Aries Dev. Co. v. California Coastal Zone Conservation Com.

• Decision Date: 28 May 1975
• Citation: 122 Cal.Rptr. 315,48 Cal.App.3d 534
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: ARIES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, etc., Respondent and Appellant. ARIES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, etc., Respondent and Appellant, Richard E. Charles and Ruth J. Charles, Movants and Appellants. Civ. 13781, 13818.

Page 315

122 Cal.Rptr. 315

48 Cal.App.3d 534

ARIES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, etc., Respondent and Appellant.

ARIES DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, etc., Petitioner and Respondent, v. CALIFORNIA COASTAL ZONE CONSERVATION COMMISSION, etc., Respondent and Appellant, Richard E. Charles and Ruth J. Charles, Movants and Appellants.

Civ. 13781, 13818.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

May 28, 1975.

Hearing Denied July 23, 1975.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Carl Boronkay, Asst. Atty. Gen., Roderick Walston, Richard C. Jacobs and Charles W. Getz, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent and appellant.

Cooper, Wyatt, Tepper & Plant, Joseph L. Wyatt, Jr. and Mark Wurm, Los Angeles, for movants and appellants.

Barrett, Stearns, Collins, Gleason & Kinney and William N. Willens, Torrance, for petitioner and respondent.

OPINION

TAMURA, Associate Justice.

These are appeals from actions of the superior court on a petition for writ of mandate filed by Aries Development Company (Aries) to review and set aside a decision of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Commission (Commission) denying Aries' claim of exemption from the permit requirements of the California Coastal Zone Conservation Act of 1972 (Coastal Act).

The Commission appeals from a judgment granting Aries a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the Commission to enter a decision recognizing Aries' claim of exemption. Richard E. Charles and Ruth J. Charles (the Charles) are owners of property adjacent to Aries' proposed development. Although they appeared in opposition to Aries before the Commission, they were not initially made parties to the mandate proceeding. However, they made a motion in the court below to vacate the judgment and have appealed from an order taking the motion 'off calendar.' We have ordered consolidation of the two appeals for briefing, argument and disposition.

The question presented by these appeals is whether the trial court erred in concluding that Aries is entitled to develop a parcel of land in the City of San Clemente (City) without a coastal permit. ¹ The property, a 1.26 acre parcel, is located on a marine terrace overlooking the Pacific Ocean and lies within the permit area as defined by the Coastal Act. The chronology of the pertinent events is as follows:

In July 1972, Aries made arrangements to purchase the property for $225,000, the price including architectural and engineering plans for the construction of 64 apartment units on the site for which City approval had been previously obtained. However, instead of constructing apartments, Aries wanted to build condominiums. During July and August 1972, Aries had architectural and engineering feasibility studies made for the construction of 45 condominium units on the site.

In September 1972, Aries submitted to the City Planning Commission a use permit application, accompanied by a site plan, and a tentative tract map.

On October 5, 1972, title to the property vested in Aires and a $1,778,082 construction loan was recorded against it.

On October 11, 1972, the Planning Commission approved the use permit application, site plan, and tentative tract map.

On October 13, 1972, Aries obtained a permit for the demolition of an existing residential structure and for rough grading and completed the work authorized under the permit shortly thereafter.

On October 18, 1972, the City Council approved the use permit application and site plan but deferred action on the tentative tract map.

On October 25, 1972, the Planning Commission accepted and approved an environmental impact report (EIR) on the project submitted by Aries.

On November 1, 1972, the City Council took the following pertinent actions: (1) It adopted a resolution establishing interim requirements and procedures for the preparation and submission of environmental impact studies on all projects within the City; (2) it approved Aries' tentative tract map; and (3) it ordered the EIR on Aries' project be set for public hearing at the next council meeting.

On November 6, 1972, Aries received a grading permit limited to the proposed underground parking structure.

On November 7, 1972, the Coastal Act was approved by the voters of the state.

On November 7, 1972, the City Council held a public hearing on the EIR for Aries' project and approved the same.

On December 14, 1972, an amended limited grading permit was issued for the underground parking structure.

On or about December 15, 1972, Aries was notified it must comply with the seismic safety element of the City's General Plan.

On January 23, 1973, a building permit for construction of the condominiums was issued.

On April 13, 1973, redesigned structural plans to satisfy the seismic safety element were approved by the City.

