Arce v. Louisiana, CIVIL ACTION No. 16-14003 SECTION I

• Decision Date: 04 June 2019
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION No. 16-14003 SECTION I
• Parties: NELSON ARCE, ET AL. v. LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Louisiana

NELSON ARCE, ET AL.
v.
LOUISIANA STATE, ET AL.

CIVIL ACTION No. 16-14003 SECTION I

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

June 4, 2019

ORDER & REASONS

This case is before the Court on remand from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit regarding attorneys' fees. For the following reasons, plaintiff Ana Christine Shelton's request for fees and additional costs is granted in part and denied in part, as stated herein.

I.

This action was originally filed by Nelson Arce, a deaf man who was placed on probation in Jefferson Parish after pleading guilty to a drug possession offense in Louisiana state court. In his complaint, Arce alleged that he had limited proficiency in written English and that he communicated primarily in American Sign Language ("ASL"). According to Arce, his probation officer refused to provide him with an ASL interpreter during their meetings.¹ As a result, Arce alleged, he did not understand the terms of his probation and inadvertently violated them.

Beginning in December of 2016, Arce was incarcerated for the probation violation in the Jefferson Parish Correctional Center ("JPCC") for 90 days. Arce alleged that JPCC officials failed to provide him with an ASL interpreter. Because he

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did not have an interpreter to help him review JPCC's inmate handbook, Arce alleged that he did not understand JPCC's rules and regulations and that he was penalized twice for purported violations. After Arce was released from JPCC, his probation officer allegedly again refused to provide him with an ASL interpreter during their meetings.

In August of 2016, Arce and his father sued the State of Louisiana, through the Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections, and Jefferson Parish Sheriff Joseph Lopinto (collectively, the "defendants") for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act.² They sought compensatory damages as well as declaratory and injunctive relief. Early in the litigation, Arce and his father moved for a preliminary injunction against the State of Louisiana, requesting that the Court order the State of Louisiana to provide him with a qualified ASL interpreter during the remainder of his probation meetings and while the case was pending. Before the Court could rule on the motion, the parties reached an agreement, pursuant to which the State of Louisiana would provide Arce with an ASL interpreter during all future probation meetings. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the motion as moot.

For reasons unrelated to this lawsuit, Arce unfortunately passed away in May of 2017, and Ana Christine Shelton, as the administrator of Arce's estate and the mother of his children, was substituted as the plaintiff. Shortly thereafter, the Court

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dismissed all claims for injunctive relief, without opposition, for lack of standing. The case proceeded to trial, the jury finding that both the State of Louisiana and Sheriff Lopinto had intentionally discriminated against Arce in violation of the ADA.³ However, the jury also found that the discrimination had not caused Arce injury and, therefore, it did not award him any compensatory damages. Rather, in accordance with a stipulation among the parties, the Court awarded Shelton nominal damages of $1 as to each defendant.

Shelton moved for an award of attorneys' fees in the amount of $495,853.50. After determining that Shelton was a prevailing party, the Court nonetheless held that special circumstances justified the denial of attorneys' fees because, at trial, Shelton sought solely monetary relief but achieved only nominal damages.⁴ Shelton timely appealed the Court's denial of fees. Upon review, the Fifth Circuit vacated this Court's order and remanded the case for reconsideration. Shelton v. Louisiana, 919 F.3d 325, 331 (5th Cir. 2019). The Fifth Circuit instructed this Court to consider "whether [Arce's, and subsequently Shelton's,] lawsuit achieved a compensable public goal"; however, it expressed no opinion as to the propriety of a fee award. Id.

II.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), provides the legal framework in this matter. Shelton, 919 F.3d at 329. In

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Farrar, the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's denial of attorneys' fees to the prevailing plaintiffs,⁵ who exclusively sought monetary relief but achieved only nominal damages. 506 U.S. at 105-08. The Supreme Court observed that, "[i]n civil rights suits for damages, . . . the awarding of nominal damages [ ] highlights the plaintiff's failure to prove actual, compensable injury." Id. at 115. "When a plaintiff recovers only nominal damages because of his failure to prove an essential element of his claim for monetary relief, the only reasonable fee is usually no fee at all." Id. (citation omitted).

Here, Shelton sought compensatory damages, but she ultimately failed to persuade the jury that Arce suffered any injury arising out of the defendants' discrimination. As a result, she recovered only nominal damages, and "Farrar counsels that denial of attorneys' fees may be appropriate." Shelton, 919 F.3d at 329.

