Arnold v. Life Ins. Co. of Ga.
Decision Date | 15 September 1954 |
Docket Number | No. 16910,16910 |
Citation | 226 S.C. 60,83 S.E.2d 553 |
Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
Parties | J.B. ARNOLD, Adm'r, Appellant, v. LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF GEORGIA, Respondent. |
Tinsley & McGowan, Greenwood, for appellant.
Nicholson & Nicholson, Greenwood, for respondent.
This is a suit on a policy issued by the Life Insurance Company of Georgia on March 7, 1950, effective as of February 22, 1950, insuring the life of Hazel P. Smith for $3,000, in which her husband, Bill Waco Smith, was designated as the beneficiary. The insurer denied liability, claiming (1) that the policy was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations, and (2) that it was procured by insured's husband with the predetermined intent to murder her and, therefore, was void in its inception.
Smith was twice married. He and his first wife separated around Christmas of 1949. During the latter part of January or early in February, 1950, the record does not disclose the exact date, he married the insured, who was then 19 years of age. The application for the insurance in controversy was made on February 22, 1950. Shortly thereafter applications were made to four other companies, resulting in the issuance during the first two weeks in March, 1950, of policies on the life of insured, aggregating (inclusive of the policy now sued on) $7,000. None of this insurance was solicited by the agents. In each instance the approach was made by insured's husband, who also accompanied his wife when the application was made and was very active in suggesting answers to the questions propounded. The first premiums on all this insurance were paid by him.
Insured died on April 3, 1950, as a result of being poisoned by her husband. In September, 1950, he was tried and convicted of murdering his wife and sentenced to life imprisonment. The judgment was affirmed by this Court in an opinion rendered on September 27, 1951. State v. Smith, 220 S.C. 224, 67 S.E.2d 82.
On August 1, 1950, an action on the policy in controversy was instituted by an assignee of the beneficiary. On November 7, 1951, or shortly after the conviction of Smith had been affirmed by this Court, the above action was dismissed.
On April 25, 1952, the instant action was brought on the policy by J.B. Arnold, the duly appointed administrator of the estate of insured. At the conclusion of the testimony, each party made a motion for a directed verdict. That of the administrator was refused. The motion by the Insurance Company was granted upon the ground that the policy was procured by fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of the insured. This appeal by the administrator followed.
We shall first determine whether there was error in granting the motion of the Insurance Company for a directed verdict upon the ground that the policy was obtained through fraudulent misrepresentations. The answers to the following questions in Part Two of the application are alleged to be false and to have been fraudulently made:
We have found considerable difficulty in ascertaining the facts which are properly before us in passing on the charge of fraud. In presenting his case, appellant offered in evidence the record of the conviction of Smith for the murder of his wife. He introduced the entire judgment roll from the office of the Clerk of Court, including the affirming opinion of this Court, as shown by the following taken from the transcript of the trial:
Doubtless the foregoing evidence was offered for the purpose of showing that appellant, as administrator of insured's estate, was the proper party to bring this action. However, the record was not introduced with this limitation, but was placed in evidence without qualification or restriction. Under the case of Greenville County v. Stover, 198 S.C. 240, 17 S.E.2d 535, and decisions therein cited, the judgment roll must be treated as admitted generally, as applicable to any issue it tended to prove, and the contents thereof available to either party to the action. True, the facts stated in the opinion of this Court in affirming the conviction of Smith could not have been admitted without consent of appellant. However, the judgment roll was not admitted without his consent, but at his request, for it was he who offered it in evidence. Under these circumstances, "it is to be considered and given its natural probative effect as if it were in law admissible." Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 32 S.Ct. 250, 252, 56 L.Ed. 500.
In our opinion above mentioned, State v. Smith, 220 S.C. at page 246, and 67 S.E.2d at page 92, the following appears:
The only reasonable inference to be drawn from the foregoing testimony is that insured, in making the application for this insurance, knowingly concealed, for the purpose of misleading respondent, the fact that approximately eight months previously she had been admitted as a patient to the Edgewood Sanatorium at Orangeburg and that shortly thereafter she was a patient in the State Hospital. This is a fact which she must have known. The company's examining physician found no evidence of insanity and it seems to be conceded that at the time the application for this insurance was made, insured was not under any mental disability. We cannot escape the conclusion that the policy was obtained by fraud.
However, apart from the foregoing, we think the evidence conclusively shows that this policy was obtained by fraudulent misrepresentations in the application. Respondent offered in evidence a judgment rendered by the Probate Judge of Anderson County on July 5, 1949, adjudging that insured was insane and directed that she be committed to the South Carolina State Hospital for care and treatment. Included in this judgment roll is a verified petition, dated June 29, 1949, by the father of the insured, in which he stated that she was then at the Edgewood Sanatorium in Orangeburg and asked that she be committed to the South Carolina State Hospital. As required by law, the patient was then examined by two physicians who, according to a certificate in the record, found her insane and a proper subject for custody and treatment at the State Hospital. In the patient's history recited in this certificate is a statement, on information furnished by the patient's father, that she was in the Edgewood Sanatorium at Orangeburg from June 22 to June 30, 1949. These physicians further certified that the patient was in good physical condition.
Respondent offered the entire judgment roll in evidence, to which appellant objected. The Court held that the record was competent for the sole purpose of showing that the insured had been adjudged insane, and only admitted in evidence from the judgment roll the order of commitment. In one of the sustaining grounds, respondent argues that the statement in the record by the father that his daughter had been a patient in the Edgewood Sanatorium in Orangeburg was competent as an admission and should be considered by us in determining whether the policy was procured by fraudulent misrepresentations.
We need not pass upon the admissibility of the statement mentioned. From the testimony conceded to be competent, it clearly appears that on July 5, 1949, approximately eight months before the policy was issued, the insured was adjudged insane by the Probate Court of Anderson County and ordered committed to the South Carolina State Hospital. We may presume that the mandate of the court was executed and that she was taken to this institution. This is particularly true in view of the fact that appellant, the father of the insured, who had full knowledge of the facts, did not testify, thereby warranting an...
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