Armstrong v. Best

• Decision Date: 14 March 1893
• Citation: 17 S.E. 14,112 N.C. 59
• Parties: ARMSTRONG et al. v. BEST et al.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

17 S.E. 14

112 N.C. 59

ARMSTRONG et al. v. BEST et al.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 14, 1893

Appeal from superior court, Wayne county; Bryan, Judge.

Action by Armstrong, Cator & Co. against N.W. and L. C. Best to recover the price of goods sold. Defendants had judgment, and plaintiffs appealed. Affirmed.

The cause was tried to the court without a jury, on the following agreed statement of facts: "It is agreed that at the time the goods, for the purchase money of which this action is brought, were bought, the plaintiffs were merchants doing business in the city of Baltimore, in the state of Maryland and the defendant L. C. Best was carrying on the trade of milliner and merchant in the city of Goldsborough, state of North Carolina, in her own name, as a licensed trader. That said goods were ordered by the defendant L. C. Best of the plaintiffs, and they were shipped by the plaintiffs to her from their place of business, in the city of Baltimore, and were to be paid for by defendant L. C. Best at the end of 60 days. That at that time, and since, the defendant was, and is, a citizen and resident of the state of North Carolina and a married woman, living with her husband, the defendant N.W. Best. The goods have not been paid for, except the credits set out in the accounts filed, and those not paid for were worth the agreed price of $212.43. That the defendant has never been a free trader under the statutes of North Carolina, and her husband has never consented, in writing, to the orders of said goods, and to the sale thereof."

A contract made in another state by a citizen of North Carolina, under whose laws it is void because of her coverture, cannot be enforced in the courts of the latter state, though the contract was valid where made.

W. C Munroe, for appellants.

W. R. Allen, for appellees.

SHEPHERD C.J.

If the contract which is the subject of this action was made in this state, it is well settled that it would be void, by reason of the common-law disability of the feme defendant to make any contract whatever, upon which a personal judgment can be rendered against her, except in the cases provided by statute. Pippen v. Wesson, 74 N.C. 437; Dougherty v. Sprinkle, 88 N.C. 300; Baker v. Garris, 108 N.C. 218, 13 S.E. Rep. 2; Flaum v. Wallace, 103 N.C. 296, 9 S.E. Rep. 567; Farthing v. Shields, 106 N.C. 289, 10 S.E. Rep. 998.

The plaintiffs, however, insist that the contract was made in the city of Baltimore, Md., their place of business, where they accepted the proposal of the defendant by shipping the goods according to her order. In this they are correct; for, if a contract is completed in another state, "it makes no difference, in principle, whether the citizen of this state goes in person, or sends an agent, or writes a letter, across the boundary line between the two states." Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374. As was said by Lord Lyndhurst: "If I, residing in England, send down my agent to Scotland, and he makes constracts for me there, it is the same as if I myself went there and made them." Pattison v. Mills, 1 Dow & C. 342. So, if one in New York orders goods from Boston, "either by a carrier whom he points out, or in the usual course of trade, this would be a completion--a making--of the contract; and it would be a Boston contract, whether he gave no note, or a note payable in Boston, or one without express place of payment." 2 Pars. Cont. 586.

The contract, then, being a Maryland contract, it is next insisted that it is one which a feme convert could have made in that state, and therefore enforceable in the courts of North Carolina. We are by no means certain that the present contract is a valid one, according to the laws of Maryland, as the statute of that state seems to recognize the legal capacity of a married woman only to the extent of contracting with reference to property acquired by her "skill, industry, or personal labor." Assuming, however, that it is a valid contract in Maryland, we will proceed to the examination of the question whether it should be enforced by the courts of this state.

It is well settled that the law of one state has, proper vigore, no force or authority beyond the jurisdiction of its own courts and that whatever effect is given to it by the courts of foreign countries or other states is the result of that international comity (more properly called "private international law") which is the product of modern civilization. Hornthal v. Burwell, 109 N.C. 10, 13 S.E. Rep. 721. It is left to each state or nation to say how far it will recognize this comity, and to what extent it will be permitted to control its own laws. It has, however, been very generally settled that all matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the validity of a contract are to be determined by the law of the place where the contract is made, and, if valid there, it is valid everywhere. Taylor v. Sharp, 108 N.C. 377, 13 S.E. Rep. 138. An exception is maintained by some of the continental jurists as to the capacity of a contracting party, and they generally hold that the incapacity of the domicile attaches to and follows the person, wherever he may go. We remarked in Taylor v. Sharp, supra, that this was not considered by Mr. Justice Story (Confl. Law, 103, 104) as the doctrine of the common law; and we also stated the conclusion of Gray, C.J., in Milliken v. Pratt, supra, that the general current of the English and American authorities is in favor of holding that a contract which, by the law of the place, is recognized as lawfully made by a capable person, is valid everywhere, although the person would not, under the law of the domicile, be deemed capable of making it. The proposition, though denied by Dr. Wharton as to infants and femes covert, (Confl. Laws, 112, 118,) seems to be generally accepted in this country, in so far as it relates to the enforcement of contracts in courts other than those of the domicile. If, for example, the plaintiffs were suing upon the present contract in the courts of Maryland, the defendant could not, it is thought, avail herself of the incapacity of her domicile, but the lex loci contracts would prevail. But quite a different question is presented when the action is brought in the forum of the...