Arreola v. Municipal Court

• Decision Date: 13 January 1983
• Citation: 139 Cal.App.3d 108,188 Cal.Rptr. 529
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Juana ARREOLA, John Callahan, Arthur Cervantez, Jose Cervantes, Jose Pedro Chaires-Beltran, Anthony T. Fay, Richard J. Hamblin, Michael J. Limon, James Brian Peters, Enrique O. Reyes, Robert E. Robinson, II, Phyllis Taylor, Albert T. Zepeda and Julian G. Zepeda, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, State of California, Respondent, The PEOPLE of the State of California, By their attorney, Michael D. BRADBURY, District Attorney of Ventura County, Real Party in Interest. John E. BROWN, Ted A. Curry, Juana F. Diaz, Jose D. Dominguez, Michael D. Edwards, Mark E. Figueroa, Baltazar Hernandez, Daniel H. Jackson, Joyce L. Lee, Everett R. Lopez, Matina M. Lozano, Roberta Norberg, Hugo Ordonez, Daniel T. Ormsby, Phillip Ortega, Jose A. Perez, Terry L. Powell, Timothy Robertson, Ronnie L. Rodriguez, Tony Roybal, Dennis Smith, Gregory A. Walthius, Alfred J. Zarate and Ronald N. