Armendariz v. State
Decision Date | 12 November 1975 |
Docket Number | No. 50508,50508 |
Citation | 529 S.W.2d 525 |
Parties | Jose ARMENDARIZ, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Jay L. Nye, El Paso, for appellant.
Steve W. Simmons, Dist. Atty., John P. Bradford, Asst. Dist. Atty., El Paso, Jim D. Vollers, State's Atty., and David S. McAngus, Asst. State's Atty., Austin, for the State.
DAVIS, Commissioner.
Appeal is taken from a conviction for possession of heroin. Punishment, enhanced under the provisions of V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(d), was assessed at life.
The indictment alleged the primary offense occurred on or about April 6, 1974, and the record reflects that trial was in October, 1974.
Appellant contends that V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(d) 'is being selectively applied by the District Attorney's Office of El Paso County, Texas, by using unjustifiable standards, arbitrary classifications which result in intentional and purposeful discrimination, thus depriving Appellant of his right to equal protection and due process under the law.'
V.T.C.A. Penal Code, Sec. 12.42(d) provides:
'If it be shown on the trial of any felony offense that the defendant has previously been finally convicted of two felony offenses, and the second previous felony conviction is for an offense that occurred subsequent to the first previous conviction having become final, on conviction he shall be punished by confinement in the Texas Department of Corrections for life.'
Appellant made a motion to quash the indictment, and at a hearing out of the presence of the jury testimony was elicited from the prosecutor that where pen papers were not available a defendant is normally indicted for the primary offense. If pen papers are subsequently obtained and a disposition of the case has not been made, 'the normal procedure will be if there is to be a trial that the man be re-indicted as a habitual.' It was further developed in the instant case that plea bargaining on the original indictment charging the primary offense had broken down and appellant was re-indicted as an habitual. The district attorney stated that the time in obtaining pen papers varies and 'many times the State is forced to trial by an alert defense attorney prior to the time that the pen papers are available and therefore prior convictions cannot be alleged in the indictment because they cannot be proved.' Appellant points to the testimony of the prosecutor relative to four cases where individuals, who had prior convictions, were not indicted under the appropriate habitual statute (since 1972).
The burden of showing intentional and purposeful discrimination in application of the law against an individual to prove denial of the process is a heavy one.
In Super X Drugs of Texas, Inc. v. State, 505 S.W.2d 333 ( ), it was stated:
Many cases are collated under Art. 63, V.A.P.C., 1 the forerunner of the present statute, which reflect that the State often encounters insurmountable problems in proving prior convictions under the habitual statutes. In addition, defects in prior convictions, such as the absence of counsel to represent an indigent defendant, often render prior convictions unusable. These factors would appear to further complicate the problem of showing 'actual and purposeful discrimination.'
We are not persuaded by appellant's additional argument that 12.42(d), supra, permits the arbitrary infliction of cruel and unusual punishment with no standards or guidelines and is thereby violative of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution under the United States Supreme Court holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct. 2726, 33 L.Ed.2d 346.
In Thrash v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 500 S.W.2d 834, this Court quoted from Cherry v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 447 S.W.2d 154, where it was stated:
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Satterwhite v. State
...him. A discriminating purpose will not be presumed; a showing of clear intentional discrimination is required. Armendariz v. State, 529 S.W.2d 525 (Tex.Cr.App.1975); S.S. Kresge Co. v. State, 546 S.W.2d 928 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1977); Super X Drugs of Texas, Inc. v. State, 505 S.W.2d 333 ......
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...several cruel and unusual punishment claims. See Thomas v. State, 543 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Armendariz v. State, 529 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975); Thrash v. State, 500 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Arriaga cites to no cases holding that the use of a juv......
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Gamble v. State, No. 01-06-01028-CR (Tex. App. 6/26/2008)
...including cruel and unusual punishment claims. See Thomas v. State, 543 S.W.2d 645, 647 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976);Armendariz v. State, 529 S.W.2d 525, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975). Appellant cites no cases holding that the use of a juvenile adjudication as an enhancement is unconstitutional, or ......