Arevalo v. Colorado Department of Human Services, 01CA0769.

• Docket Nº: No. 01CA0769.
• Citation: 72 P.3d 436
• Case Date: May 08, 2003
• Court: Court of Appeals of Colorado

72 P.3d 436

Jessie AREVALO; Lindsey Griffith; Bill Pemberton; Robert D. Yeager; Lawrence C. Stapleton; Elain Lamm, by her next friend Argentina Stein; Lash L. Jackson; and Kathy Edminston, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiffs-Appellees,
v.
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN SERVICES and Marva Hammons, in her official capacity as the executive director of the Colorado Department of Human Services, Defendants-Appellants

No. 01CA0769.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. II.

May 8, 2003.

72 P.3d 437

Law Office of Kathleen Mullen, P.C., Kathleen Mullen, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiffs-Appellees

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Wade S. Livingston, First Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-Appellants.

Opinion by Judge NEY.

Defendants, Colorado Department of Human Services and Marva Hammons, in her official capacity as the Executive Director of the department, appeal several orders of the trial court in favor of the plaintiff class. We dismiss the appeal in part and otherwise affirm.

The history of this class action litigation is set forth in Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions, 764 P.2d 785 (Colo.1988), and Goebel v. Colorado Department of Institutions, 830 P.2d 1036 (Colo.1992).

In 1994, the parties entered into a settlement agreement, which was approved by the court. At the same time, the parties prepared a services plan, which detailed the services to be provided to plaintiffs.

In 1997, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce specific provisions of the settlement agreement and the services plan. The trial court initially concluded that defendants' obligations under the services plan that were not contained in the settlement agreement were not specifically enforceable, and it limited plaintiffs' enforcement action to defendants' obligations contained in the settlement agreement.

Plaintiffs appealed this order, pursuant to a C.R.C.P. 54(b) certification. A division of this court reversed the trial court and held that obligations contained in the services plan were also specifically enforceable. See Arevalo v. City & County of Denver, (Colo.App. No. 98CA0349, July 1, 1999)(not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(f)).

However, pending that appeal, the trial court retained jurisdiction over the obligations under the settlement agreement that it had concluded were specifically enforceable.

On October 20, 1999, the trial court ordered defendants to specifically perform several obligations required by the settlement agreement, including obligations not raised in plaintiffs' initial motion. The trial court denied defendants' motion to certify this order under C.R.C.P. 54(b) because the ruling did not finally dispose of a single claim for relief and the certification would fracture and complicate the case further.

On March 31, 2001, the trial court, upon plaintiffs' motion, found defendants in contempt for failing to abide by the terms of the October 20, 1999 order. In the same order and in response to the opinion of a division of this court, the trial court ordered defendants to perform the obligations under the services plan that had not been previously considered by the trial court.

Subsequent to the March 31, 2001 order, based on evolving facts, the trial court issued further orders that modify, add, and vacate defendants' responsibilities pursuant to the settlement agreement.

I.

Defendants contend the trial court erred in ordering specific performance in both the October 20, 1999 and March 31, 2001 orders. We decline to address this argument because we conclude that these orders are not final and therefore we are without jurisdiction to consider them.

Our jurisdiction is limited to the review of final orders. Section 13-4-102(1), C.R.S. 2002; C.A.R. 1(a).

The parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon this court by their consent. Sanchez v. Straight Creek Constructors, 41 Colo.App. 19, 580 P.2d 827 (1978).

A trial court and an appellate court cannot hold concurrent jurisdiction to determine substantive matters that directly affect the judgment of the trial court. See People v. Dillon, 655 P.2d 841 (Colo.1982).

Accordingly, we must determine whether the trial court's orders of specific performance were final and invest us with jurisdiction to consider their contents, or

72 P.3d 438

whether those orders were not final and left the trial court with jurisdiction to modify them. We conclude that the orders of specific performance were not final and that the trial court retained jurisdiction over their substantive contents

The enforcement proceedings in the trial court are based on the terms of the settlement agreement. The agreement provides that, "if the plaintiffs believe that ... Defendants have failed to substantially perform their obligations ... the plaintiffs may apply to the Court for a hearing to enforce the obligation(s)." It continues:

If, after hearing, the Court finds that ... one or more of defendant(s) have failed to substantially comply, the Court shall issue an Order directing

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