Arnel Development Co. v. City of Costa Mesa

• Decision Date: 18 December 1980
• Citation: 620 P.2d 565,28 Cal.3d 511,169 Cal.Rptr. 904
• Parties: , 620 P.2d 565 ARNEL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF COSTA MESA et al., Defendants and Respondents. SOUTH COAST PLAZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF COSTA MESA et al., Defendants and Respondents. L. A. 31205.
• Court: California Supreme Court

Page 904

169 Cal.Rptr. 904

28 Cal.3d 511, 620 P.2d 565

ARNEL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF COSTA MESA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

SOUTH COAST PLAZA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF COSTA MESA et al., Defendants and Respondents.

L. A. 31205.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Dec. 18, 1980.

Rutan & Tucker, Leonard A. Hampel, Robert S. Bower, Santa Ana, Latham & Watkins, Robert E. Currie and Robert K. Break, Newport Beach, for plaintiffs and appellants.

Robert Myers, John E. McDermott, Los Angeles, Richard A. Rothschild, San Francisco, Crystal Sims, Michael E. Wine, Stearns, Kim & Willens, William N. Willens, Loring E. Jahnke, Torrence, Richard J. Reynolds, Redondo Beach, Carlyle W. Hall, Jr., Los Angeles, and Carolyn Burton, Sacramento, as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiffs and appellants.

R. R. Campagna, City Atty., Thomas C. Wood, Asst. City Atty., and Mark J. Huebsch, Deputy City Atty., for defendant and respondent.

George Deukmejian, Atty. Gen., E. Clement Shute, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., Daniel P. Selmi, Deputy Atty. Gen., George Agnost, City Atty., San Francisco, Burk E. Delventhal, Diane L. Hermann, Alice Suet Yee Barkley, Deputy City Attys., John W. Scanlon, City Atty., Haywood, Burt Pine, City Atty., Los Angeles, Federick W. Clough, City Atty., Santa Barbara, Robert J. Logan, City Atty., San Jose, Daniel J. Curtin, Jr., City Atty., Walnut Creek, Carter J. Stroud, City Atty., Alameda, Ronald A. Zumbrun, Thomas E. Hookano, Howard E. Susman, Sacramento, Frank Lee Crist, Jr., Crist, Crist, Griffiths, Bryant, Schulz & Biorn, Palo Alto, and Martin Wolff, San Luis Obispo, as amici curiae.

TOBRINER, Justice.

Plaintiff Arnel proposed to construct a 50-acre development consisting of 127 single-family residences and 539 apartment units. ¹ Objecting to this proposal, a neighborhood association circulated an initiative rezoning the Arnel property and two adjoining properties (68 acres in all) to single family residential use. When the voters approved the initiative, Arnel instituted the instant action. ² The superior court upheld the initiative: the Court of Appeal reversed. We transferred the cause here on our own motion ³ to examine further the holding of the Court of Appeal that the rezoning of specific, relatively small parcels of privately owned property is essentially adjudicatory in nature, and thus cannot be enacted by initiative.

As we shall explain, California precedent has settled the principle that zoning ordinances, whatever the size of parcel affected, are legislative acts. We find no warrant for departing from that principle. A decision that some zoning ordinances, depending on the size and number of parcels affected and perhaps on other factors, are adjudicative acts would unsettle well established rules which govern the enactment of land use restrictions, creating confusion which would require years of litigation to resolve. Since such a decision is unnecessary to protect either the rights of the landowners or the public interest in orderly community planning and development, we adhere to established precedent and conclude, accordingly, that the ordinance rezoning plaintiffs' property was a legislative act.

Our opinion therefore holds that the Court of Appeal erred in holding the initiative ordinance invalid on the ground that is is adjudicative in nature. Plaintiffs raised numerous other objections to the initiative, however, which were not resolved by the Court of Appeal and not fully argued before this court. Accordingly our order retransfers this cause to the Court of Appeal for resolution of those issues.

We turn now to a more detailed statement of the factual background of this litigation. The initiative in question seeks to rezone three contiguous undeveloped properties located in the City of Costa Mesa ⁴-the Arnel property (50 acres), the South Coast Plaza property (13 acres), and the Roberts property (4.6 acres). Under the city's general plan, as amended in 1976, 8.5 acres of the Arnel property was designated as low density residential; the balance of the approximately 68 acres affected by the initiative was designated medium density residential. In November of 1976 the city approved a specific plan for development of the Arnel property, and pursuant to that plan, rezoned the property PDR-LD (planned development residential-low density) and PDR-MD (Planned development residential-medium density). The South Coast Plaza and Roberts properties retained A-1 (general agricultural) zoning.

