Karlson v. City of Camarillo

• Decision Date: 08 January 1980
• Parties: Victor Albert KARLSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CITY OF CAMARILLO, Respondent. Civ. 56376.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 260

161 Cal.Rptr. 260

100 Cal.App.3d 789

Victor Albert KARLSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v. CITY OF CAMARILLO, Respondent.

Civ. 56376.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 1, California.

Jan. 8, 1980.

Hearing Denied April 10, 1980.

Victor A. Karlson, in pro. per

Royal M. Sorensen, City Atty., and Burke, Williams & Sorensen, Beatrice Joy Braun, Los Angeles, for respondent.

KAUFMANN, ^* Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment denying a peremptory writ of mandate sought by the appellant to set aside two amendments to the General Plan of the respondent (hereinafter referred to as City) enacted pursuant to Government Code sections 65000 et seq. The petition alleged that amendments 77-2 and 77-3 were inconsistent with various provisions of the General Plan, citing Government Code section 65300.5 as requiring the integrated, internal consistency of a General Plan. ¹ Although two parcels were involved in amendment 77-3, the petition objected only to the one denominated the White parcel.

As additional grounds for setting aside the City's action, appellant alleged a violation of section 65361 ² and violation of section 65356. ³

After the City filed its return, the case was tried upon the affidavit of the City's planning director and affidavits of the appellant and a third person. In addition, certain exhibits were introduced by appellant, but no record was submitted of the hearing before the city council or the preliminary hearing before the planning commission, although the action of the latter was referred to in the Environmental Impact Reports (hereinafter referred to as EIRs). Findings of fact and conclusions of law favorable to the City were rendered by the trial judge and following entry of judgment, this appeal ensued.

Amendment 77-2 was approved on October 26, 1977. It amended the land use element by changing the land use designation of a 132.5 acre parcel from an agricultural to a low density housing use for the purpose of constructing a residential subdivision of 335 units housing 1,200 persons (hereinafter referred to as the Longo parcel, although the City was the applicant). It also amended the recreation element to create additional park sites. The acreage is south of the Ventura Freeway and adjacent to a mobile home park on the west, although separated from it by a creek. A high school is located to the north, separated from it by the freeway, and an industrial park is located to the southeast. On the southerly and easterly side of the parcel is Pleasant Valley Road. A developer had already indicated its interest in developing the parcel. It was contemplated by the City that certain design provisions would be required to mitigate noise from the road and the freeway, that appropriate dedication of land and fees be required to serve the needs of the school district (an agreement had in fact been entered into), and that school and park sites be reserved from the area specified for low density residential development. It also appears that as a condition of development the developer would be required to extend sewers to serve a designated industrial park to the north of the freeway.

A residential project was previously approved for this parcel in April 1972, but Amendment 77-3 was adopted December 28, 1977. It amended the land use element by changing the designation of 10 acres from agricultural to commercial (hereinafter designated as the White parcel since the applicant and prospective developer is White). Also included was a second parcel of some 14.75 acres from rural to low density residential (applicant Byerly), but the merits of this action are not challenged and its relevancy is only to the issue involving section 65361. The White parcel is also located south of the freeway and directly opposite to the Longo parcel. It is separated from the Longo parcel by Pleasant Valley Road. The commercial development contemplated is to be unique in character as a freeway oriented shopping center providing a retail outlet for agricultural products raised on the subject property. Except for the Longo parcel, it is surrounded by agricultural land and it is contemplated that such land would remain agricultural.

expired after three extensions without construction. The General Plan Land Use Element adopted in May 1975 indicated agricultural land use for the parcel. In October 1976 the planning staff recommended no change in the status of the area with reevaluation in a year; however, the planning commission recommended a substantial portion of the area for low density residential use. In December 1976 the city council, on a proposed amendment to the General Plan, referred the matter back to the commission for consideration of the entire spectrum of possible uses and alternative densities. In January 1977 the commission considered twelve alternative plans and recommended substantially the same portion for low density housing. The city council adopted an alternative plan which is challenged in this litigation.

