Scott v. City of Indian Wells

• Citation: 6 Cal.3d 541,492 P.2d 1137,99 Cal.Rptr. 745
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Decision Date: 27 January 1972
• Parties: , 492 P.2d 1137 Mary Lou SCOTT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF INDIAN WELLS et al., Defendants and Respondents. L.A. 29904. In Bank

Page 745

99 Cal.Rptr. 745

6 Cal.3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137

Mary Lou SCOTT et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF INDIAN WELLS et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L.A. 29904.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

Jan. 27, 1972.

Albert S. Scott, Jr., Claremont, in pro. per.

David J. Erwin, Indio, for defendants and respondents.

PETERS, Justice.

Plaintiffs Mary Lou and Albert Scott filed an action on behalf of themselves and other similarly situated landowners against the City of Indian Wells, California, seeking a declaratory judgment voiding the city's grant of a conditional use permit to construct a large planned development on land lying just within the city limits. Plaintiffs and the class they represent own neighboring land lying just outside the city limits. A demurrer to plaintiffs' first amended complaint was sustained without leave to amend, and plaintiffs have appealed from the ensuing judgment.

The pertinent allegations of the complaint may be summarized as follows: Plaintiffs Mr. and Mrs. Scott own a 200-foot by 200-foot parcel of land the southern edge of which abuts the northern limits of the City of Indian Wells. In November 1969 the city sent notice of hearing before the city planning commission to consider the granting of a conditional use permit to construct a planned development (two golf courses, tennis courts, clubhouses, 675 condominium units, 90 individual lots) within the city on land which abuts Scott's property and which was formerly zoned R--1, single family, single story residences. ¹ Notice of hearing was mailed to Scott by mistake; no other abutting property owners residing outside the city limits were so notified of the hearing.

Scott inspected the public site plan of the proposed development and sent a letter to the planning commission well in advance of the meeting, suggesting certain restrictions on the development which would protect the view of property owners to the north of the development. Scott received no reply to this letter. At the hearing, when the commission chairman asked his clerk whether letters had been received, the clerk did not admit that Scott's letter had been received.

Scott attended the hearing of November 18, 1969. At that time Scott was first made aware that the development would include a heliport, several two-story buildings, and one six-story building. He also learned at that time that his neighboring property owners had not been given notice of the hearing.

At the hearing the architect explained that the development would be 'indigenous' to a neighboring country club development in the city. Taller buildings and commercial shops would be placed behind a hill, so that they would not be visible to members of the adjacent El Dorado Country Club. These buildings would, however, directly block the view of Scott and his neighbors. The architect refused to answer Scott's question as to why the development could not be made 'indigenous' to his residential area as well. Scott was allowed to speak, but the planning commission members did not respond to Scott's objections to the development and apparently ignored him.

On December 4, 1969, Scott appeared at the city council meeting at which the planning commission's recommendation to grant the permit was approved. Scott asked to have a petition opposing the development, bearing 45 signatures (all apparently nonresidents of Indian Wells but owners of property within 300 feet of the development), read into the record. This request was refused, and '(s) aid petition was totally ignored . . .' ²

Throughout these proceedings, plaintiffs allege, the city 'pursued a deliberate course of not giving notice (to plaintiffs and their class) to conceal their plans from interested northern area adjacent property owners, . . .' Plaintiffs cite municipal code sections which require that notice of hearing relating to a conditional use permit application be mailed to all landowners within 300 feet of the parcel under consideration. ³

Finally, plaintiffs alleged that the project plans 'deliberately discriminate against plaintiffs and similarly situated property owners . . . (and) in favor of the property of owners of Eldorado Country Club' by proposing to build a seven-story apartment building, liquor store, rental office, and heliport in a location quite close to plaintiffs' property but out of sight of the country club. Plaintiffs contended that the project could be built in such a way so as not to impinge on the view or tranquility of either group of landowners.

Defendant city demurred generally and specially, alleging that (1) the complaint did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; (2) plaintiffs had not alleged exhaustion of their administrative remedies; and (3) the complaint was uncertain. In support of the first ground the city argued in its points and authorities that (a) the complaint argued conclusions of law rather than fact, and (b) plaintiffs, as nonresidents, had no standing to sue. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on the first ground specified, finding it unnecessary to rule upon defendant's other contentions. The court did not state whether it sustained the demurrer on defendant's theory (a) or (b) set forth above, or on some other basis.

