Arlington Hotel Company v. Fant

• Citation: 4 S.W.2d 7,176 Ark. 613
• Decision Date: 12 March 1928
• Docket Number: 279
• Parties: ARLINGTON HOTEL COMPANY v. FANT
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

4 S.W.2d 7

176 Ark. 613

ARLINGTON HOTEL COMPANY v. FANT

No. 279

Supreme Court of Arkansas

March 12, 1928

Appeal from Garland Circuit Court; Earl Witt, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

Martin Wootton & Martin, for appellant.

Cockrill & Armistead and Murphy & Wood, for appellee.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

Three suits were begun in the Garland Circuit Court against the appellant, and were consolidated by order of the court, and tried together. The suits were to recover compensation for loss of baggage which was destroyed in the fire on April 5, 1923, when the Arlington Hotel was burned.

This is the second appeal in this case. The decision on the former appeal is in 170 Ark. 440, 280 S.W. 20. When the suits were first brought in the Garland Circuit Court the court sustained a demurrer to the complaints of the plaintiffs, and, when the case was here before, the court said that the demurrers presented a question, first, whether or not the courts of this State have jurisdiction to enforce civil liability which accrued within territory over which exclusive jurisdiction has been ceded by the State to the United States Government; and second, whether or not a statute regulating civil liability, enacted after a cession of jurisdiction, is applicable to causes of action arising within that territory. And on the questions above mentioned, which were passed upon by this court in the former appeal, the decision on the former appeal is the law of the case on second appeal.

The court on the former appeal, after stating the questions raised by the demurrer, said:

"Our conclusion in regard to the first question is that the courts of this State are not deprived, by the State's cession to the General Government of exclusive jurisdiction, of the right to exercise judicial power in the enforcement of rights of action in civil matters which accrue in the ceded territory. We are not dealing with a local action, such as one which concerns the title to real estate, and what we say now must, of course, be confined to the character of action involved in these appeals. These are transitory actions which may be enforced anywhere that jurisdiction can be acquired over the person of the defendant. * * * The power of the State and General Government over ceded territory has been discussed at length by the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in several cases."

The court then cites the cases that have discussed this question. Again the court said: "The next question presented is one which necessarily arises, but which counsel for appellee disclaims being presented in the present status of the case."

This second question is whether or not the statute regulating civil liability enacted after the cession of jurisdiction is applicable to causes of action arising within that territory. The court, it will be observed, held that this question necessarily arose, and it was stated: "We think it is equally clear that the statute was inoperative. The cession of jurisdiction was necessarily one of political power, and...