 8, 81 P.3d 652, 655 (citations omitted). Fee-shifting statutes are strictly construed because of the "chilling" effect the statutes have on access to courts. Id. Thus, proper application of § 551-312 requires that we ascertain the Legislature's intent when the UCCJEA was enacted. State v. Tate, 2012 OK 31, ¶ 7, 276 P.3d 1017, 1020.

¶ 12 Legislative intent is presumed to be expressed in the statute's text, and, where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, the court will not supplant its own interpretation in its place. Arrow Tool & Gauge v. Mead, 2000 OK 86, ¶ 15, 16 P.3d 1120, 1125. "The [w]ords and phrases of a statute are to be understood and used not in an abstract sense, but with due regard for context, and they must harmonize with other sections of the Act." Tate, 2012 OK 31, ¶ 7, 276 P.3d at 1020. Section 551-312 is a fee-shifting statute and must be interpreted according to its own terms. State ex rel. Dep't of Transp. v. Norman Indus. Dev. Corp., 2001 OK 72, ¶ 17, 41 P.3d 960, 965-66. Moreover, "courts should not read into a statute exceptions not made by the Legislature." Seventeen Hundred Peoria, Inc. v. City of Tulsa, 1966 OK 155, ¶ 14, 422 P.2d 840, 843 (citation omitted). When a legislature intends for an exception to exist within a statute, it is free to do so, and when the language used is broad and comprehensive and no exception is made, it is conclusive evidence that no exception is intended. City of Chickasha v. O'Brien, 1915 OK 813, ¶ 15, 58 Okla. 46, 159 P. 282, 284.

¶ 13 The UCCJEA has been adopted by 49 states, including Oklahoma, to prevent forum shopping schemes and to combat interstate custody disputes. Summarily, the purposes of the UCCJEA are to: (1) avoid jurisdictional competition in child custody cases; (2) promote cooperation with the courts of other states; (3) discourage the use of the interstate system for the same; (4) deter abductions of children; (5) avoid relitigation of custody decisions of other states in this State; and (6) facilitate the enforcement of custody decrees of other states. Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 551-101, Official Comment (2011); see also, Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act (1968) § 1. Article Three of...