Arnold v. Maine State Highway Commission
| Decision Date | 11 November 1971 |
| Citation | 283 A.2d 655 |
| Parties | Clyde B. ARNOLD et al. v. MAINE STATE HIGHWAY COMMISSION. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Donald H. Marden, Waterville, for plaintiffs.
Ronald M. Roy, Winslow, Atwood C. Nelson, Augusta, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and WEBBER, WEATHERBEE and ARCHIBALD, JJ.
On appeal by the defendant. The plaintiffs (Arnolds) own real estate in Waterville at the interchange of two major highways, Kennedy Memorial Drive and Interstate 95. The State of Maine took by eminent domain the access rights of the plaintiffs to Kennedy Memorial Drive, thereby depriving them of all their frontage on the Drive, this being the last ninety feet (90 ) on the northerly side of the Drive prior to its intersection with Interstate 95.
Following proper procedures in such cases, the matter reached the Superior Court and was tried before a jury on the sole issue of damage, resulting in an award of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00). On motion by the plaintiffs asserting inadequacy of damage, and over the defendant's objection, the verdict was set aside and a new trial ordered. The parties thereafter stipulated that a single justice of the Superior Court could render a decision on the issue of damage based only on the record of the prior proceeding. The second trial resulted in an award of Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00) from which the defendant appealed. The appeal preserves defendant's objections to the order mandating a new trial as well as the result of the second trial.
The Arnolds' land is a corner lot bounded westerly by the northbound ramp leading to Interstate 95, southerly by Kennedy Memorial Drive, and easterly by a minor city street fifty feet (50 ) in width, thus being accessible from two public ways.
Sun Oil Company on October 10, 1963, prior to the condemnation, had executed a contract with the Arnolds for the purchase of this land, the consideration therefor being Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00), subject to cancellation if certain access rights to Kennedy Memorial Drive could not be obtained. Prior to the taking, but before the sale was consummated, Sun Oil Company had arrived at a satisfactory understanding on means of access to the land from the appropriate officials. 1 Thus postured, the contracting parties were ready to complete the transfer of title when the State Highway Commission, on May 13, 1964, determined that public exigency required the condemnation of all access rights from Kennedy Memorial Drive. This effectively relieved Sun Oil Company from any further obligation to the Arnolds under the contract which, but for the action of the State, was then enforceable by either party.
The Arnolds' real estate appraiser testified that damage resulting from the condemnation was Eighteen Thousand Dollars ($18,000.00). His counterpart for the appellant stated his opinion of damage to be Fifty-eight Hundred Fifty Dollars ($5,850.00). Both experts agreed that the highest and best use of the Arnold property was for commercial use as a gasoline service station, and both used the market value approach. The differential in their opinion of value is demonstrated by the following summary:
Owners' Expert State's Expert
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Value before: $30,000.00 $17,300.00
Value after: 12,000.00 11,450.00
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Damage: $18,000.00 $ 5,850.00
The appraiser for the State considered three sales of service station properties in the area and stated: 'I felt that the sales, the land sales that took place in the immediate neighborhood of the property were more indicative of value than the sales contract.' On the other hand, the expert for the owners, while considering other property, said: 'The number one in my consideration was the actual sales agreement with Sun Oil * * *.'
Mrs. Arnold testified that the differential in value before and after the taking was Twenty-four Thousand Dollars ($24,000.00) and her husband put this figure at Twenty-three Thousand Dollars ($23,000.00) or Twenty-three Thousand, Five Hundred Dollars ($23,500.00), both using Thirty Thousand Dollars ($30,000.00) as the socalled 'before' value.
The negotiations between Sun Oil Company and the Arnolds resulting in the execution of the contract, which was admitted in evidence, were described by the Arnolds and the representative of the Oil Company. The Company considered the property of prime value because of its superior visibility from Interstate 95 compared to any other site, reasoning: 'Because of the fact that motorists on the Interstate highway are travelling at seventy miles an hour and the better sign visibility that you can get, the more business you get.' Although the frontage was ninety feet (90 ), Sun Oil Company also considered it would have an extra fifty feet (50 ) available for ingress and egress via the adjacent street.
The court has held on numerous occasions that new trials will be granted when the damages awarded are clearly inadequate.
'It is the duty of the court, in the case of excessive or inadequate damages, to set aside the verdict if the jury disregards the evidence * * *' Johnson et al. v. Kreuzer, (1951) 147 Me. 206, 211, 85 A.2d 179, 182; or '(W)hen the smallness of a verdict shows that the jury may have made a compromise * * *' Conroy v. Reid, (1933) 132 Me. 162, 166, 168 A. 215, 216; Bergeron v. Allard, (1957) 152 Me. 297, 128 A.2d 848; Domenico v. Kaherl, (1964) 160 Me. 182, 200 A.2d 844.
The contract of sale was properly before the jury, and was relevant evidence bearing on the value of the plaintiffs' land. The record clearly indicates that it was a voluntary transaction made in good faith and neither remote in point of time nor simulated. Brush Hill Development, Inc. v. Commonwealth, (Mass.1959) 155 N.E.2d 170; Robards v. State, (Tex.Civ.App.1956) 285 S.W.2d 247; State v. Clevenger, (Tex.Civ.App.1964) 384 S.W.2d 207; Durika v. School District of Derry Township, (1964) 415 Pa. 480, 203 A.2d 474; United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., (3d Cir. 1944) 144 F.2d 626.
The constitution mandates that 'Private property shall not be taken for public uses without just compensation' (Maine Constitution, Art. 1 § 21), and this requires that an owner 'shall be put in as good a condition, pecuniarily, by a just compensation, as he would have been in if (his) land had remained entire, as his own property.' Bangor & P. R. Co. v. McComb, (1872) 60 Me. 290, 297.
We must consider the appropriate weight to be given the contract of sale in terms of the jury award to determine whether the ruling granting a new trial was proper.
In Brush Hill Development, Inc. v. Commonwealth, supra 155 N.E.2d at 174, it was stated: 'Such testimony about executory contracts of sale, absolute in terms, relating to the very land taken, is much more directly relevant than if it concerned neighboring or comparable land.' (Emphasis supplied.)
'It would seem to logically follow that, in the absence of a completed sale, evidence of the price agreed upon in a binding contract of sale for property between the owner and a purchaser, both acting in good faith, would be of substantial significance in arriving at the fair market value of such property.' (Emphasis supplied.) East Orange v. Crawford, (1963) 78 N.J.Super. 239, 188 A.2d 219, 221.
An actual sale very near to the time at which the value is to be fixed is of 'great weight' as contrasted with mere opinion evidence. Watson v. Milwaukee & M. R. Co., (1883) 57 Wis. 332, 15 N.W. 468.
'And if market value * * * is 'what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller,' evidence of what the property sold for in a bona fide sale is most significant.' (Emphasis supplied.) United States v. Certain Parcels of Land, etc., supra, 144 F.2d at 629.
On the facts before us, the jury had before it the opinion of the State's...
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