Arkansas Central Railroad Company v. Smith
Citation | 71 S.W. 947,71 Ark. 189 |
Parties | ARKANSAS CENTRAL RAILROAD COMPANY v. SMITH |
Decision Date | 17 January 1903 |
Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Appeal from Sebastian Circuit Court, Greenwood District, STYLES T ROWE, Judge.
Affirmed.
STATEMENT BY THE COURT.
J. H Smith was the owner of a tract of land in Sebastian county across which the Arkansas Central Railroad Company desider a right of way. On the 31st of July, 1897, Smith and his wife executed a deed conveying a right of way to the company. This deed recites "That for and in consideration of a depot at Spring Hill or in the vicinity, by December, 1898 otherwise this deed is to be null and void, we, Johnson H. Smith and Willie G. Smith, his wife, have granted, bargained and sold, and be these presents hereby grant, bargain, sell and convey unto the Arkansas Central Railroad Company, its successors, the following described real estate for right of way for its proposed railroad." Then follows a description of the land conveyed and other formal parts of the deed not material to be set out here. The railroad was constructed as proposed, and the company established a usual stopping place for trains at or near Spring Hill, which is a small hamlet with only one or two stores, but erected no depot building or platform there, and kept no agent there to receive freight or sell tickets. It built a side track there, and has continued to receive passengers and freight.
Afterwards Smith brought this action to recover five hundred dollars damages for the right of way, alleging that defendant had failed to erect the depot as required in the deed. On the trial there was a verdict and judgment in favor of plaintiff for the sum of $ 250, from which the company appealed.
Judgment affirmed.
Oscar L. Miles, for appellant.
The deed shows no condition, but a consideration which has been performed. 45 N.Y. 514; 7 Wall. 290; 43 Ia. 498; 29 Ia. 255; 59 Ark. 65; 8 Blackf. 290; 16 Pa.St. 140; 96 Mo. 174; 89 Ind. 375.
Hill & Brizzolara, for appellee.
Spring Hill was not a railroad station. 64 N.H. 596; 35 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 529; 40 Am. & Eng. R. Cas. 18; 133 Ind. 69; 33 S.W. 939; 140 U.S. 304; 25 Grant Ch. (U. C.) 64; 20 Id. 16. Whether the condition in the deed was a subsequent or precedent one makes no difference. 3 Ark. 252; 26 Ark. 617; 28 Ark. 48; 59 Ark. 66; 55 Ark. 360; 152 U.S. 444; Rapalje & Mack, Ry. Law, 472-6; 1 Jones, Real Prop. §§ 715-18; 2 Pin. Real Est. §§ 736-746. It was proper to recover damages in this action. 44 Ark. 258, 360; 54 Ark. 140.
RIDDICK, J., (after stating the facts.)
The main question presented in this case is whether the defendant company has complied with the contract in reference to placing a depot at Spring Hill. If it has not done so, the plaintiff is entitled to his judgment. Now, it is a little difficult to determine exactly what was meant by the expression for and in consideration "of a depot at Spring Hill" found in the deed, for the term "depot" may mean one thing or another, under different circumstances. It may mean a house for the storage of freight and the accommodation of passengers, or it may mean a place where railroad trains regularly come to a stop for the convenience of passengers and for the purpose of receiving and discharging freight, or may include all of these things. Its meaning must be determined in each instance from the contract and the circumstances under which it is used.
Though we feel some doubt about the matter, yet after considering the evidence, we are of the opinion that the consideration recited in the deed called for something more than a mere stopping place where passengers and freight were received and discharged. The term "depot" usually includes not only the idea of stopping place, but also that of a building or something of the kind for protection and convenience of passengers and freight. Cent. Dict., Webster's Dict.
We think that was the meaning of the term as used in this deed and...
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