Ard v. People

• Decision Date: 07 July 1919
• Docket Number: 9029.
• Citation: 66 Colo. 480,182 P. 892
• Parties: ARD v. PEOPLE.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

182 P. 892

66 Colo. 480

ARD v. PEOPLE.

No. 9029.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

July 7, 1919

Error to District Court, Logan County; H. P. Burke, Judge.

Sam Ard was convicted of operating a motor vehicle without having it registered with the Secretary of State, in violation of Motor Vehicle Act 1913,§ 1, and he brings error. Affirmed.

Munson & Munson, of Sterling, for plaintiff in error.

Leslie E. Hubbard, Atty. Gen., and Charles Roach, Asst. Atty. Gen for the People.

ALLEN J.

The plaintiff in error was convicted in the district court of Logan County on a charge of violating section 1 of the Motor Vehicle License Act (chapter 114, Session Laws of 1913). The information alleges, in substance, that he operated a motor vehicle 'without having said motor vehicle registered with the Secretary of State.' The evidence shows, and it is conceded, that the defendant operated a motor vehicle without having procured a license, and that he refused to take out a license.

The assignments of error, as argued, raise only questions pertaining to the constitutionality of the Motor Vehicle Act of 1913, above cited.

The first contention of the plaintiff in error is that the act violates section 25 of article 5 of the Constitution of Colorado, which prohibits the general assembly from passing any local or special law. In this connection, the plaintiff in error claims that the act 'places a burden upon one class of persons, while it exempts others similarly situated,' and that 'it is class legislation.'

This contention is based solely on the construction which the plaintiff in error places upon the statute, which is that it exempts from licensing those motor vehicles which are of 20 horse power and also those of 40 horse power. If such construction is not correct, and if the act places the requirement for license upon all motor vehicles including those of 20 and those of 40 horse power there is no occasion for considering the constitutional question above mentioned; nor is it contended that in that event the statute would be class or special legislation.

The language of the act which gives rise to the foregoing question of construction is found in section 2 thereof, where it is provided that a license fee of $2.50 shall be paid 'for motor vehicles of up to twenty horse power, five dollars for motor vehicles of twenty-one horse power and less than forty horse power inclusive; and ten dollars for motor vehicles of forty-one horse power and over.'

The plaintiff in error insists that the phrase 'up to twenty horse power' excludes vehicles of 20 horse power, and that no provision is made for licensing motor vehicles of 20 horse power, since the statute next provides for a fee for registering motor vehicles of 21 horse power or over. In other words, it is claimed that the word 'to,' in the expression above quoted, is a word of exclusion.

The meaning of the word 'to' is to be ascertained from the reason and sense in which it is used. Stough v. Reeves 42 Colo. 432, 437, 95 P. 958. Whether the word will be held to be one of exclusion or inclusion is usually determined by the context of the statute, and will be held to include or exclude as the evident intention of the Legislature requires. State v. Benson, 21 Wash. 365, 370, 58 P. 217. Tested by these rules, the word 'to,' as used in the statute in question, is undoubtedly a term of inclusion, and the statute must be construed as if it expressly and unequivocally required a registration fee for all motor vehicles; the fee of $2.50 being fixed for all motor vehicles of up to and 'including' 20 horse power. One of the purposes of the statute was to require the registration of 'all' motor vehicles that shall be operated or driven upon the streets or highways. This purpose is indicated by the title of the act, and is also evidenced by various provisions of the statute. It also follows from these considerations that the provision for a license fee 'for motor vehicles of twenty-one horse power and less than forty horse power inclusive' includes motor vehicles of 40 horse power.

It is next contended that the Motor Vehicle Act of 1913 'violates section 3, article 10, of the state Constitution of the state of Colorado, requiring uniformity in taxation, and requiring taxes to be based upon a just valuation.' The constitutional provision or section thus referred to provides as follows:

'All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax, and shall be levied and collected under general laws, which shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation for taxation of all property, real and personal.'

This section of the state Constitution refers solely to 'taxation' according to the commonly accepted meaning of that term, by assessment, levy, and collection, and does not apply to license or registration fees. In Denver city Ry Co. v. Denver, 21 Colo....