Apffel v. Huddleston

• Decision Date: 27 May 1999
• Docket Number: No. 2:98-CV-0496-S.,2:98-CV-0496-S.
• Parties: Mike APFFEL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert HUDDLESTON, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Utah

50 F.Supp.2d 1129

Mike APFFEL, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Robert HUDDLESTON, et al., Defendants.

No. 2:98-CV-0496-S.

United States District Court, D. Utah, Central Division.

May 27, 1999.

Kathryn Collard, Law Firm of Kathryn Collard, L.C., Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiffs.

Dan R. Larsen, Utah Attorney General's Office, Salt Lake City, UT, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

SAM, Chief Judge.

BACKGROUND

This action arises out of the death of an 18 year-old Dixie College freshman, Jason Apffel, on September 24, 1996. Apffel was from California and was a new student at Dixie College when he attended a party for incoming freshman called the "Sandblast". The activity was held near the South entrance to Snow Canyon State Park. While attending the party he climbed the sandstone cliffs which are near the area and fell to his death. Plaintiffs allege defendants had personal knowledge of the extreme danger posed by climbing the sandstone cliffs and hence defendants' planning of the party in the area was in wilful disregard for the safety of "out-of-state," and therefore uninformed and unprepared, students who would be attending the party and be attracted to the cliffs. Plaintiffs' claims are against Robert Huddleston, the president of Dixie College, personally; Don Reid, the director of campus security and the campus police department, personally; John Ibach, the manager of Snow Canyon State Park, personally; and another individual, Mike Reynolds, who was presumably a security officer, although he is not identified in the "Parties" section of the complaint.

Plaintiffs' claims for relief fall under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the common law and the wrongful death and survival statutes of the State of Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-11-6, 17-11-7 and 78-11-12.

Defendants have moved to dismiss plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Defendants argue that plaintiffs fail to state a federal claim under the Fourteenth Amendment; plaintiffs' federal claims are barred by the doctrine of qualified immunity; plaintiffs fail to state a state law negligence claim; and plaintiffs' claims are barred under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

ANALYSIS

Standard of review applicable to plaintiffs' complaint.

The first issue for determination by the court is whether the plaintiffs' complaint is held to the general standard of Fed. R.Civ.P. 8(a) which requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim," or whether there is a heightened pleading standard required once the affirmative defense of qualified immunity is raised. Plaintiffs rely on Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993), which held that there is no heightened pleading standard in municipal liability cases under § 1983, to support their position that the general standard of Rule 8(a) should apply. However, as plaintiffs acknowledge and defendants are quick to point out, the Leatherman Court left open the question of "whether qualified immunity jurisprudence would require a heightened pleading in cases [like the instant matter] involving individual government officials." Id. at 167, 113 S.Ct. 1160.

Whether qualified immunity jurisprudence requires a heightened pleading standard where claims are made against individual government officials has been addressed, and the question answered by the Tenth Circuit in Dill v. City of Edmond, Oklahoma, 155 F.3d 1193, 1204 (10th Cir.1998).

In the context of a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, our review of the qualified immunity defense is limited to the pleadings. See Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473, 1475 (10th Cir.1994). We must construe the allegations in the complaint and any reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, in favor of Plaintiff. Breidenbach v. Bolish, 126 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir.1997). Where a qualified immunity defense is asserted in a 12(b)(6) motion, however, we apply a heightened pleading standard, requiring the complaint to contain "specific, nonconclusory allegations of fact sufficient to allow the district court to determine that those facts, if proved, demonstrate that the actions taken were not objectively reasonable in light of clearly established law." Id. at 1293. After the defense is raised, Plaintiff may amend his complaint to include additional "specific, non-conclusory allegations of fact" sufficient to allow the district court to determine whether Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. In this case, Plaintiff stood on his original complaint and the district court's grant of qualified immunity was based solely on the allegations set forth therein and the arguments raised in the parties' briefs.

