Arellano v. Hodge
| Decision Date | 30 July 2018 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 14-cv-00590-JLS-JLB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
| Parties | RAUL ARELLANO, JR., Plaintiff, v. OFFICER HODGE, et al., Defendants. |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Plaintiff Raul Arellano Jr., a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on November 18, 2016, alleging civil rights violations pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants J. Chau, M. Glynn, D. Hodge, F. Sedighi, K. Seeley, P. Velardi, and L. Zamora. (ECF No. 126.) Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 164.) Plaintiff opposes Defendants' motion. (ECF Nos. 191, 195.)
The Court submits this Report and Recommendation to United States District Judge Janis L. Sammartino pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 72.1 of the Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. After a thorough review of the parties' moving and supporting papers, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 164) be GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiff initiated the present suit by filing a complaint in this Court on March 13, 2014. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff filed a Third Amended Complaint on July 16, 2015, naming J. Chau, M. Glynn, D. Hodge, F. Sedighi, K. Seeley, P. Velardi, and L. Zamora as defendants. (ECF No. 59.) On October 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss the claims asserted in the Third Amended Complaint against Defendants Glynn and Seeley. (ECF No. 63.) On December 21, 2015, Defendants also moved to dismiss the claims in Plaintiff's Third Amended Complaint asserted against Defendant Zamora. (ECF No. 69.) On September 9, 2016, the Honorable Janis L. Sammartino adopted in full this Court's Report and Recommendation on Defendants' motions to dismiss. (ECF No. 116.) Judge Sammartino dismissed with prejudice Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment claims against Defendants Glynn, Seeley, and Zamora, and dismissed without prejudice and with leave to amend Plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment claims against Defendants M. Glynn, K. Seeley, and D. Zamora. (Id.) Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint on November 18, 2016. (ECF No. 126.)1
On November 11, 2017, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment seeking judgment against Plaintiff on all claims. (ECF No. 164.) Plaintiff filed an Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on March 20, 2018. (ECF No. 191.) On March 26, 2018, Defendants filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Opposition. (ECF No. 192.) On April 9, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Sur-Reply to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and Reply. (ECF No. 195.)
Plaintiff names Correctional Officer Hodge, Nurse Practitioner Velardi, Doctors Sedighi and Chau, and Executive Officers Seeley, Glynn, and Zamora as defendants. (ECFNo. 126 at 2.)2 In his complaint, Plaintiff alleges the following: On March 3, 2012, while Plaintiff was incarcerated at Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility ("RJDCF"), Officer Hodge moved Plaintiff from a lower bunk to an upper bunk despite Plaintiff's protests that he had a lower bunk chrono and suffered from seizures and other medical issues. (Id. at 6.) Plaintiff alleges that prior to being forced to move, he showed Officer Hodge a lower bunk medical chrono and told Hodge that he had a seizure disorder. (Id.) Within days of moving to an upper bunk, Plaintiff claims to have suffered a seizure, fallen from the bunk, and injured his back. (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Officer Hodge's conduct violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 6-7.)
Plaintiff reports that he was abused by officials in Mexico prior to his incarceration in the United States. (ECF No. 126 at 11-12.) As a result of this abuse, Plaintiff alleges that he experiences seizures and suffers from nerve damage, among other health issues. (Id. at 12.) Plaintiff was prescribed Gabapentin in county jail and for a period of time at Calipatria State Prison, before being transferred to RJDCF. (Id. at 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that after he arrived at RJDCF he was prescribed medications other than Gabapentin, which did not properly treat his seizure disorder or severe pain. (Id. at 13-23.) Plaintiff asserts Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment claims against his medical providers, Doctor Sedighi, Doctor Chau, and Nurse Practitioner Velardi, for the medical care they provided. (Id.)
Lastly, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants Seeley, Glynn, and Zamora failed to properly review his grievances and appeals relating to the above allegations and failed to take action to relieve his pain and suffering, amounting to violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Id. at 23-39.)
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show that, as to any claim or defense, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled tojudgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 empowers the Court to enter summary judgment on factually unsupported claims or defenses, and thereby "secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of any genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party can satisfy this burden by demonstrating that the nonmoving party failed to make a showing sufficient to establish an element of his or her claim on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Id. at 322-23. If the moving party fails to bear the initial burden, summary judgment must be denied and the court need not consider the nonmoving party's evidence. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159-60 (1970).
If the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the burden shifts to the nonmoving party who "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)). The nonmoving party may not rely on allegations in the complaint, but "must come forward with specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 587 (emphasis in original) (internal citation omitted). "By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). "An issue of material fact is genuine 'if there is sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the non-moving party.'" Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010) (quoting Long v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006)). If the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing of an element of its case, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325.
At summary judgment, it is not the Court's function "to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249. Inferences drawn from the underlying facts must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 588.
Each party's position as to whether a fact is disputed or undisputed must be supported by: (1) citation to particular parts of materials in the record, including but not limited to depositions, documents, declarations, or discovery; or (2) a showing that the materials cited do not establish the presence or absence of a genuine dispute or that the opposing party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). The Court may consider other materials in the record not cited to by the parties, but it is not required to do so. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(3); Carmen v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 237 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2001) (). If a party supports its motion by declaration, the declaration must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters stated. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4).
Ordinary pro se litigants, like other litigants, must comply strictly with the summary judgment rules. Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir. 2010). Pro se inmates are, however, expressly exempted from strict compliance with the summary judgment rules. Id. Courts should "construe liberally motion papers and pleadings filed by pro se inmates and should avoid applying summary judgment rules strictly." Id. In addition, the Court may consider as evidence all contentions "offered [by a plaintiff] in motions and pleadings, where such contentions are based on personal knowledge and set forth facts that would be admissible in evidence, and where [the plaintiff] attested under penalty of perjury that the contents of the motions or pleadings are true and correct." Jones v. Blanas, 393 F.3d 918, 923 (9th Cir. 2004). This approach "exempts pro se inmates from strict compliance with the summary judgment rules, but it does not exempt them from allcompliance." Soto v. Sweetman, 882 F.3d 865, 872 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Blaisdell v. Frappiea, 729 F.3d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original)).
As an initial matter, Defendants argue that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claims against Defendants Sedighi, Chau, and Velardi...
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