Appeal of Borough of Churchill

• Decision Date: 23 May 1990
• Docket Number: No. 370-N-350,370-N-350
• Citation: 575 A.2d 550,525 Pa. 80
• Parties: In re Appeal of the BOROUGH OF CHURCHILL and the Churchill Area School District (now known as Woodland Hills School District) From the Action of the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on Property Situate in the Borough of Churchill and Owned by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. (Two Cases) In re Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION from Assessment by the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County upon Real Property Located in the Borough of Churchill, Pennsylvania, Block and LotKnown as the Research and Development Center of Westinghouse Electric Corporation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 550

575 A.2d 550

525 Pa. 80

In re Appeal of the BOROUGH OF CHURCHILL and the Churchill Area School District (now known as Woodland Hills School District) From the Action of the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County Pennsylvania, on Property Situate in the Borough of Churchill and Owned by Westinghouse Electric Corporation Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. (Two Cases) In re Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION from Assessment by the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County upon Real Property Located in the Borough of Churchill, Pennsylvania, Block and Lot No 370-N-350 Known as the Research and Development Center of Westinghouse Electric Corporation.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued March 9, 1990.

Decided May 23, 1990.

Philip Baskin, Marvin A. Fein, Dusty L. Elias Kirk, Baskin Flaherty Elliott & Mannino, P.C., Pittsburgh, for appellant.

Robert W. Goehring, Goehring & West, Sol., Borough of Churchill, Thomas M. Rutter, Jr., Goehring, Rutter & Boehm, Sol., Patrick J. Clair, Woodland Hills School Dist., Patrick J. Loughney, Asst. Legal Counsel, Sol., Bd. of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review, Ira Weiss, Asst. Sol., Pittsburgh, for appellees.

Before NIX, C.J., and LARSEN, FLAHERTY, McDERMOTT, ZAPPALA, PAPADAKOS and CAPPY, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PAPADAKOS, Justice.

These are two appeals of Westinghouse Electric Corporation (Appellant) from the orders of the Commonwealth Court quashing the appeals lodged before that court from the Order of the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County denying post-trial relief. 118 Pa.Cmwlth. 152, 544 A.2d 1088.

Appellant is the owner of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation Research and Development Center, located in the Borough of Churchill. The Board of Property Assessment Appeals and Review of Allegheny County established Fair Market Values for Appellant's property for tax years 1977-86 which were appealed to the court of common pleas of Allegheny County by the taxing bodies and the Appellant as provided by the General County Assessment Law Act of May 22, 1933, P.L. 853, as amended, 72 P.S. Section 5020-518.1.

Twelve days of hearings were held before the Honorable Emil E. Narick, former Administrative Judge of the Civil Division, who, on September 24, 1986, and September 30, 1986, issued oral opinions setting forth his findings of fact and conclusions of law and setting the fair market value for the subject property for the tax years in question. Judge Narick also advised the parties that he would issue a written order and file same with the Prothonotary's office and that when the parties filed the transcript with the court they could appeal or file exceptions.

In compliance with the judge's instructions, exceptions were filed by Appellant on October 9, 1986, from the court's oral orders, although a written order was not issued by Judge Narick until October 14, 1986 and not docketed in the Prothonotary's office until October 15, 1986. Exceptions were filed to the docketed order by the Borough of Churchill and the School District of Woodland Hills on October 23, 1986, and all the exceptions were considered by the trial court and dismissed by its order of October 31, 1986.

Appeals to the Commonwealth Court were filed by Appellant on November 13, 1986, from the October 31, 1986 dismissal order of the trial court and the taxing bodies filed their notice of appeal to the Commonwealth Court from the October 31, 1986, order on November 26, 1986. The Commonwealth Court quashed all appeals on July 25, 1988, sua sponte, as untimely because the appeals were not taken from the order of the trial court docketed October 15, 1986, but rather, were taken from the order of October 31, 1986, dismissing the exceptions. In the Commonwealth Court's view, exceptions do not lie in tax assessment cases, because the General County Assessment Law does not call for them, nor do our Rules of Civil Procedure apply to such cases and, finally, because no local rule governs this practice. Given this interpretation, the Commonwealth Court concluded that the order dismissing the exceptions was a nullity and any appeal taken from this order was also a nullity.

We have granted allocatur in these cases to determine whether exceptions lie in tax assessment cases and, more importantly, to clear up the confusion that clearly exists among our various judicial districts regarding this practice.

