Armstrong v. Egeler
Decision Date | 03 February 1975 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 4-72230. |
Parties | James W. ARMSTRONG, Petitioner, v. Charles E. EGELER, Warden, State Prison of Southern Michigan, Jackson, Michigan, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Michigan |
James W. Armstrong, pro per.
Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Crim. Div., by Keith D. Roberts, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lansing, Mich., for respondent.
SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This is a habeas corpus action in which petitioner attacks the validity of a guilty plea to a murder charge. He contends that the trial court erred in not conducting a hearing to determine what degree of murder petitioner had committed, and that in advising him that the maximum possible sentence for first degree murder was life imprisonment, the court failed to advise him that he would also be ineligible for parole.
On October 22, 1974 this court dismissed the petition by memorandum opinion, addressing the first issue on the merits and dismissing the other for failure to exhaust state remedies. On November 20, 1974 petitioner filed a supplemental pleading, appending a copy of the Michigan Supreme Court's decision in People v. Armstrong, 390 Mich. 693, 213 N.W.2d 190 (1973). That opinion clearly frames the issues applicable here:
While it is true that the petitioner did not supply the court with a copy of, or citation to, the Michigan Supreme Court decision, the court is more troubled by the response of the Attorney General's office which represented by both brief and letter that the relevant files had been checked, and that this issue was not exhausted. It is clear that petitioner did raise this issue before the state courts, and that it is now squarely before this court.
In rejecting his claim the Michigan Supreme Court held:
390 Mich. at 697-98, 213 N.W. 2d at 192.
Petitioner now phrases his argument in terms of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and claims that the state trial judge had the duty to inform him of all of the "direct consequences" of his plea. He then cites numerous cases holding that statutory ineligibility for parole is such a direct consequence. See, for example, Harris v. United States, 426 F.2d 99 (6th Cir. 1970); Moody v. United States, 469 F.2d 705 (8th Cir. 1972). These cases, however, were brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by federal prisoners. Rule 11 of the Federal Rules is not applicable to state proceedings. Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1972); State of Missouri v. Turley, 443 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1971); Beavers v. Anderson, 474 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1973).
Under different factual situations, several courts have also concluded on constitutional grounds that a state defendant must be informed of the consequences of his plea. These cases do not require a specific ritual, but are based on the idea that unless a criminal defendant knows of these consequences he cannot voluntarily and intelligently waive his right to trial. See Moore v. Anderson, 474 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir. 1973); Cuthrell v. Director, Patuxent Institution, 475 F.2d 1364 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1005, 94 S.Ct. 362, 38 L.Ed.2d 241; Wade v. Coiner, 468 F.2d 1059 (4th Cir. 1972). In Cuthrell, supra, the court borrows from the Rule 11 cases examples of consequences which must be known by the defendant for there to be an effective waiver:
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1968) makes it clear that when a criminal defendant pleads guilty and waives rights associated with trial, the record must disclose that the plea was intelligently and understandingly made. One factor, if not the most important factor, involved in making an intelligent decision as to whether or not to plead guilty is the severity of the sentence to which the defendant exposes himself.
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Armstrong v. Egeler
...for parole and whether under the totality of the circumstances he knowingly and intelligently waived his rights." Armstrong v. Egeler, 389 F.Supp. 483, 485 (E.D.Mich.1975). At the hearing the district court heard the testimony of the trial judge who took the plea, of petitioner's defense co......
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Berry v. Mintzes
...made unless the accused is aware of the consequences of his plea, that is, the sentence which may be imposed. Armstrong v. Egeler, 389 F.Supp. 483 (E.D.Mich.1975), aff'd., 563 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. Petitioner does not allege specifically in his petition nor in the brief in support that he was ......