Arangure v. Garland
| Decision Date | 23 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-4025 |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
| Parties | RAMON JASSO ARANGURE, Petitioner, v. MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney General, Respondent. |
Ramon Jasso Arangure lived in the United States as a lawful permanent resident. After he pled guilty to first-degree home invasion, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. But the removal didn't go as planned: DHS failed to show that Jasso was in fact removable, and the immigration judge terminated the proceeding. So DHS tried again. It started a second removal proceeding based on a new legal theory but the same underlying facts. The problem? The doctrine of claim preclusion prevents parties from litigating matters they failed to raise in an earlier case. Because claim preclusion barred the second removal proceeding, we grant the petition for review, vacate, and remand.
Ramon Jasso Arangure is a native and citizen of Mexico. He married a United States citizen and became a lawful permanent resident in 2003. Eleven years later, Jasso pled guilty to first-degree home invasion.[1] See Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.110a(2) (1999).
Shortly after, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal. It argued that Jasso was removable for committing an aggravated felony. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Specifically, DHS argued that Jasso had committed a "crime of violence." See id. § 1101(a)(43)(F) (). The statute defines a crime of violence in two ways: (1) through an elements clause, and (2) through a residual clause. 18 U.S.C. § 16. The immigration judge held that Jasso was removable under the residual clause. But while Jasso's appeal was pending, we determined that the residual clause is unconstitutional. Shuti v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 440, 451 (6th Cir. 2016).
So the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for the immigration judge to consider if Jasso was removable under the elements clause. The immigration judge held that Jasso's conviction did not qualify as a crime of violence under that clause. As a result, he concluded the charge that Jasso had committed an aggravated felony was "not sustained" and terminated the proceeding.
Undeterred DHS tried a different tack: It opened a second removal proceeding and argued that Jasso was instead removable for committing a "burglary offense." See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G) (). Jasso argued that claim preclusion barred the second proceeding, but the immigration judge and the BIA disagreed. Both held that claim preclusion does not apply to removal proceedings.
We reversed. Because Congress legislates against the background of the common law, removal proceedings are subject to the normal rules of claim preclusion. Arangure v Whitaker, 911 F.3d 333, 342-45 (6th Cir. 2018). We then resolved three out of the four elements of claim preclusion in Jasso's favor. Id. at 345-47. But the record was unclear as to whether the parties litigated Jasso's first removal proceeding to a final judgment on the merits. Id. at 347. So we vacated and remanded for clarification from the BIA. Id. at 347-48. On remand, the BIA held that the immigration judge terminated Jasso's removal proceeding without prejudice. Jasso now appeals.
We review the BIA's legal holdings de novo but are "highly deferential" to the BIA's findings of fact. Kilic v. Barr, 965 F.3d 469, 473 (6th Cir. 2020). Claim preclusion applies if Jasso's first removal proceeding (1) was litigated to a final judgment on the merits, (2) arose out of the same factual occurrence as his second removal proceeding, (3) involved the same parties, and (4) was based on the same cause of action. See Montana v United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979). The sole question before us is whether Jasso's first removal proceeding was litigated to a final judgment on the merits. See Arangure, 911 F.3d at 346-47.
As the name suggests, a final judgment on the merits has two components: The judgment is (1) final and (2) on the merits. See 18A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 4432 (3d ed. 2002) (). In the context of claim preclusion, a judgment is final if it "represents the completion of all steps in the adjudication of the claim," Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 13 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1982), "leaving nothing to be done . . . save execution of the judgment," Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 527 (2003). And a judgment is on the merits when it "passes directly on the substance of a particular claim." Semtek Int'l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 501-02 (2001) (cleaned up). Taken together, a final judgment on the merits "signifies the 'death knell' of the litigation . . . permanently foreclos[ing] a party from further advancing a claim or defense." Mitchell v. Chapman, 343 F.3d 811, 821 (6th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted).
Start with finality. Because a judgment without prejudice allows a party to return "to the same court, with the same underlying claim," it is "not truly final." Arangure, 911 F.3d at 347 (cleaned up). As a result, we must determine whether Jasso's first removal proceeding was terminated with or without prejudice.[2]
The problem is that the record is unclear. The immigration judge's decision simply held that Jasso's charge of removability was "not sustained" and terminated the proceeding. A.R. 363. It wasn't until a later hearing that the immigration judge clarified: A.R. 456.
The BIA held that the immigration judge's statement is dispositive. It first determined that immigration judges have discretion to terminate proceedings without prejudice. Then it held that there is no default rule when an immigration judge does not specify a termination's effect. Finally, the BIA determined that, absent a default rule, it must rely upon the immigration judge's statement. We address each of these conclusions in turn.
Discretion to terminate without prejudice.
The BIA's first conclusion is that immigration judges have discretion to terminate removal proceedings without prejudice. The BIA reasoned that because no "provision in the [Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)] or regulations requir[es] an Immigration Judge to designate a termination order as being entered with or without prejudice," an immigration judge must have discretion to choose. A.R. 6.
The BIA's analysis is backwards, but its conclusion is correct. Immigration judges do not have freestanding authority to adjudicate proceedings. See Hernandez-Serrano v. Barr, 981 F.3d 459, 462 (6th Cir. 2020); see also Matter of S-O-G- & F-D-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 462, 465-66 (A.G. 2018). Rather, immigration judges "exercise the powers and duties delegated to them by the [INA] and by the Attorney General through regulation." 8 C.F.R. § 1003.10(b). As a result, it is not enough to determine that the INA and its implementing regulations do not explicitly prohibit an exercise of power; there must be an affirmative delegation of authority.
The INA and its implementing regulations make such a delegation. Among an immigration judge's enumerated powers is the ability to decide removability and terminate removal proceedings. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(1)(A); 8 C.F.R. § 1240.12(c). True, neither the INA nor its implementing regulations specify whether termination must be with or without prejudice.[3] But silence "does not necessarily connote ambiguity." Arangure, 911 F.3d at 338. Rather, Congress legislates "against a background of common-law adjudicatory principles." Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991); see Arangure, 911 F.3d at 342-45 (). As a result, we assume that well-established principles of common law apply unless "a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident." Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (citation omitted).
It is well established that courts at law could render a judgment of nonsuit-the functional equivalent of a dismissal without prejudice. See United States v. Parker, 120 U.S. 89, 95 (1887); Buchholz-Hill Transp. Co. v. Baxter, 206 N.Y. 173, 177 (1912). A nonsuit was "the medium by which the court intimate[d] an opinion that the plaintiff ha[d] not made out a sufficient case for the consideration of the jury." Slocum v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 228 U.S. 364, 393 (1913). Like a dismissal without prejudice, a judgment of nonsuit did not trigger claim preclusion. See id. at 394- 95; see also Note, Developments in the Law of Res Judicata, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 818, 838 (1952). And a nonsuit could be ordered at the court's sole discretion (though it was traditionally available only at the plaintiff's request). See Hopkins v. Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry., 34 S.W. 1029, 1035-37 (Tenn. 1896); Restatement (First) of Judgments § 53 cmt. b (Am. L. Inst. 1942); 1 Walter M. Rose, A Code of Federal Procedure 869 (1907). In short, at common law, courts could terminate cases in the same manner as a dismissal without prejudice.
And there is no "statutory purpose to the contrary." Astoria, 501 U.S. at 108 (citation omitted). We have not identified any provision or function of the INA that a termination without prejudice would contradict,...
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