On July 18, 1977, the city approved development of the Arnel property and a tentative tract map. In its final form, the Arnel project was to consist of 127 single-family residences on approximately 23 acres and 539 apartment units on a similar acreage. Projected apartment rentals indicated that the project was intended primarily for moderate income housing.

Shortly after the city's approval of the Arnel development, the North Costa Mesa Homeowner's Association circulated an initiative petition to rezone the Arnel, South Coast Plaza, and Roberts properties to R-1 (single-family residential) zoning. At the municipal election of March 7, 1978, the voters adopted the initiative by a narrow majority. ⁵

The city thereafter refused to process the final tract map or applications for building permits for the Arnel project. Arnel filed suit for mandate, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief. On the same day, South Coast Plaza filed a separate action for declaratory relief. Pursuant to stipulation the actions were consolidated for trial.

The trial court rejected the numerous contentions raised by the plaintiffs and rendered judgment upholding the validity of the initiative. The Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the rezoning of specific, relatively small parcels of private property is an act adjudicatory in nature, and therefore cannot be accomplished by initiative. ^{6 6} We transferred the cause to this court for further consideration of that issue.

Numerous California cases have settled that the enactment of a measure which zones or rezones property is a legislative act. California courts have so held in cases permitting zoning by initiative (Associated Home Builders, etc. Inc. v. City of Livermore (1976) 18 Cal.3d 582, 135 Cal.Rptr. 41, 557 P.2d 473; San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, (1974), 13 Cal.3d 205, 118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570; Bayless v. Limber (1972) 26 Cal.App.3d 463, 102 Cal.Rptr. 647), in cases upholding zoning referendums (Johnston v. City of Claremont (1958) 49 Cal.2d 826, 323 P.2d 71; Dwyer v. City Council (1927) 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 320), and in cases involving other issues which distinguish between adjudicative and legislative acts (Lockard v. City of Los Angeles (1949) 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38 (scope of judicial review); Toso v. City of St. Barbara (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 934, 162 Cal.Rptr. 210 (scope of judicial review); Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 467, 137 Cal.Rptr. 304 (findings); Hilton v. Bd. of Supervisors (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 708, 86 Cal.Rptr. 754 (sufficiency of evidence).

The cases draw no distinctions based on the size of the area or the number of owners. Some of the cases involved measures which rezoned a substantial part of the city (e. g., San Diego Bldg. Contractors Assn. v. City Council, supra, 13 Cal.3d 205, 118 Cal.Rptr. 146, 529 P.2d 570); some rezoned areas roughly comparable to the 68 acres at issue here (e. g., Lockard v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 33 Cal.2d 453, 202 P.2d 38); many involved parcels much smaller than 68 acres (Dwyer v. City Council, supra, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 320 (proposed site for poultry farm owned by University of California, said to constitute one five-hundred-fiftieth of the City of Berkeley); Toso v. City of St. Barbara, supra, 101 Cal.App.3d 934, 162 Cal.Rptr. 210 (single lot); Ensign Bickford Realty Corp. v. City Council, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d 467, 137 Cal.Rptr. 304 (single lot); Hilton v. Bd. of Supervisors, supra, 7 Cal.App.3d 708, 86 Cal.Rptr. 754 (5 acres); cf. Wheelright v. County of Marin (1970) 2 Cal.3d 448, 85 Cal.Rptr. 809, 467 P.2d 537 (location of subdivision access road a legislative act subject to referendum); Karlson v. City of Camarillo (1980) 100 Cal.App.3d 789, 161 Cal.Rptr. 260 (amendment to general plan a legislative act although it affects only 2 lots, of 10 and 14.75 acres)). Thus whatever the legal controversy and whatever the size or ownership of the land involved, every California decision on point (and there are many more than the few cited in this paragraph) has held that the enactment or amendment of a zoning ordinance is a legislative act.

Of the various cases cited, Dwyer v. City Council, supra, 200 Cal. 505, 253 P. 320, is the closest on point. The City of Berkeley rezoned a single small parcel owned by the University of California to permit operation of an experimental poultry farm. Plaintiffs petitioned for a referendum, and sought mandate to compel the city to submit the measure to the voters. Defendants argued that the referendum was improper because the measure rezoned only a small area and affected only persons living in the vicinity of the lot-essentially the same argument presented by the plaintiffs in the present case. Rejecting that argument, the court stated that "if the comprehensive zoning law districting all portions of the city were before us, it could not be successfully contended that the ordinance would not be subject to the referendum.... A zoning ordinance as amended becomes in effect a different ordinance. Even if it be granted that a reclassification of an area as small as that involved in the instant case cannot be said to effect a new scheme, the same rule must necessarily be followed as would be applied if a larger area had been reclassified, and it may be observed that a piecemeal rezoning of small areas may result in a plan differing in vital particulars...