Appleton v. Board of Education, (AC 17778)
Decision Date | 11 May 1999 |
Docket Number | (AC 17778) |
Citation | 730 A.2d 88,53 Conn. App. 252 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | SANDRA APPLETON v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE TOWN OF STONINGTON ET AL. |
Schaller, Hennessy and Sullivan, Js. Gilbert Shasha, with whom, on the brief, was Juri E. Taalman, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael C. Deakin, with whom, on the brief, was Peter D. Clark, for the appellees (defendants).
The plaintiff, Sandra Appleton, appeals from the judgment rendered following the trial court's granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all three counts of her complaint. The plaintiff brought an action against the defendants, the Stonington board of education (board), Cherri Rifenburg, principal of Deans Mill School, and Anthony Vacca, assistant principal of Deans Mill School,1 alleging breach of contract against the board, intentional infliction of emotional distress against all three defendants, and tortious interference with a contract against the defendants Rifenburg and Vacca. The plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment (1) as to count one of the complaint, because the trial court improperly found that (a) the trial court lacked jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies, (b) the plaintiff voluntarily resigned her position and (c) as a matter of law, there can be no discharge where there has been a resignation, (2) as to count two of the complaint, because the trial court improperly concluded that, because the plaintiff was represented by counsel and voluntarily resigned her position, as a matter of law, she cannot claim intentional infliction of emotional distress and (3) as to count three of the complaint, because the trial court improperly concluded, as a matter of law, that the defendants Rifenburg and Vacca could not tortiously interfere with the contract because they were employees of the board and parties to the contract. We reverse the judgment of the trial court in part and affirm it in part. The following undisputed facts are relevant to this appeal. The plaintiff was a tenured teacher who had a contract with the board that began in 1963. Beginning in September, 1995, Rifenburg voiced her displeasure with the plaintiff because she believed that the plaintiff failed to monitor a student properly concerning attendance at an after school program. The particular incident involved a situation in which one of the plaintiffs students boarded a school bus for home when he was supposed to be attending the after school program. The student's parents, who were not at home at the time, registered a complaint with the school.
Subsequently, the plaintiffs competency as a teacher was questioned by the defendants. On September 15, 1995, Rifenburg and a school psychologist met with the plaintiff in her classroom following a report by another teacher that the plaintiff was acting in a strange manner. During this period, Vacca and Rifenburg expressed concern about the plaintiffs health.
On September 18, 1995, Rifenburg informed the plaintiff that she would be placed on a paid leave of absence. Subsequently, a series of discussions and negotiations arose between the interim superintendent of schools, the board's attorney, counsel for the Connecticut Education Association (CEA), the president of the Stonington Education Association, the plaintiffs union representative and the plaintiff. The plaintiff submitted to two psychological evaluations at the defendants' request. The evaluations indicated that the plaintiff was capable of returning to work. As a result of the negotiations, a memorandum of agreement was drafted and signed by the parties. As part of the agreement, the plaintiff agreed to sign a letter of resignation. On February 5, 1996, the plaintiff submitted a signed letter of resignation to the interim superintendent of schools, which was to be effective in June, 1996, the close of the school year. The plaintiff was allowed to return to work as a curriculum assistant until her resignation was effective.
Zichichi v. Middlesex Memorial Hospital, 204 Conn. 399, 402, 528 A.2d 805 (1987). (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Avon Meadow Condominium Assn., Inc. v. Bank of Boston Connecticut, 50 Conn. App. 688, 692-93, 719 A.2d 66, cert. denied, 247 Conn. 946, 723 A.2d 320 (1998).
The plaintiff first claims that the trial court improperly granted summary judgment on the breach of contract claim. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly determined that it did not have jurisdiction, that she had voluntarily resigned and that, as a matter of law, there can be no discharge when there is a resignation.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly determined that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction to hear the breach of contract claim because the plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies. We agree.
The trial court ruled that To support its conclusion, the court points to the language of article 28, § A, of the collective bargaining agreement. Article 28, § A, lists the items that are not to be considered grievances. Subsection (b) excludes "[a] complaint of a teacher which arises by reason of the termination of his/her employment relationship with Stonington Public Schools...." The terms of the bargaining agreement, therefore, exclude the subject matter of the plaintiffs complaint from the grievance procedures. In her complaint, the plaintiff alleged that the board breached her contract by terminating her without good cause when it suspended her for an indefinite period.
We conclude, therefore, that the collective bargaining agreement did not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to hear the matter. The defendant argues, however, that even if the plaintiffs complaint did not fall within the terms of the bargaining agreement, she was required to follow the tenets of General Statutes § 10-151, the Teacher Tenure Act. Section 10-151 provides for a specific procedure for a tenured teacher to appeal to the board of education to challenge a proposed termination and includes a provision for a hearing before a single hearing officer. We are not persuaded by that argument.
In Geren v. Board of Education, 36 Conn. App. 282, 650 A.2d 616 (1994), cert. denied, 232 Conn. 907, 653 A.2d 194 (1995), this court rejected the plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly denied his motion for a directed verdict because the exclusive forum for determining the voluntariness of a resignation in a breach of an employment contract claim is an administrative hearing pursuant to § 10-151. In Geren, we held that "[t]he determination of voluntariness ... is logically prior to and, thus, outside the scope of a hearing pursuant to § 10-151." Id., 296; see also Mendillo v. Board of Education, 246 Conn. 456, 464-70, 717 A.2d 1177 (1998) ( ). Therefore, the plaintiff would need to follow the tenets of § 10-151 only after an initial determination was made that her resignation was involuntary.
The plaintiff argues that the trial court improperly inferred from the facts that she voluntarily resigned from her position. Specifically, the plaintiff argues that she was placed on paid leave of absence, not allowed to return to her classroom and coerced into signing the agreement and resignation letter, believing that she had no other choice.
In support of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the trial court had before it an agreement and a resignation letter signed by the plaintiff, and evidence that a negotiated settlement existed in which the plaintiff was represented by counsel for the CEA and the president of her local union. Additionally, the plaintiff admitted in her affidavit in support of her objection to the defendant's motion for summary judgment that she intended to retire at the end of the 1996 school year.2 Countering those facts was a statement by the plaintiff contained in her pleadings that she had "reluctantly" signed the agreement.
(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Wellington Systems, Inc. v. Redding...
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