Appleby v. Estates of Appleby
| Decision Date | 28 March 1907 |
| Docket Number | 15,006 - (175) |
| Parties | T.E.W.V. APPLEBY v. Estates of C.D.W. APPLEBY and F. S. WILDER |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
T.E.W Villiers Appleby appealed from a final decree of distribution of the probate court of Ramsey county in the matter of the estates of Cornelia Day Wilder Appleby and Fannie S. Wilder to the district court for Ramsey county, where the judgment of the probate court was substantially affirmed. From an order of Hallam, J., before whom the appeal was tried denying a motion for a new trial, an appeal was taken to the supreme court. Affirmed.
Contract in Restraint of Marriage.
Contracts in restraint of marriage, or which tend to induce a separation of husband and wife, are, on broad grounds of public policy, utterly void.
Antenuptial Contract.
An antenuptial contract contained a provision by which, in consideration of the contemplated marriage and the release and relinquishment by the intended husband of all his rights and interests in and to the property and estate of the intended wife, she agreed to provide from her estate, after her death, an annual income to him of $10,000 so long as he should remain unmarried. This is held not a condition in restraint of marriage, but one limiting the duration of the income, terminable at the voluntary election of the husband.
Antenuptial Contract -- Construction.
An antenuptial contract provided for the income mentioned in the preceding paragraph if the parties were at the time of the death of the wife living and cohabiting together as husband and wife. The contract in this respect is construed, and held not to tend to induce a separation between husband and wife, and therefore valid.
Antenuptial Contract -- Consideration.
The agreement to marry is a sufficient consideration to support an antenuptial contract disposing of and definitely fixing the property rights of the parties.
Antenuptial Contract.
Even though the original engagement of marriage be absolute, and entered into some months preceding the making and signing of the antenuptial contract, the agreement to marry remains a consideration for that contract, and sufficient to support it.
Antenuptial Contract.
Antenuptial contracts in anticipation of marriage, equitably and fairly made, exclude the operation of law in respect to the property rights of each, in so far as covered by the contract.
Antenuptial Contract -- Validity.
The antenuptial contract involved in this case, cutting off the homestead right of appellant and his statutory one-third interest in his wife's property, is not prohibited by statute, and is valid.
Antenuptial Contract -- Construction.
An antenuptial contract, fair and reasonable, respecting the property and property rights of the parties, fully performed by one of the parties after the marriage and before his or her death, will not be held void at the instance of the other party, merely because one of the provisions thereof might be so construed as to have justified the one performing in adopting a course of conduct before death that would render the contract inoperative and of no effect.
Construction of Will.
The will involved in this case, being supplemental to that construed in the case of Watkins v. Bigelow, 93 Minn. 361, by which the "Amherst H. Wilder Charity" was created, construed, and held in all substantial respects similar to the will construed in that case, and not violative of the statute against uses and trusts.
Will -- Equitable Election.
The will devised to appellant certain property, which constituted the homestead of the mother of the testatrix, if at the time of her death she was the owner of the same. Coupled therewith were bequests to her mother, which the mother accepted and received. It is held that, the devise being conditioned upon her ownership of the property, the rule of equitable election, laid down in Brown v. Brown, 42 Minn. 270, did not apply.
Will -- Lapsed Legacy.
The provisions of the part of the will providing for an annual allowance of $5,000 for the care and maintenance of the property referred to in the tenth subdivision of this syllabus were intended by the testatrix for the purpose of maintaining the homestead in suitable condition for occupancy so long as it should be occupied rightfully by appellant; and inasmuch as the right to occupy the same never passed to appellant by the will, it not being the testatrix's property at the time of her death, the provisions for the maintenance thereof lapsed and became inoperative.
Thomas D. O'Brien, A. E. Clarke, and Harris Richardson, for appellants.
The antenuptial contract was void because it tended unreasonably to restrain appellant's second marriage in case of his wife's death, and was consequently contrary to public policy. It contained inducements to postpone appellant's marriage indefinitely. The longer he put off marrying, the more Dr. Appleby would receive. It amounted to a general restraint, because there is no limit within which he may marry. White v. Equitable, 76 Ala. 251; Hartley v. Rice, 10 East, 22; Chalfant v. Payton, 91 Ind. 202; Sterling v. Sinnickson, 5 N.J.L. 756, 871; Baker v. White, 2 Vern. 215; Key v. Bradshaw, 2 Vern. 102; Cook v. Richards, 10 Ves. Jr. 429; State v. Towle, 80 Me. 287; Waters v. Tazewell, 9 Md. 291; Moran v. Stewart, 173 Mo. 207; Clippinger v. Hepbaugh, 5 Watts & S. 315; Stanton v. Allen, 5 Denio, 434.
