Armuress Sapp v. Rogers

Decision Date11 June 2019
Docket NumberE068030
Citation248 Cal.Rptr.3d 244,36 Cal.App.5th 86
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
Parties ESTATE OF Roscoe SAPP, Sr., Deceased. Armuress Sapp et al., Petitioners and Respondents, v. Edith Rogers, Objector and Appellant.

Edith Rogers, in pro. per., for Objector and Appellant.

Alexander Law Offices and Thomas M. Alexander, Jr., for Petitioner and Respondent Armuress Sapp.

No appearance for Petitioner and Respondent Brian Lincoln.

OPINION

McKINSTER J.

Edith Rogers appeals from her removal as administrator of the estate of her grandfather Roscoe Sapp, Sr. (decedent), who died in 1994. Armuress Sapp and Brian Lincoln, two of decedent's grandsons, separately petitioned to remove Rogers as administrator. The probate court found Rogers (1) had failed to comply with the court's 2001 instructions that she and her coadministrator (who died in 2003) sell the estate's remaining real estate holdings and distribute the net proceeds to the beneficiaries of the decedent's will; and (2) acted in bad faith toward the beneficiaries by trying to buy them out for much less than they would have received if she had timely sold the properties. The court therefore concluded Rogers had to be removed because she "mismanaged" the estate and was "incapable of properly executing the duties of the office" of administrator. ( Prob. Code,1 § 8502, subds. (a), (b).) The probate court withdrew letters of administration issued to Rogers and appointed Armuress as special administrator.

In her briefs, Rogers challenges: (1) the 2001 order instructing the coadministrators to sell the estate's real property; (2) the probate court's 2016 denial of her petition for additional instructions; and (3) the 2017 judgment removing her as personal representative. Only the 2017 judgment is properly before this court. Although we conclude the evidence does not support a finding that Rogers was incapable of executing the duties of administrator, we find the evidence supports her removal because she is not otherwise qualified to act as administrator, and she mismanaged the estate. Because we conclude Rogers has not demonstrated the probate court abused its discretion when it removed her, we affirm the judgment.

I.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND2
A. Early Years of the Estate, 1994-2000.

Decedent died on March 20, 1994, and on July 26 of that year the probate court issued letters of special administration to Vivian Macon, decedent's sister. At the time of his death, decedent was survived by seven children (Gloria Lovett, Robert Sapp, Armelius Sapp, Ronald Sapp, Glenda Sapp, Betty Jo Sapp, & Roscoe Sapp, Jr.).3 Decedent's daughter, Levonia Holmes, predeceased him. Levonia had five children, including objector and appellant Edith Rogers; Ronald Sapp had three children, including petitioner and respondent Armuress; Betty Jo had four children, including petitioner and appellant Brian Lincoln; and Glenda had two children, including former coadministrator Jennifer Sapp.

A document entitled, "Living Trust of Roscoe Sapp, Sr." (the will), dated November 6, 1993, was deposited with the probate court on August 25, 1994. Decedent left considerable improved and unimproved real property to his living natural children "to share + share alike," and the share of any deceased child was to be divided equally to the deceased child's children. The same day, the probate court granted Macon's petition for letters of administration and overruled a demurrer and objections filed by Rogers. The probate court appointed Macon administrator and issued letters of administration to her on September 8, 1994.

On June 22, 1995, the probate court granted Macon's petition for probate of the will, admitted the will to probate, and on July 13, 1995, issued letters of administration to Macon with will annexed. Macon served as administrator for six years, and in 1998 she survived an attempt by Rogers and other heirs to remove her.

Undeterred, Rogers again moved to remove Macon as administrator. This time, the probate court removed Macon on July 27, 1999. The court appointed Rogers, Roscoe Sapp, Jr., and Jennifer Sapp as coadministrators, and the following January the court issued special letters of administration to them. On February 7, 2000, the probate court appointed the three as coadministrators, but that July the court removed Jennifer as coadministrator. The court issued letters of administration to Rogers and Roscoe Sapp, Jr., on December 27, 2000.

B. 2001 Petition for Instructions and Ruling that the Coadministrators Sell the Remaining Estate Property.

On June 22, 2001, the remaining two coadministrators petitioned the probate court for instructions. The petition explained that some of decedent's surviving children were disabled and incapable of caring for themselves. The coadministrators were "uncertain as to what effect to give" the document the court had "deemed to be the Last Will and Testament of the decedent," and they asked for instructions on how to proceed and interpret the will.

