Arellano v. City of San Diego
Decision Date | 18 April 2022 |
Docket Number | D078442 |
Parties | RAUL ARELLANO, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF SAN DIEGO et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court No 37-2016-00016908-CU-PO-CTL of San Diego County, Ronald L Styn, Judge.
Raul Arellano, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Mara Woodworth Elliot, City Attorney and Tyler Louis Krentz Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent, City of San Diego.
Dean Gazzo Roistacher and Lee H. Roistacher, Joseph Michael Radachonski for Defendant and Respondent, City of El Cajon.
Lonnie Eldridge, County Counsel and Joshua Michael Heinlein, Senior Deputy Counsel, for Defendant and Respondent, County of San Diego.
Plaintiff and appellant Raul Arellano, a self-represented litigant who is incarcerated in state prison, appeals from a judgment entered after the trial court sustained without leave to amend demurrers by defendants and respondents City of San Diego (San Diego), City of El Cajon (El Cajon) and County of San Diego (County) to Arellano's operative second amended complaint. [1] The court ruled Arellano failed to allege compliance with claims presentation requirements of the Government Claims Act ( ), and that he had not demonstrated the so-called "prison-delivery rule" extended to those requirements. It entered judgment in defendants' favor. Arellano challenges the court's ruling, and asserts the court made other errors. We reject his challenge to the order sustaining the demurrers without leave to amend, and hold he has forfeited his remaining arguments. We affirm the judgment.[3]
When reviewing a judgment entered on a demurrer sustained without leave to amend, the appellate court usually assumes the truth of properly pleaded facts alleged in the plaintiffs operative complaint. (Mathews v. Becerra (2019) 8 Cal.5th 756, 768; Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512.) Here, Arellano's operative second amended complaint mainly consists of arguments and legal conclusions, making it difficult to cull material factual allegations. That pleading incorporated Arellano's first amended complaint, so we view those allegations as well. Arellano does not acknowledge or set out the pertinent standard of review, and there is no indication in his brief that he has summarized the material allegations of his pleadings. The general background facts of the incident are ultimately not dispositive on our review of defendants' demurrers.[4]
Arellano's original May 2016 lawsuit alleged he suffered personal injuries at the hands of law enforcement officers during his November 2010 arrest and while in county jail, causing him to suffer seizures and emotional distress. Defendants filed demurrers, including on grounds Arellano did not state viable causes of action against them under the Act as government entities, and failed to allege compliance with the claims presentation requirement of the Act. The trial court agreed with these arguments and sustained the demurrers, granting Arellano 60 days leave to amend. Arellano eventually filed a document entitled "serving 3 defendants with 2nd Amended Complaint dated Dec 14, 2018" as well as a Judicial Council form pleading and handwritten attachment labeled as a second amended complaint. The court deemed that September 2019 pleading as Arellano's operative second amended complaint.
Arellano's operative second amended complaint purported to set forth causes of action for assault and battery, negligent supervision and retention, intentional infliction of emotional distress, excessive force, gross negligence, and violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1) based in part on allegations that officers used deadly force to arrest him. Arellano alleged he complied with Government Claims Act requirements by submitting his claim within six months of the incident, addressing it to the public agencies' principal offices, and giving his notice of claim to another inmate who gave it to an officer who collects the mail to be sent out.
Defendants again filed demurrers, on grounds, among others, that Arellano failed to file a claim as required by the Act. The trial court sustained the demurrers, ruling the operative complaint did not allege facts sufficient to establish compliance with the Act:
'"' " '" (Mathews v. Becerra, supra, 8 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Our primary task is to determine whether the facts alleged provide the basis for a cause of action against defendants under any theory. (Alliance Mortgage Co. v. Rothwell (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1226, 1232; Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1019.)
"Although we review the complaint de novo,' "[t]he plaintiff has the burden of showing that the facts pleaded are sufficient to establish every element of the cause of action and overcoming all of the legal grounds on which the trial court sustained the demurrer, and if the defendant negates any essential element, we will affirm the order sustaining the demurrer as to the cause of action. [Citation.] We will affirm if there is any ground on which the demurrer can properly be sustained, whether or not the trial court relied on proper grounds or the defendant asserted a proper ground in the trial court proceedings."' [Citation.] It is the trial court's ruling we review, not its reasoning or rationale." (Kahan v. City of Richmond (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 721, 730.)
On appeal, a judgment or an order is presumed to be correct, and Arellano as the party challenging the judgment must affirmatively show error. (E.g., Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1140-1141; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1133; Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) To meet this burden, he must provide cogent legal argument in support of his claims of error with citation to legal authority. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Sims v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1059, 1081.) Absent these required matters, the point is forfeited. (Sims, at p. 1081; People v. Stanley (1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 793.)
California's Government Claims Act authorizes limited liability for injuries suffered as a result of the acts or omissions of public entities or their employees. (§§ 815.2, 815.6.) A person seeking to maintain an action against a public entity must comply with a written claims procedure as a condition precedent. (J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214, 1219.) "Generally speaking, no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented until a written claim has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board." (Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1776; § 945.4.)
A claim for personal injury against a government entity "shall be presented as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 915) not later than six months after the accrual of the cause of action." (§ 911.2, subd. (a); City of Stockton v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 730, 737-738; Andrews v. Metropolitan Transit System (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 597, 604-605.) Section 915 requires a claim to be delivered to, mailed to, or actually received by the "clerk, secretary or auditor [of the public entity]" or to the "governing body at its principal office" within the allotted time. (§ 915, subds. (a), (e); DiCampli-Mintz v. County of Santa Clara (2012) 55 Cal.4th 983, 990 (DiCampli-Mintz); Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 770.) That section "reflects the Legislature's intent to precisely identify those who may receive claims on behalf of a local public entity." (DiCampli-Mintz, at p. 992.) If a claim is misdirected but actually received by a statutorily designated recipient, it will satisfy the presentation requirement. (Ibid.) But "[i]f an appropriate public employee or board never receives the claim, an undelivered or misdirected claim fails to comply with the statute." (Ibid.) Addressing a claim to the wrong entity will not constitute substantial compliance...
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