Archer v. Johnson, 34997
| Citation | 90 Ga.App. 418,83 S.E.2d 314 |
| Decision Date | 25 June 1954 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,No. 34997,34997,1 |
| Parties | ARCHER v. JOHNSON |
| Court | United States Court of Appeals (Georgia) |
Syllabus by the Court.
The plaintiff's evidence was sufficient to prove his case as laid, and the trial court erred in granting the nonsuit.
Claud A. Archer filed his petition claiming damages from D. G. Johnson and Aristocrat Ice Cream Company. Subsequently Aristocrat Ice Cream Company was stricken as a defendant, and the case proceeded to trial against Johnson alone. The petition of Archer as amended, alleged that, at the time complained of, the plaintiff was a deputy sheriff commissioned and acting under the direction of Johnson who was sheriff of Floyd County; that the automobile in which they were riding was owned and operated in connection with the duties of Johnson and petitioner, and other deputy sheriffs about the official duties and business of the sheriff's office. Title to the automobile was registered in the name of Johnson but actually belonged and was owned by petitioner, Johnson and Elex Lindsey, another deputy sheriff; that petitioner as deputy sheriff was at all times under the direction, control and subject to the orders of the defendant Johnson as sheriff; as a part of their duties they were to investigate reports of crime in the county and arrest persons charged and connected therewith.
That Maple Street is a main street and highway in said county, between Rome and Lindale both in said county and is also known as the Lindale Highway; it is paved approximately 20 feet in width with a shoulder on either side thereof, and runs in a generally north and south direction. The place of business of Aristocrat Ice Cream Company is on the east side of the highway and to the left in going from the city of Rome in the direction of Lindale.
That the defendant Johnson told petitioner he had received a call from Lindale of a shooting that had taken place there and for petitioner to accompany him in response to a call, and in response to this direction, he got into the automobile which was driven by Johnson, petitioner occupying the right hand side thereof and next to Johnson; that they proceeded along Maple Street in response to this call traveling at a rate of speed of approximately 80 miles per hour. That a truck of the Aristocrat Ice Cream Company was being driven along said street in a southerly direction toward Lindale, and when it reached the point approximately in front of the place of business of Aristocrat Ice Cream Company the driver and operator turned the same to the left and into the path of the approaching automobile being driven by Johnson, and as a result the truck and automobile collided and petitioner was injured in certain ways and manners which are not necessary to describe for determining the question now before this court. That the siren on the automobile of Johnson was being sounded, making a loud noise, and indicated the approach of the sheriff's car, and that it was on an official trip, and was traveling at a high and rapid rate of speed. That the automobile of Johnson was being driven at such a high and rapid rate of speed that upon seeing the truck being turned to the left and in its path, the brakes thereon were applied, and the same skidded 182 and 1/2 feet before striking the truck with tremendous force practically demolishing the automobile in which petitioner was riding.
It was further alleged that Maple Street is used by all traffic and travel between Rome and Lindale, Rome being a city of approximately 30,000 inhabitants and Lindale having approximately 6,000 inhabitants and as a result the traffic and travel is extremely heavy and particularly at approximately 6 p.m.; that there are dwellings and places of business all the way from Rome to Lindale on either side of the street and particularly at the place where the collision occurred, there being driveways into said dwellings and places of approach and driveways into said places of business, and as a result automobiles are constantly turning from the street into the driveways and approaches.
That the driving of said automobile by said defendant Johnson at the time and place and at a rate of speed alleged was without due regard for the safety of persons using the highway, and was in reckless disregard of the safety of petitioner.
It was further alleged that Johnson was guilty of negligence per se, in that he was operating said automobile in violation of laws of the State of Georgia and in excess of 55 miles per hour; that he is guilty of negligence in driving said automobile at said high rate, rapid and illegal rate of speed without anticipating that the other vehicle would turn to the left and into the path of said automobile and in driving said automobile at a high and rapid rate of speed of 80 miles per hour.
Johnson filed his demurrer to the petition, both general and special, and upon hearing had the same was overruled, and there is no exception before this court as to the overruling of this demurrer. Defendant filed an answer in which he admmitted most of the allegations of the petition but he denied that the plaintiff was acting under the direction of the defendant but says he was only carrying out sworn duties of his office as deputy sheriff and that he gave the plaintiff no direction or orders to accompany him, but simply stated the facts, and the plaintiff did accompany the defendant. He further alleged that he was only traveling at 65 miles per hour, and says that the red blinker light on his automobile and siren were both being operated, and that the truck of the Aristocrat Ice Cream Company was pulled to his left directly in the path of the defendant's automobile; that he did apply the brakes to his automobile but that, on account of the failure of the Ice Cream Company to signal his intention to pull into the left lane of traffic, the defendant did not have sufficient time to avoid striking the truck of the ice cream company.
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