Arnold v. Groose, 95-2013
Decision Date | 31 March 1997 |
Docket Number | No. 95-2013,95-2013 |
Citation | 109 F.3d 1292 |
Parties | 46 Fed. R. Evid. Serv. 909 Robert Don ARNOLD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael GROOSE, Dave Dormire, Jack Kirk, Defendants, James Bohannon, James Eberle, Arthur W. Dearixon, Defendants-Appellants, Robert Faith, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Carolyn Gail Vasterling, Jefferson City, MO, argued (John Munich, Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, on the brief), for Defendants-Appellants.
John Rollins, Kansas City, MO, argued, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Before LOKEN, REAVLEY, 1 and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.
Robert Don Arnold, a Missouri inmate who is serving a life sentence without parole for first degree murder at the Jefferson City Correctional Center (JCCC), filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, inter alia, that Lieutenant James Bohannon (an officer at JCCC) conspired with another inmate, Claude Woodard, to kill Arnold, and that Arthur W. Dearixon (the Chief Investigator at JCCC) and James Eberle (Chief of Security at JCCC) destroyed evidence of the conspiracy. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Arnold against the defendants, and the defendants appeal. We reverse and remand.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, the jury could have found the following facts.
Arnold was transferred to the JCCC in 1991 and was assigned to housing unit 2A. At the time of Arnold's transfer, inmate Claude Woodard, a reputed prison drug dealer who had "dirt" on two or more guards, was the clerk of housing unit 2A. As clerk of the housing unit, Woodard had an office which had a second, secret, private phone Shortly after Arnold arrived, Arnold was appointed as the new housing unit clerk, replacing Woodard. Although Woodard had officially lost his position as the housing unit clerk, he retained his ability to move freely within the housing unit and to use the secret phone line in the housing clerk's office. Arnold overheard some of Woodard's conversations and learned that a particular officer, defendant Bohannon, was financing Woodard's drug dealings inside the prison. Arnold installed a wire tap on the secret phone line and connected it to a voice-activated tape recorder in his cell. Arnold recorded some incriminating telephone conversations between Woodard and Bohannan and later, after filing this lawsuit, summarized them in a log.
line. Woodard used the secret phone for setting up drug deals and communicating with certain correctional officers.
At some point, Woodard asked Arnold to record some conversations for him. Woodard had been terminated from a maintenance job and wanted to lay the factual foundation for a lawsuit against certain prison officials. Arnold recorded two conversations relating to Woodard's loss of his prison job and later transcribed them into his log.
According to Arnold's testimony and his log, some of the conversations Arnold taped related to setting up drug transactions. During one phone call, Lieutenant Bohannon allegedly told Woodard, "It's here," and then hung up. (Trial Tr. at 112.) Arnold himself answered the phone on the next call and told Bohannon that Woodard had gone to pick up "that package." (Id.) Bohannon responded in an angry tone, and hung up. (Id.) Bohannon later discussed with Woodard on the tapped phone the fact that Arnold knew of their dealings and ordered Woodard to murder Arnold. (Id. at 114-15.) All of these alleged conversations were supposedly recorded on Arnold's tape.
Upon listening to the recorded conversation in which Woodard and Bohannan discussed killing him, and knowing that Woodard had plans to kill another inmate the next morning, Arnold contacted a roving guard and asked to see someone about the matter. He was allowed to speak to the watch commander, who then referred Arnold to appellants Dearixon and Eberle. Upon hearing Arnold's story and receiving Arnold's tape, Dearixon and Eberle asked Arnold to give a written statement summarizing the facts and advised him not to tell anybody about the tape. Arnold completed his written statement and was transferred to segregated housing for his protection. So was Woodard. A day or two later, Arnold was instructed to give another statement, this time making no reference to Bohannon. Arnold complied. At the time of trial, only the second statement remained in Arnold's file.
Arnold allegedly had made three copies of the original tape. He sent one to the Department of Justice in Washington, D.C., and one to the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Kansas City. Arnold was unable to produce these two copies at the trial. The custodian of the FBI's records testified that there was no tape recording of any kind in the FBI's file containing Arnold's letter, and that there was no mention of any tapes in Arnold's letter. Another copy, which Arnold had in his personal possession, was, according to Arnold, confiscated by a different prison official. The fourth tape, which Arnold had turned over to Eberle and Dearixon, was admitted into evidence at trial, and at that time, it contained only the two, nonincriminating telephone conversations; one between Woodard and Bohannon regarding Woodard's termination from his maintenance job, and one between Woodard and the living unit manager on the same subject.
During the time Arnold was segregated from the general population for his protection, he received several letters from Woodard (who was also in segregation) referring obliquely to taped telephone conversations and directly to Bohannan, who Woodard described as his "dirty ally." Arnold turned over these letters to Dearixon, and they were admitted at trial.
When Arnold was later released back into the general population, Woodard began to threaten Arnold's life. One morning, Woodard and several other inmates followed Arnold in a tunnel towards an unsupervised Arnold filed this cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the appellants had violated his Eighth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Arnold, assessing $15,000 in compensatory damages against the appellants. The appellants moved for an entry of judgment as a matter of law or, in the alternative, for a new trial. The district court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
corner of the tunnel where many inmate stabbings have taken place. One of the inmates displayed a knife to Arnold. Arnold feared for his life, but when the inmates rounded the corner, they saw an officer. The would-be assailants retreated.
Although the appellants raise a number of issues, we find dispositive their argument that the district court committed reversible error in refusing to admit evidence the appellants sought to use to impeach Arnold. Due to our reversal and remand for a new trial, the district court may confront an instructional issue argued by the appellants. Thus, as a matter of prudence, we additionally examine the appellants' claim of instructional error.
In an effort to impeach Arnold, the appellants twice sought to admit portions of Arnold's handwritten pro se pleadings from an earlier suit (No. 91-4571) Arnold had filed arising out of the same nucleus of facts at issue in this case and which had been consolidated with the action tried (No. 92-4447). The district court refused to admit the evidence. The first attempt was during the cross-examination of Arnold when the defendants' counsel sought to use Arnold's third amended complaint as a prior inconsistent statement. Arnold's counsel's relevancy objection was sustained. With respect to the second attempt, during the defendants' case in chief, the trial transcript does not reveal either the grounds for the objection that was made by Arnold's counsel or the basis for the court's ruling excluding the evidence.
(Trial Tr., Vol. 2, at 116-17.)
Defendants' counsel was later permitted to make a specific offer of proof of Arnold's previous written versions of the events at issue, but neither Arnold's counsel nor the court added anything at that time concerning what Arnold's objection was to the proffered evidence or what the reasons were for the court's exclusion. (Id. at 155-56.); see Fed.R.Evid. 103(a)(2),(b). The defendants filed a motion for new trial, claiming (among other We review a district court's decision to exclude evidence for a " 'clear and prejudicial' abuse of discretion." Cummings v. Malone, 995 F.2d 817, 823 (8th Cir.1993). After...
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