Our research indicates that over eighty years ago we spoke on the subject of exceptions in assessment cases in Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company's Assessment Appeal, 225 Pa. 272, 74 A. 65 (1909), where we remanded the case to the trial court to consider exceptions which had been filed and not considered. This procedure was reaffirmed in Thompson's Appeal, 271 Pa. 225, 114 A. 774 (1921), where we explained that the practice of filing exceptions in tax assessment appeals was based, in part, as a method to point out mistakes of law or fact to the hearing judge or the full court sitting en banc, and to give the reviewing authority an opportunity to correct those mistakes, before an appeal was lodged. We next had occasion to comment on this practice in the Chester Holding Corp. Appeal, 390 Pa. 152, 134 A.2d 668 (1957), where we endorsed, once again, our expectation that exceptions were permitted in tax assessment cases and further held that whether one judge (the hearing judge) or the full court disposed of the exceptions was a matter of convenience and practice, left to the discretion of each trial court.

In compliance with these holdings, our Commonwealth Court enforced the practice of allowing exceptions to be filed in tax assessment appeals in Hollidaysburg Manor Associates v. Blair County Board of Assessment, 26 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 628, 364 A.2d 959 (1976), and in that case remanded the matter to the trial court to dispose of the exceptions that had been filed but not considered by the trial court.

This practice continued until Ciaffoni v. Washington County Board for Assessment of Appeals, 112 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 135, 535 A.2d 247 (1987), where the Commonwealth Court quashed an appeal filed to it from the denial of "post-trial relief," under the theory that such relief, permitted by our Rules of Civil Procedure 227.1, is inapplicable to tax assessment appeals unless specifically permitted by the statute which creates the right of appeal or local rule. The Court dismissed the Ciaffoni appeal as untimely and applied that reasoning to dismiss appeals to it in CNG Coal Company v. Greene County Board of Assessment and Revision of Taxes, 121 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 443, 551 A.2d 328 (1988), and these appeals. (It is interesting to note that in both cases the Commonwealth Court addressed and resolved the merits in recognition of the possibility that it erred in dismissing the appeals on jurisdictional grounds.)

In Quad Associates v. Blair County Board of Assessment Appeals, 130 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 62, 566 A.2d 1274 (1989), the Commonwealth Court noted that its current interpretation was inconsistent with its own precedent in Hollidaysburg Manor and even noted that the practice of filing exceptions was "eminently sensible" yet felt bound to follow its later line of cases and held Hollidaysburg Manor to be overruled. In spite of this holding, however, the Commonwealth Court reached the merits in Quad Associates because the exceptions in that case were invited by the trial court, which action was considered to be a breakdown in the operation of the court warranting hearing the appeal on a nunc pro tunc basis.

Appellant forcefully argues that the recent line of Commonwealth Court holdings, beginning with Ciaffoni and ending with Quad Associates are aberrations and totally inconsistent with our prior holdings in this area of the law and, therefore, must be reversed. We agree.

The filing of exceptions in tax assessment cases has been an important part of our practice and procedure, as clearly defined in our prior cases, and that when exceptions have been submitted and not disposed of by the trial court, we have not hesitated in remanding to the trial court for consideration and disposition of exceptions in order that the court below may do its full duty in the consideration of the case. Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre.

Our Commonwealth Court recognized that we endorsed this practice in Hollidaysburg Manor and continued to do so until its decision in Ciaffoni where, unfortunately, they felt more honor bound to follow their precedents than ours. Our review of these later cases reveals that they turn on an analysis of whether the Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable and if they are not, then "post-trial" relief pursuant to Pa. Rule of Civil Procedure 227.1, is unavailable to a party, and that, therefore, exceptions cannot be filed in such cases.

Our difficulty with this analysis is that even if we assume that we have never made the Rules of Civil Procedure applicable in tax assessment appeals, why does that mean that exceptions, whether they are designated as such or misnamed as something else, cannot be filed with a court when eighty years of precedent approves of this practice?

The simple answer is that if the Rules of Civil Procedure do not apply to tax assessment appeals, then the former accepted practice acknowledged by this Court is still the rule, and if no precedent exists on the subject, then the practice is left to the discretion of the trial court, which always has the right to regulate the practice and procedure before it.

Our Rules of Civil Procedure are applicable to all actions which were formally asserted in assumpsit or trespass and other forms of action where we incorporate the rules by reference. Pa.R.C.P. 1001. In addition to assumpsit and trespass, we have made the rules applicable to actions in Ejectment (see Rule 1051), actions to Quiet Title (see Rule 1061), Actions in Replevin (see Rule 1071),...