Preliminarily, it must be noted that plaintiffs sued only for declaratory relief. An action for declaratory relief may not be used to attack an administrative order. (Hostetter v. Alderson, 38 Cal.2d 499, 500, 241 P.2d 230; Triangle Ranch, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 135 Cal.App.2d 428, 434, 287 P.2d 537.) Review of planning commission proceedings regarding a conditional use permit is appropriate under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1094.5. (Triangle Ranch, Inc. v. Union Oil Co., Supra, 135 Cal.App.2d 428, 434, 287 P.2d 537; Mid-Way Cabinet, etc., Mfg. v. County of San Joaquin, 257 Cal.App.2d 181, 191, 65 Cal.Rptr. 37; Cal. Zoning Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar. 1969) § 12.11, p. 508.) ⁴ 'As against a general demurrer, however, it is unimportant that plaintiff's pleading was not in form a petition for mandamus or certiorari. All that is required is that plaintiff state facts entitling him to some type of relief, and if a cause of action for mandamus or certiorari has been stated, the general demurrer should have been overruled. (Citations.)' (Boren v. State Personnel Board (1951) 37 Cal.2d 634, 638, 234 P.2d 981, 983.) Accordingly, an action for declaratory relief to review an administrative order should be regarded as a petition for a writ of mandate for purposes of ruling upon a general demurrer. (Id.; Hostetter v. Alderson, Supra, 38 Cal.2d 499, 500, 241 P.2d 230.)

Defendant city contends, as it did before the trial court, that '(p)laintiff has no standing as a nonresident nontaxpayer to challenge the zoning and use decisions of the defendant.' In accord with this position the city further contends that '(i)t is not possible or constitutionally required that the ordinances of the City apply to areas outside of the City. The zoning ordinances are not designed to provide protection to nonresidents' property located outside the City, but rather for the benefit of residents.'

Whether a nonresident but obviously affected landowner has standing to contest a city's zoning, and whether the city owes the nonresident adjacent landowner any duty to consider his views or the effect of a proposed development upon his property, has not previously been settled in our state. ⁵ States which have considered the issue have generally held that affected property owners or residents have standing to contest a municipality's zoning even though they are not residents of the municipality. In the leading case of Cresskill Borough v. Dumont Borough (1953) 28 N.J.Super. 26, 100 A.2d 182, affirmed (1954) 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441, the Cresskill Borough and some of its residents brought suit to contest Dumont's rezoning of a parcel of Dumont property surrounded by non-Dumont land. The surrounding land was residential; Dumont attempted to zone its land for commercial use. The lower court, in holding the zoning void, held that 'the restrictions and regulations in a zoning ordinance must be made with reasonable consideration to the character of the land and also to the character of the neighborhood lying along the border of the municipality adopting the ordinance.' (28 N.J.Super. 26, 43, 100 A.2d 182, 191.)

On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed. Said the court: 'The appellant (contends) that the responsibility of a municipality for zoning halts at the municipal boundary lines without regard to the effect of its zoning ordinances on adjoining and nearby land outside the municipality. Such a view might prevail where there are large undeveloped areas at the borders of two contiguous towns, but it cannot be tolerated where, as here, the area is built up and one cannot tell when one is passing from one borough to another. . . . At the very least Dumont owes a duty to hear any residents and taxpayers of adjoining municipalities who may be adversely affected by proposed zoning changes and to give as much consideration to their rights as they would to those of residents and taxpayers of Dumont. To do less would be to make a fetish out of invisible municipal boundary lines and a mockery of the principles of zoning.' (15 N.J. 238, 247, 104 A.2d 441, 445; italics added.)

In Koppel v. City of Fairway (1962) 189 Kan. 710, 371 P.2d 113, a Kansas statute gave landowners in the front and rear of the subject property the right to be heard. The Kansas Supreme Court interpreted the statute to apply to all Affected property owners, not only to affected property owners who were also residents of the City of Fairway. The Colorado Supreme Court came to the same conclusion without benefit of statute (Roosevelt v. Beau Monde Co. (1963) 152 Colo, 567, 384 P.2d 96), reasoning that the nonresident neighboring landowners would be just as affected by...