There are many provisions considered in will cases which are held to be void because in restraint of marriage. Kennedy v. Alexander, 21 App. Cas. D.C. 424; Hoopes v. Dundas, 10 Pa. St. 75; McIlvaine v. Gethen, 3 Whart. 575; Middleton v. Rice, 4 Pa. L.J. 228; Stilwell v. Knapper, 69 Ind. 558; Parsons v. Winslow, 6 Mass. 169; Williams v. Cowden, 13 Mo. 212; Binnerman v. Weaver, 8 Md. 517; Coon v. Bean, 69 Ind. 474; Maddox v. Maddox, 11 Gratt. 804; Otis v. Prince, 10 Gray, 581; Smythe v. Smythe, 90 Va. 638; Marples v. Bainbridge, 1 Madd. 590; Bellairs v. Bellairs, L.R. 18 Eq. 510; Scott v. Tyler, 2 Brown, Ch. Cas. 432; Garret v. Pritty, 2 Vern. 293; Morley v. Renoldson, L.R. 1 Ch. 449; Allen v. Jackson, L.R. 1 Ch. 399; Long v. Dennis, 4 Burr. 2052; Lloyd v. Lloyd, 2 Sim. (N.S.) 255; Randall v. Marble, 69 Me. 310.
The contract was also void on grounds of public policy, because under its provisions, if his wife chose not to live with him he would take nothing, and her estate would gain $10,000 a year. Cartwright v. Cartwright, 22 L.J. Ch. 841; H. v. W., 3 Kay & J. 382; Brown v. Peck, 1 Eden, 140; Randall v. Randall, 37 Mich. 563; Brun v. Brun, 64 Neb. 782; Boland v. O'Neil, 72 Conn. 217; Durant v. Titley, 7 Price, 577; St. John v. St. John, 11 Ves. Jr. 526; Westmeath v. Westmeath, 1 Jacob, 126; Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507. Where a contract belongs to a class which is contrary to public policy it will be declared illegal, as the test is the evil tendency of the contract and not its actual result. Brown v. First National, 137 Ind. 655; Elkhart v. Crary, 98 Ind. 238; Atcheson v. Mallon, 43 N.Y. 147; Tool Co. v. Norris, 2 Wall. 45. Provisions in the contract being void as against public policy, the whole contract is void.
This antenuptial contract was entire, illegality in one part tainted the whole. Handy v. St. Paul Globe Pub. Co., 41 Minn. 188; Todd v. Bettingen, 98 Minn. 170; Houlton v. Dunn, 60 Minn. 26; More v. Bonnet, 40 Cal. 251; Crawford v. Wick, 18 Oh. St. 190; Filson v. Himes, 5 Pa. St. 452; Saratoga v. King, 44 N.Y. 87.
The contract was void for want of a consideration. Antenuptial contracts, as well as other contracts, must have a consideration. Generally, the marriage is said to be the consideration. But in some cases it is not. Moran v. Stewart, 173 Mo. 207.
An antenuptial contract cutting off the third right and the homestead right of a spouse is not authorized in this state, and is void. By the common law no provision made by a man before marriage in favor of his future wife could bar her dower. Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota passed statutes the effect of which was that her dower could be barred, provided the prospective wife was given something equally as good as her dower right. In re Pulling's Estate, 93 Mich. 274; Moran v. Stewart, supra; G.S. 1866, c. 48, § 14, c. 69, §§ 1, 4. The married woman's act of 1869 (Laws 1869, c. 56, § 6) provided that antenuptial contracts were not affected, but it did not repeal the provision of c. 48, § 14, barring dower. But by Laws 1875, c. 40, the right to dower was gone, and in place of it the surviving husband or widow was to have one third of the real estate free from any testamentary disposition to which assent had not been given in writing. This was re-enacted by Laws 1876, c. 37. It means that neither can be deprived of the third right, except by some writing made after they become husband and wife.
The policy of the law gave the third right to the wife, not only on her own account, but on account of the children. The provision was to enable her to care for the children. The state was interested in this as a matter of public policy. That policy demands that the law be so interpreted that men and women in contemplation of marriage, and before they know whether there will be children, cannot cut off rights which were originally given, and have always been maintained, for the benefit of children.
As Dr. Appleby did not consent after marriage to any disposition he still has his statutory third right. Desnoyer v. Jordan, 27 Minn. 295; Hosford v. Rowe, 41 Minn. 245.
When Mrs. Appleby made her will she broke the antenuptial contract by departing from its terms and thus released her husband.
Frank B. Kellogg, C. A. Severance, and Robert E. Olds, for respondents.
The antenuptial contract is valid. Jones v. Jones, 1 Q.B....
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