Actual construction of the condominiums commenced on or about April 13, 1973, and continued until the Regional Coastal Commission demanded Aries either secure a coastal permit or an exemption.

Thereafter Aries submitted an exemption application and an application for a permit with the Regional Commission. The Regional Commission denied the exemption and Aries appealed that decision to the Commission. Subsequently the Regional Commission granted the permit application and the Charles appealed that decision to the Commission. The Commission denied both the permit and the claim of exemption.

The only issue raised by the petition for writ of mandate was Aries' entitlement to exemption from the permit requirements of the Coastal Act; the petition did not seek judicial review of the permit denial.

The trial court made findings of fact and concluded that by virtue of Public Resources Code ² sections 27400 and 27404 and 'constitutional and common law principles of vested rights,' Aries was exempt from the permit provisions of the Coastal Act and the Commission's denial of the claim of exemption constituted prejudicial abuse of discretion. Judgment was entered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue commanding the Commission to vacate its former decision and enter a decision recognizing the claim of exemption.

Following entry of judgment, the Charles who until then were not parties to the mandate proceeding moved to vacate the judgment. After the motion was filed, but before it was heard, the Commission filed its notice of appeal from the judgment. When the motion came on to be heard, it was ordered off calendar on the ground the movants had no standing in the case.

The Commission contends the trial court erred in concluding Aries had a vested right or statutory entitlement to construct its project without a coastal permit. The Charles contend they became parties of record by filing a motion to vacate the judgment and therefore have standing to attack the judgment for errors of law as well as on jurisdictional grounds. They assail the judgment on basically the same grounds advanced by the Commission. ³

From the analysis which follows, we have concluded: (1) The Charles have standing to attack the judgment for errors of law and (2) the trial court erred in determining Aries was exempt from the permit requirements of the Coastal Act.

I

We first deal with the Charles' standing to attack the judgment for errors of law.

One who is legally aggrieved by a judgment may, though not initially a party to the action, become a party of record and obtain a right to appeal from the judgment by moving to vacate the judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 663. (County of Alameda v. Carleson, 5 Cal.3d 730, 736, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953; Luckenbach v. Laer, 190 Cal. 395, 212 P. 918. She Eggert v. Pac. States S. & L. Co., 20 Cal.2d 199, 201, 124 P.2d 815; Elliott v. Superior Court, 144 Cal. 501, 509, 77 P. 1109; 6 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed., 1971) Appeal, § 115, p. 4115.) A person whose rights or interests are injuriously affected by the judgment is a person aggrieved. (County of Alameda v. Carleson, Supra, 5 Cal.3d at p. 737, 97 Cal.Rptr. 385, 488 P.2d 953.)

As property owners residing in the immediate vicinity of the proposed development, the Charles have an interest in the enforcement of land use laws affecting the quality of the neighborhood. (See Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal.3d 541, 99 Cal.Rptr. 745, 492 P.2d 1137; Residents of Beverly Glen, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 34 Cal.App.3d 117, 109 Cal.Rptr. 724; Tustin Heights Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors, 170 Cal.App.2d 619, 636, 339 P.2d 914.) The Charles were parties to the proceedings before the Commission and successfully opposed Aries' claim of exemption. Had the Commission decision been adverse to them, the Charles would have had the right to a judicial review of that decision. (§ 27424. ⁴ See Tustin Heights Assn. v. Bd. of Supervisors, Supra, at p. 636, 339 P.2d 914.) Clearly they were injuriously affected by the judgment annulling the favorable Commission decision. We find no merit in Aries' contention that, although the Charles might have had standing if the issue had been its right to a permit, they have no standing on the issue of exemption. Indeed, given the greater potential for injury, their interests intensify where the issue is one of total exemption from the Coastal Act rather than entitlement to a permit. (See Pettitt v. City of Fresno, 34 Cal.App.3d 813, 822--823, 110 Cal.Rptr. 262.)

Aries contends that the notice of appeal filed by the Commission after the Charles' motion to vacate was filed, but before it could be heard, deprived the Charles of the right to appeal. The contention is without merit. The Charles having become parties of record by filing their motion to vacate, their right of appeal could not be destroyed by the fact that a subsequent event over which they had no control may have divested the court of jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the motion. The right accrued when the motion to vacate was ordered off calendar on the ground the movants lacked...