The White parcel was before the city council along with the Longo parcel in December 1976. Unlike Longo, the request originally was denied because of potential for an excess of commercially zoned land in the vicinity. When amendment 77-3 was adopted, the city council quite clearly indicated the nature of its change of direction and why in the following recitals:

"WHEREAS, the Planning Commission in considering the commercial designation concluded that the change to a commercial usage was consistent with goals established under the General Plan which states it should not be a duplication or further expansion of the general retail centers, but be designed and relate to a tourist-oriented facility which could include restaurants and service type facilities geared toward the motoring public and the sales of items and wares and merchandise either grown or manufactured and would relate to a tourist industry; and,

"WHEREAS, the designation of a commercial center shall be reviewed at the time of submittal of the development plan in relation to actual uses to insure the general objectives as set forth under the Commission resolution being adhered to and not simply the establishment of an additional commercial center; and,

"WHEREAS, the Planning Commission indicated that the areas surrounding the commercial area should be retained in agricultural usage and recommended rezoning of the property to be consistent with the General Plan to an AE, agricultural exclusive, zone designation which was concurred with by the applicant for the commercial center; . . ."

Each amendment was the last step of the required procedure, which included preparation and certification of environmental impact reports, noticed public hearings before both the planning commission and the city council, and approval by each body.

CONTENTIONS

On appeal three contentions are raised: (1) the City failed to comply with section 65300.5 because the amendments were internally inconsistent with the provisions of the General Plan; (2) the City violated section 65361 in adopting amendment 77-3 because it exceeded the maximum permissible number of annual amendments; (3) the City violated section 65356 in adopting amendment 77-3 because in deleting one of the submitted proposals of the planning commission and adopting the remaining two, it had "changed" the proposal and was required by the section to return the entire matter to the planning commission for its consideration in the light of the deletion. We hold that none of these positions are supported by the law or the record produced by the appellant.

SCOPE OF REVIEW

The reference to section 65300.5 is more complicated than the rather simple manner in which the contention is set forth by the appellant. The underlying issue raised by him is the scope of judicial review applicable to these amendments. The scope of review itself turns on whether the action of the city council is determined to be quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial, as these terms have been defined in judicial decisions. Actions taken by an administrative agency in its legislative capacity are reviewable under Code of Civil Procedure section 1085, the traditional writ of mandate. Judicial review is limited to an examination of the proceedings before the agency to determine whether its action has been arbitrary or capricious, or entirely lacking in evidentiary support, or whether it has failed to follow the procedure and give the notices required by law. (Strumsky v. San Diego County Employees Retirement Assn., 11 Cal.3d 28, 34, fn. 2, 112 Cal.Rptr. 805, 520 P.2d 29.)

Review of actions taken by an administrative agency which is required by law to hold a hearing and perform quasi-judicial functions is under Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. In this case, it is agreed that if the action reviewed is determined to be quasi-judicial, the review is limited to whether the findings of an agency are supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record. ⁴ Under either approach appellant seeks to introduce section 65300.5 as a statutory standard of review superimposed upon the well established rules of review.

The case of Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal.App.3d 101, 127 Cal.Rptr. 520, is dispositive of the question of scope of review. In that case the court was presented with a declaratory relief cause of action attempting to challenge an amendment to a general plan which had the effect of restricting the plaintiff's use of its property to open space, and thus it was alleged that this precluded its development for residential use. There was no allegation of procedural defect in the adoption of the amendment. The appellate court held that a demurrer to the cause of action for review was properly sustained without leave to amend. The court relied upon the holding of the Supreme Court in Selby Realty Co. v. City of San Buenaventura, 10 Cal.3d 110, pp. 117-118, 109 Cal.Rptr. 799, 514 P.2d 111...