Application Of Dodd.

• Decision Date: 28 June 1945
• Citation: 132 Conn. 237,43 A.2d 224
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: Application of DODD.

132 Conn. 237

43 A.2d 224

Application of DODD.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

June 28, 1945.

Appeal from Superior Court, New London County; Quinlan, Judge.

Proceedings in the matter of the application of Thomas J. Dodd, Jr., for admission to the bar on motion and without examination, wherein William H. Shields, an attorney at law, moved that the application of Dodd be denied, made in the superior court and heard by the court. Judgment denying the motion and granting the application from which William H. Shields appeals. ¹ On appeal, appellant filed a motion to strike out part of appellee's brief, which was denied.

Error, and case remanded with directions.

W. Arthur Countryman, Jr., of Hartford, and Arthur M. Brown, of Norwich, for appellant.

M. J. Blumenfeld, of Hartford, Frank L. McGuire, of New London, and Thomas J. Dodd, Jr., of Hartford, (pro se), for appellee.

Robert P. Butler, of Hartford, and David Goldstein, of Bridgeport, amici curiae in favor of appellee.

David L. Daggett, of New Haven (Richard Hooker, Jr., of New Haven, on the brief) amicus curiae, in favor of appellant.

Before JENNINGS, ELLS, DICKENSON, MUNGER, and COMLEY, JJ. (ROBERT L. MUNGER and WILLIAM H. COMLEY, JJ. of the Superior Court, sat for MALTBIE, C. J., and BROWN, J.)

JENNINGS, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment admitting the applicant to the bar of Connecticut without examination. The five assignments of error amount to a claim that neither the record as a whole nor the report of the committee on recommendations for admission to the bar in particular shows that the applicant has actually practiced for ten years in the highest court of original jurisdiction in South Dakota, as § 8 of the Practice Book requires in his case.

The candidate's application for admission to the bar, signed by him, contains the following statements of fact, admitted to be true for the purposes of this appeal: The applicant was born in Connecticut, the son of parents who were natives of Connecticut, and he lived here until 1933. He was graduated from St. Anselm's Preparatory School, Manchester, N. H., Providence College, Providence, R. I., and the Yale Law School. He resided in St. Louis, Mo., from 1933 to 1934, and in Vermillion, S. D., in 1934. Since 1934 he has resided in Washington, D. C., New Haven, Conn., Bethesda, Md., and Lebanon, Conn. In 1933 he appeared before the committee of the New Haven bar in connection with his application to take the Connecticut bar examination and his application was approved. It is admitted that he failed to pass, although this fact does not appear on the application. He was admitted to the bar of South Dakota on July 24, 1934, to the bar of the Circuit Court of Appeals, Washington, D. C., on March 6, 1940, and to the bar of the United States Supreme Court on March 13, 1940.

In 1934 and 1935 the applicant was engaged in the preparation of cases for trial in the United States Departments of Justice and the Interior; from August, 1935, to October, 1938, he was state director of the National Youth Administration for Connecticut, engaged in administrative-legal work. Since that time he has been a special assistant to the several attorneys general of the United States, exclusively engaged in the preparation and trial of civil and criminal cases on behalf of the federal government in the District Courts of Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Michigan, New Mexico, Indiana, Arkansas, Georgia and the District of Columbia. He has also appeared in the Circuit Courts of Appeal and the United States SupremeCourt. He has acted as chief counsel in more than two hundred and fifty cases.

Affidavits and certificates annexed to the application show that the applicant passed the South Dakota bar examinations and was admitted to, and has since been carried on the rolls of, its integrated bar as an active member. Only active members of the state bar of South Dakota are entitled to practice there. His character references are of the best. The Connecticut state bar examining committee certified that his educational qualifications were such as to entitle him to take the Connecticut bar examination at this time. The committee on recommendations for admission to the Connecticut bar for New London County reported that he met the requirements as to character and general fitness and recommended that his application to be admitted without examination be granted. The bar of New London County accepted this report on November 3, 1944. On December 18, 1944, William H. Shields, an attorney resident in New London County, filed a motion to deny and dismiss the application. On January 17, 1945, the application for admission to the bar was granted and the motion was denied. On January 18, 1945, the applicant took the attorney's oath in open court.