But the Court's inquiry does not end there. "'[E]ven nominal damages can support an award of attorneys' fees' if the litigation 'achieved a compensable goal.'" Id. at 329-30 (quoting Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256, 278 (5th Cir. 2000)). The Fifth Circuit decisions affirming fee awards in these limited cases "have focused on the plaintiff's accomplishments within the litigation itself, such as the deterrent value of a jury verdict or the significance of a new legal precedent." Id. at 331. The Court must therefore determine whether—despite Shelton's failure to establish one of the elements of her claim for monetary damages at trial and her resulting failure to

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achieve more than nominal damages—she nonetheless accomplished a compensable goal that entitles her to attorneys' fees.

III.

Shelton argues that this litigation accomplished two compensable legal: (1) that it set new legal precedent and (2) that she achieved a favorable jury verdict with deterrent effects. With respect to her argument that Arce's lawsuit has generated significant legal precedent, the Court is unpersuaded.

Shelton relies on the fact that this case has been cited twice since trial concluded.⁶ First, in 2016, the plaintiffs in a disability-discrimination action cited this Court in support of their motion for summary judgment.⁷ The plaintiffs argued:

Defendants' failure to provide qualified ASL interpreters to Plaintiffs clearly violates the Rehabilitation Act and ADA. See Arce v. Louisiana, No. 16-cv-14003, 2017 WL 6767200 (E.D. La., Dec. 18, 2018) (finding defendants were liable under [the] Rehabilitation Act and ADA for failing to provide qualified ASL interpreter to hard of hearing offender).

Levy v. La. Dep't of Pub. Safety & Corr., Civil Action No. 16-542 (M.D. La.) R. Doc. No. 55-31, at 15-16. But the Levy plaintiffs' reference is dubious at best. They cited to this Court's one-sentence judgment following the jury's verdict in this matter.⁸ Although the descriptive parenthetical suggests that the Court found that the defendants violated Arce's rights, the Court made no such finding. Rather, the jury made the finding, and the Court entered judgment accordingly.

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Second, another section of the Court recently cited this Court's ruling in response to the motion to dismiss filed by the State of Louisiana in this case.⁹ See Pegues v. Bd. of Supervisors, No. 18-2407, 2018 WL 4076385, at *3 & nn.23, 26 (E.D. La. Aug. 27, 2018) (Morgan, J.). According to Shelton, this Court's order "clarified complex legal issues regarding the Fourteenth Amendment and [s]tate [i]mmunity in the context of ADA Title II cases."¹⁰ Even so, in the portion of this Court's opinion cited by Judge Morgan, the Court did not posit a novel theory or formulate a new approach to the law; it simply summarized the law as it was already firmly established by the Supreme Court. See id. (citing Arce v. Louisiana, No. 16-14003, 2017 WL 5619376, at *22 (E.D. La. Nov. 21, 2017) (Africk, J.)). In the same section of this Court's opinion, the Court did discuss the existence of a circuit split on a particular sub-issue pertinent to the State of Louisiana's motion—perhaps that analysis is the "clarif[cation] of complex legal issues" to which Shelton alludes. But Judge Morgan did not cite this Court for that discussion.

Moreover, the fact that this Court's ruling has been cited once by another court does not demonstrate that Shelton achieved a compensable legal goal. This cannot be what the Fifth Circuit intended when it spoke of rewarding the creation of "significant legal precedent." Cf. Hopwood v. State of Tex., 999 F. Supp. 872, 878 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 1998), aff'd in part and reversed in part, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (explaining that the plaintiffs achieved a declaration by the Fifth Circuit that the University of

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Texas at Austin School of Law's use of racial preferences served no compelling state interests under the Fourteenth Amendment, a significant legal precedent).

Shelton also argues that it was necessary to obtain a jury verdict in her favor in order to deter further ADA violations by the defendants. According to Shelton, both defendants denied any wrongdoing up until, and through, trial.¹¹ As a result, Shelton argues, the verdict was pivotal to holding the defendants accountable for discrimination and protecting similarly situated deaf and hard-of-hearing individuals in the future.¹² Shelton also argues that Arce's lawsuit was the "primary impetus" behind substantial policy changes implemented by each defendant.¹³

In response, the defendants argue that the jury verdict is simply too vague to serve as a deterrent.¹⁴ They contend that the verdict in this matter resembles the verdict in Farrar, which the Supreme Court described as "accomplish[ing] little beyond giving petitioners 'the moral...