Armstrong v. Obucino

• Decision Date: 14 December 1921
• Docket Number: No. 14076.,14076.
• Parties: ARMSTRONG v. OBUCINO et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

300 Ill. 140

133 N.E. 58

ARMSTRONG

v.OBUCINO et al.

No. 14076.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 22, 1921.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 14, 1921.

Bill by Clyde D. Armstrong against Katie Obucino to declare a mechanic's lien. Decree for complainant, and sale was had thereunder, and from an order quashing a writ of assistance to Earle L. Fiske, who claimed under the purchaser, he appeals.

Order affirmed.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Kickham Scanlan, judge.

William Slack, of Chicago, for appellant.

William T. Dickerman, of Chicago, for appellee.

CARTWRIGHT, J.

The question in this case is whether a sale made contrary to the provisions of the statute, but in conformity with the directions of the decree under which it was made, and a deed executed in pursuance of such sale and the provisions of the decree, are null and void, and therefore subject to collateral attack, or merely irregular and erroneous, to be set aside only in a direct proceeding. The question arose in this way: On November 16, 1918, Clyde D. Armstrong filed in the circuit court of Cook county his bill of complaint, asking the court to declare a mechanic's lien in his favor on property of Katie Obucino for improvements made thereon under a contract entered into July 26, 1918, and completed September 21, 1918. Katie Obucino was served with process and answered the bill, and, a replication having been filed, the issues were referred to master in chancery. On his report a decree was entered establishing a lien for $511.48, fixing the master's fees on the reference at $100.30, and providing that in default of payment of the amount of the lien and costs of suit within five days the master in chancery should sell the property. The sale was to be made subject to redemption, and the decree stated in detail the particulars as to sale and rights of redemption according to the statute existing prior to July 1, 1917. The sale was made to Charles E. Guenberg, a stranger to the record, and a certificate of purchase was issued to him. The master reported the sale and it was confirmed by the court. Guenberg assigned the certificate to the appellant, Earle L. Fiske, and, there being no redemption, he received a master's deed at the expiration of 15 months. Possession was refused to Fiske, and on his petition a writ of assistance was ordered, and on December 22, 1920, Katie Obucino was dispossessed of the premises and possession was delivered to the appellant. On March 1, 1921, on motion of Katie Obucino the writ of assistance was quashed, and it was ordered that she be forthwith restored to thepossession of the premises. From that order this appeal was prosecuted.

Where a court of general jurisdiction, having jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, enters a decree within the authority granted to it by the law, the decree, however erroneous, cannot be questioned collaterally, and a stranger to the record, such as Charles Guenberg, purchasing at a sale under such decree, cannot be divested of his title. All that Guenberg was required to do was to look to the question of the jurisdiction of the court rendering the decree, and, if the court had jurisdiction to order the sale as made, he would be protected, however, erroneous the decree. Guiteau v. Wisely, 47 Ill. 433;Wadhams v. Gay, 73 Ill. 415;Montanye v. Wallahan, 84 Ill. 355;Thompson v. Frew, 107 Ill. 478;Crawford v. Thomson, 161 Ill. 161, 43 N. E. 617;Ure v. Ure, 223 Ill. 454, 79 N. E. 153,114 Am. St. Rep. 336;Thompson v. Davis, 297 Ill. 11, 130 N. E. 455. The circuit court, having jurisdiction of the class of cases to which this case belonged, acquired jurisdiction of the subject-matter by the filing of the bill, and obtained jurisdiction of the defendant by service of process and her appearance, and so far as the bill prayed for the establishment of a mechanic's lien the decree was within the jurisdiction, and not subject to collateral attack.

The statement has very frequently been made that, where a court has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, its decree, however erroneous, can only be attacked on appeal or error; but the rule is subject to an exception equally well settled-that a decree may be void because the court has exceeded its jurisdiction. The bill prayed for the enforcement of the lien by a sale beyond and contrary to the powers given by the statute for enforcing mechanics' liens, and it does not follow that, because the court had acquired jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter, it could make such a decree as was prayed for. Courts are limited in the extent and character of their judgments, and if they transcend their lawful powers their judgments and decrees are void. and may be collaterally impeached, wherever rights claimed under them are brought in question. The doctrine that where a court has once acquired jurisdiction it has a right to decide every question which arises in the cause and its judgment or decree, however erroneous, cannot be collaterally assailed, is only correct when the court proceeds according to the established modes governing the class to which the case belongs, and does not transcend in the extent and character of its judgment or decree the law or statute which is applicable to it. Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U. S. 274, 23 L. Ed. 914;United States v. Walker, 109 U. S. 258, 3 Sup. Ct. 277, 27 L. Ed. 927; Rogers v. Dill, 6 Hill, (N. Y.) 415; Folger v. Columbian Ins. Co., 99 Mass. 267, 96 Am. Dec. 747;Fithian v. Monks, 43 Mo. 502;Seamster v. Blackstock, 83 Va. 233, 2 S. E. 36,5 Am. St. Rep. 262;Anthony v. Kasey, 83 Va. 338, 5...