The appellant has filed a motion in this court to strike out parts of the applicant's brief. It is necessary to dispose of this as a preliminary matter. The motion alleges that the applicant's brief contains matters dehors the record. Incidentally, the applicant claimed in oral argument that the appellant's brief contained unjustified innuendo. There is some basis for both claims. As to both, it suffices to say that this court is not interested in innuendo as distinguished from legitimate argument, nor will it regard facts set up in the brief but not contained in the record. To clear the record, the motion is denied.

The facts, detailed at some length above, show that the applicant is fully qualified by character and education for admission to the bar without examination. He has also practiced extensively in the federal courts. Indeed, this is not disputed by the appellant. Few young lawyers could improve on his record in these respects. The only claim that has been or can be made is that the applicant has not actually practiced for at least ten years in the highest court of original jurisdiction in South Dakota within the meaning of the rules of court for the admission of attorneys to practice in Connecticut. General Statutes, § 5343, as amended by Cum.Sup.1935, § 1627c, provides that: ‘The superior court may admit and cause to be sworn as attorneys such persons as are qualified therefor, agreeable to the rules established by the judges of said court * * * and said judges may establish rules relative to the admission, qualifications, practice and removal of attorneys.’ Such rules have the force of statute. The relevant portion of the rules of court, Practice Book, §§ 8, 9, are printed in the footnote. ²

^{“Attempts to define the practice of law}have not been particularly successful. The reason for this is the broad field covered. The more practical approach is to consider each state of facts and determine whether it falls within the fair intendment of the term.' Grievance Committee v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 329, 22 A.2d 623, 625. Practice of law is not confined to practice in court. Id., 128 Conn. at page 330, 22 A.2d 623; Eley v. Miller, 7 Ind.App. 529, 535, 34 N.E. 836. There may be some question whether the experience of the applicant as director of the National Youth Administration for Connecticut was practice of law but, since his application states that his work was ‘administrative-legal,’ it is assumed for the purposes of this opinion that the trial court could reasonably resolve this in favor of the applicant. The issue is thus further narrowed and may be stated as follows: Could the trial court reasonably conclude upon the record before it that the applicant's practice of law constituted actual practice of law in the highest court of original jurisdiction in South Dakota for ten years? The difficulty of the applicant stems from the fact that he did not, so far as appears, try any cases in that court, did not maintain an office in South Dakota and lived there for not more than one out of the ten years. The most that can be said is that he was admitted there to the integrated bar, that he has since been carried on its rolls as an active member and that soon after his admission he entered the federal service where he has practiced law ever since as stated in his application, quoted above.

There is no finding in this case (see In re Summers, 65 S.Ct. 1307), but the memorandum of the trial court may be consulted to determine the basis of its decision. Duggan v. Byrolly Transportation Co., 121 Conn. 372, 375, 185 A. 85. From this it appears that the judgment for the applicant was based on the ground that the findings of the favorable report of the standing committee on recommendations for admission to the bar should stand because they were not attacked as irregular, unfair, or the result of prejudice or ill will, nor of conspiracy (Higgins v. Hartford County Bar Association, 111 Conn. 47, 149 A. 415) nor as being arbitrary or unreasonable or an abuse of their discretionary powers (Blaney v. Standing Committee, 129 Conn. 51, 54, 26 A.2d 354,),' and that in any event the practice of the applicant was actual practice in the courts of South Dakota under the circumstances.

Practice Book, § 9, provides that the committee on recommendations shall report whether the candidate ‘has complied with the rules relating to admission to the bar, is a person of good character and should be admitted.’ Its report in this case failed...