Id. As in Dill, plaintiffs in the case before this court did not chose to amend their complaint after the qualified immunity defense was raised. Hence, the allegations contained in the original complaint are the allegations before the court for review.

Whether the complaint states a cognizable substantive due process claim.

The Fourteenth Amendment is phrased as a limitation on the State's power to act; not as a guarantee of certain minimal levels of safety and security. See DeShaney v. Winnebago, 489 U.S. 189, 194-195, 109 S.Ct. 998, 103 L.Ed.2d 249 (1989). There are two exceptions to this rule, however: 1) where a "special relationship" exists between the state and the individual; and 2) where there is a "state-created-danger." Uhlrig v. Harder, 64 F.3d 567, 572 (10th Cir.1995). Plaintiffs have argued both theories of liability.

The court will first address the "special relationship" exception. The general question of whether university school officials and students have a "special relationship" such that there is an affirmative duty to protect and keep free from foreseeable harm in connection with off-campus, extracurricular activities has not been addressed by the United States Supreme Court. In other contexts it has been made clear that an affirmative duty to provide protection to the individual exists only "when the State by the affirmative exercise of its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for his basic human needs — e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable safety...." DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 200, 109 S.Ct. 998. See also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (state must provide adequate medical care to prisoners); Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 314-25, 102 S.Ct. 2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982) (state must protect involuntarily committed mental patients); Revere v. Massachusetts General Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244, 103 S.Ct. 2979, 77 L.Ed.2d 605 (1983) (state has obligation to care for individuals injured while being apprehended by police); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727, 730 (10th Cir.1992) (state compulsory school attendance law did not give rise under the Due Process Clause to an affirmative duty to protect school children who attend state-run schools from constitutional deprivations by private actors because children are still under care and supervision of parents, not state).

In support of their claim that a "special relationship" was present between plaintiffs and defendants, plaintiffs argue that a contractual relationship existed between the decedent's parents and defendants because the Apffel's paid tuition and fees to Dixie College. Plaintiffs claim that arising out of this contractual relationship was an implied-in-fact agreement that defendants would conduct student activities in a reasonably safe environment and manner, particularly since decedent's parents were out of state and unable to personally care for their son. Plaintiffs cite to Hartman v. Bethany College, 778 F.Supp. 286, 291 (N.D.W.Va.1991) for support; however, their reliance is misplaced. Hartman specifically recognizes that the general obligation colleges have to students to maintain a campus environment free of foreseeable harm "has not been extended to non-curricular activities taking place beyond campus boundaries." Id. at 291.

Furthermore, the court found no cases which would support finding a "special relationship" which justifies imposing § 1983 liability on college officials arising out of an implied-in-fact contract to protect college students from injury during extracurricular off-campus activities. To the contrary, there are many cases, including Tenth Circuit precedent, which support a conclusion that no special relationship is created in such situations solely by virtue of the student/university relationship. See Seamons v. Snow, 84 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. 1996) (no "special relationship" exists between public school officials and students by virtue of a state's compulsory attendance laws since a child and parent can still care for the child's needs); Maldonado v. Josey, 975 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.1992) (state compulsory attendance laws did not give rise under the Due Process Clause to affirmative duty to protect); Orr v. Brigham Young University, 960 F.Supp. 1522 (D.Utah 1994) (no special relationship existed between student football player and university since the relationship was not custodial in nature and the player retained his free will and independence). Finally, the court finds the facts and legal analysis contained in Beach v. University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986) highly relevant and its holding persuasive.

The Utah Supreme court held in Beach that there was no "special relationship" between the university and an intoxicated student injured on a university-sponsored field trip sufficient to trigger an affirmative duty to protect. Beach attempted to rely on the university's knowledge of a previous incident involving drinking while on a field trip to create a special duty to supervise her on the evening in question. The court determined that such knowledge created no special duty. Of equal significance to the...