Arici v. Scharf

• Decision Date: 23 June 2021
• Docket Number: 2019–09391,Index No. 58806/18
• Citation: 146 N.Y.S.3d 508 (Mem),195 A.D.3d 925
• Parties: In the Matter of Adem ARICI, respondent, v. Jared SCHARF, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

195 A.D.3d 925

146 N.Y.S.3d 508 (Mem)

In the Matter of Adem ARICI, respondent,

v.Jared SCHARF, appellant.

2019–09391

Index No. 58806/18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—June 1, 2021

June 23, 2021

Jared Scharf, Rye Brook, NY, appellant pro se.

Law Office of Michael H. Joseph, PLLC, White Plains, NY, for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, ANGELA G. IANNACCI LINDA, CHRISTOPHER, JJ.

DECISION & ORDER

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5222–a(d), Jared Scharf appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Charles D. Wood, J.), dated July 12, 2019. The order denied his motion pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate an order of the same court dated April 5, 2019, after a hearing, granting the petition, inter alia, to restrain funds in certain of his bank accounts to satisfy a money judgment in favor of the petitioner and against him in the total sum of $1,835,283.33.

ORDERED that the order dated July 12, 2019, is affirmed, with costs.

On April 24, 2018, a judgment was entered in favor of Adem Arici and against Jared Scharf in the total sum of $1,835,283.33. Arici commenced this proceeding pursuant to CPLR 5222–a(d). On October 3, 2018, both parties participated in a hearing pursuant to CPLR 5222(d) before the Supreme Court on the issue of whether funds in certain bank accounts of Scharf were exempt from execution. Following that hearing, by order dated April 5, 2019, the court determined that the funds in question were not exempt from execution, and granted the petition, inter alia, to restrain funds in certain of Scharf's bank accounts to satisfy the money judgment. Scharf did not appeal from that order.

By notice of motion dated April 25, 2019, Scharf moved pursuant to CPLR 5015 to vacate the April 5, 2019 order. In an order dated July 12, 2019, the Supreme Court denied Scharf's motion to vacate. Scharf appeals.

The Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in denying Scharf's motion to vacate the April 5, 2019 order. Scharf failed to establish that any of the enumerated grounds set forth in CPLR 5015(a) entitle him to vacatur of the April 5, 2019 order. In addition to the grounds specifically set forth in CPLR 5015(a), "a court may vacate its own [order or] judgment for sufficient reason and in the interests of substantial justice" ( Woodson v. Mendon Leasing Corp., 100 N.Y.2d 62, 68, 760 N.Y.S.2d 727, 790 N.E.2d 1156 ; see Cox v. Marshall, 161 A.D.3d 1140, 1141, 78 N.Y.S.3d 212 ). This discretion, however, "is reserved for unique or unusual circumstances that warrant such action" ( Pennymac Corp. v. Sellitti, 193 A.D.3d 959, 960, 142 N.Y.S.3d 842 [internal quotation marks omitted]). Here, "the circumstances presented were not unique or unusual and did not warrant the invocation of a court's inherent power to vacate an order in the interests of substantial justice" ( Cox v. Marshall, 161 A.D.3d at 1142, 78...