Archdiocese v. Moersen

• Decision Date: 14 June 2007
• Docket Number: No. 69 September Term, 2005.,69 September Term, 2005.
• Citation: 925 A.2d 659,399 Md. 637
• Parties: ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON, et al. v. William T. MOERSEN.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

925 A.2d 659

399 Md. 637

ARCHDIOCESE OF WASHINGTON, et al. v. William T. MOERSEN.

No. 69 September Term, 2005.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 14, 2007.

Emmet T. Flood (Lisa M. Duggan and Jeb Boatman of Williams & Connolly, LLP, Washington, DC), on brief, for Petitioners.

L. Jaenette Rice (Walsh, Becker, Spears & Moody, Bowie, MD), on brief for Respondent.

ARGUED BEFORE BELL, C.J., RAKER, WILNER^*, CATHELL, HARRELL, BATTAGLIA and GREENE, JJ.

BELL, Chief Judge.

The central issue in this case involves whether an organist for a Catholic church falls within the Title VII "ministerial exception," a legal exception carved out in deference to the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment that precludes government interference, or judicial involvement, in the employment decisions of religious organizations. We shall hold that, under the facts of this case, an organist holding a position similar to that occupied by the respondent does not come within the ministerial exception. Thus, he may prosecute a Title VII claim.

A.

The First Amendment, as relevant, provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof...." U.S. Const., Am. I. These religious prohibitions are applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 876-77, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1599, 108 L.Ed.2d 876, 884 (1990). See also Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303, 60 S.Ct. 900, 903, 84 L.Ed. 1213, 1217-18 (1940); Levitsky v. Levitsky, 231 Md. 388, 396-97, 190 A.2d 621, 625 (1963); Craig v. State, 220 Md. 590, 599, 155 A.2d 684, 690 (1959). The free exercise clause prohibits government regulation of religious beliefs. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 219, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1535, 32 L.Ed.2d 15, 27 (1972). Legitimate claims to free exercise, however, can be outweighed by government interests, albeit only those of the highest importance. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-15, 92 S.Ct. at 1532-33, 32 L.Ed.2d at 23-25.

The free exercise protection is also present in Article 36 of the Declaration of Rights of the Maryland Constitution. It provides, as relevant, that:

"... all persons are equally entitled to protection in their religious liberty; wherefore, no person ought by any law to be molested in his person or estate, on account of his religious persuasion, or profession, or for his religious practice, unless, under the color of religion, he shall disturb the good order, peace or safety of the State, or shall infringe the laws of morality, or injure others in their natural, civil or religious rights; nor ought any person to be compelled to frequent, or maintain, or contribute, unless on contract, to maintain, any place of worship, or any ministry. . ."

The Free Exercise Clause, as embodied in the U.S. Constitution and Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, does not provide "a constitutional right to ignore neutral laws of general applicability," even when such laws have, as an incidental effect, the burdening of a particular religious activity, however. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 513, 117 S.Ct. 2157, 2161, 138 L.Ed.2d 624, 634 (1997). See also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531, 113 S.Ct. 2217, 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d 472, 489 (1993); Employment Div., Ore. Dept. of Human Res., 494 U.S. at 892, 110 S.Ct. at 1607, 108 L.Ed.2d at 894; Levitsky, 231 Md. at 396-397, 190 A.2d at 625; Craig, 220 Md. at 599, 155 A.2d at 689.

Under the Free Exercise Clause, strict scrutiny is used to evaluate whether laws target religious practices or impose burdens, motivated by religious belief, on conduct. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 531-32, 113 S.Ct. at 2226, 124 L.Ed.2d at 489. Moreover, the Supreme Court has noted that:

"[A] spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no improper methods of choice are proven, we think, must now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of religion against state interference."

Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church, 344 U.S. 94, 116, 73 S.Ct. 143, 154-155, 97 L.Ed. 120, 136-137 (1952).

The Supreme Court has made clear that the church can self-govern beyond the reach of judicial power. See, e.g., N.L.R.B. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490, 504, 99 S.Ct. 1313, 1320, 59 L.Ed.2d 533, 543 (1979) (holding that, because of a potential conflict with the First Amendment, the National Labor Relations Act did not apply to teachers in church-operated schools). Federal courts have reinforced that message. See, e.g., Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir.2000) (holding that, in matters of church governance and administration, the government shall not interfere); Bollard v. California Province of Society of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940, 945 (9th Cir.1999) (holding that the "Free Exercise Clause restricts the government's ability to intrude into ecclesiastical matters or to interfere with a church's governance of its own affairs"); Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343, 348 (5th Cir.1999) (noting that the Free Exercise Clause protects a church from government interference with church management); E.E.O.C. v. Catholic University of America, 83 F.3d 455, 463 (D.C.Cir.1996) (holding that the Free Exercise Clause "guarantees a church's freedom to decide how it will govern itself").

Employment decisions typically are governed by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (1964). That Title makes unlawful any employment practice that discriminates on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (a) carves out a statutory exception, however. That exception is for:

". . . an employer with respect to the employment of aliens outside any State, or to a religious corporation, association, educational institution, or society with respect to the employment of individuals of a particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corporation, association, educational institution, or society of its activities."

(Emphasis added). This "exception" for religious organizations also is embodied in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (e), which provides:

"(2) it shall not be an unlawful employment practice for a school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning to hire and employ employees of a particular religion if such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is, in whole or in substantial part, owned, supported, controlled, or managed by a particular religion or by a particular religious corporation, association, or society, or if the curriculum of such school, college, university, or other educational institution or institution of learning is directed toward the propagation of a particular religion."

(Emphasis added).

The exception for religious organizations and their employment relationships with persons performing religious duties was considered by the Supreme Court in Corporation of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336, 107 S.Ct. 2862, 2868, 97 L.Ed.2d 273, 283 (1987). Supporting the exception, it explained:

"[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright one, and an organization might understandably be concerned that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it understood to be its religious mission."

See also Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1303-1304 (holding that government interference with clergy employment matters violates the Free Exercise Clause); Combs, 173 F.3d at 350 (holding that the judiciary could not rule on an employment decision concerning a minister without violating the Free Exercise Clause).

This Court, in addition to recognizing the Title VII exception insulating religious organizations from sanction for discrimination when making employment decisions, based on religious beliefs, even with respect to the protected classes of race, color, sex, and national origin, the other protected classes, has recognized that under Title VII, "the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment precludes the application of these Title VII provisions to employment decisions by religious organizations concerning ministers, teachers, and other employees whose duties are `integral to the spiritual and pastoral mission' of the religious organization." Montrose Christian School Corporation v. Walsh, 363 Md. 565, 590, 770 A.2d 111, 126 (2001), quoting E.E.O.C. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, N.C., 213 F.3d 795, 797 (4th Cir. 2000). Other courts have done so as well. See Little v. Wuerl, 929 F.2d 944, 951 (3rd Cir.1991) (holding that a parochial school teacher could not, because of the exception, file a Title VII claim even though she was discharged because she remarried); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360, 363 (8th Cir.1991) (holding that, in a gender discrimination action, a chaplain at a church hospital could not file a Title VII claim). In other words, engrafting a ministerial exception onto the Title VII protected classes allows the church significant latitude in its employment decisions when the employee in question has duties that are integral to the religious mission.

The "ministerial exception to Title VII," as it is known, applies to any employee whose "primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith, church...