According to the petition, one coadministrator believed it was decedent's intent that: real property owned by the estate should be liquidated, with the possible exception of one property to be used as a care facility for disabled heirs; the proceeds of the sales be distributed to those heirs who were capable of caring for themselves; and the remaining assets be used to establish a care facility for heirs who were incapable of caring for themselves. The other coadministrator believed the real property should be sold and the net proceeds distributed to the heirs outright. The living heirs executed documents indicating they consented to and requested all the estate's real property be sold, and the proceeds be distributed equally.

On August 30, 2001, the Honorable Stephen D. Cunnison (Judge Cunnison) granted the petition and directed the coadministrators to "sell the [estate's] property." The court instructed coadministrators' attorney to file proofs of service, and to submit a "formal order." As discussed further, post , the attorney never submitted a formal order, and the court never entered one.

C. Rogers's Administration of the Estate from 2001 until 2016, and the 2016 Judgment Denying Her Petition for Additional Instructions.

Coadministrator Roscoe Sapp, Jr., died on May 5, 2003, and on January 24, 2005, the probate court issued amended letters of administration with will annexed to Rogers as sole administrator. In the 14 years following the probate court's 2001 ruling on the coadministrators' petition for instructions, the court had approved the sale of four properties in San Bernardino and approved accounts submitted by Rogers. On February 21, 2014, the probate court set a hearing for July 25, 2014, regarding the filing of a final distribution of the estate's assets. That hearing was continued to December 5, 2014. When Rogers and her attorney failed to submit their petition for final distribution, the probate court issued an order to show cause (OSC) why they should not be sanctioned. Rogers filed a status report on February 5, 2015.

At the March 6, 2015 hearing on the OSC, the Honorable Thomas H. Cahraman (Judge Cahraman) stated he was not inclined to approve Rogers's most recent status report because it broached, but ultimately failed to address, questions about the 2001 ruling on the petition for instructions. Judge Cahraman stated the 2001 ruling was "ambiguous," but the proper means to clarify that or any other prior rulings was to petition for additional instructions. Rogers subsequently filed a petition for additional instructions on June 29, 2015. The petition asked the probate court to determine whether the document the court had deemed to be a will was instead a trust and, if it was a will, how Rogers should proceed.

After conducting a hearing on Rogers's petition, Judge Cahraman issued a tentative decision denying the petition. Judge Cahraman noted the 2001 petition for instructions had presented Judge Cunnison with two options: "(1) partial liquidation, partial distribution, and maintenance of a home where heirs unable to properly care for themselves could visit on the weekends or live in as a care facility, or (2) complete liquidation and distribution." After reviewing the minutes and the transcript of the 2001 hearing, Judge Cahraman concluded, "The court ordered the co-administrators to do the latter." (Underscoring omitted.)

Judge Cahraman noted Rogers had at least implicitly requested the probate court set aside the 2001 ruling, but she provided no support for such an order. In light of his interpretation of the 2001 ruling, Judge Cahraman concluded the remainder of Rogers's petition was moot. "There is no need to determine whether the will creates a testamentary trust in light of the August 30, 2001 order to distribute the property outright." Therefore, he denied Rogers's petition and directed her to file "a final accounting and petition for final distribution within 90 days that distributes any remaining real property pro-rata ...." On September 2, 2016, the court entered a judgment denying Rogers's petition for additional instructions.

D. Petition to Remove Rogers as Administrator.

Two of decedent's grandsons, Brian Lincoln and Armuress Sapp, filed separate petitions to remove Rogers as administrator and to be appointed as administrator. In his trial brief, Armuress argued Rogers "never demonstrated an actual intent to distribute the estate to any of the heirs of Roscoe Sapp," despite being ordered to do just that by Judge Cunnison. According to Armuress, "none of the heirs have received anything, [and] none of the creditors have been paid." Armuress argued Rogers had "her own agenda, which is not that of Roscoe Sapp, and that agenda makes her incapable of administering the estate."

1. Petitioners' evidence.

At trial, Armuress introduced testimony from a commercial broker. Based on his review of the documentation Rogers submitted with her declaration of progress, the expert opined...

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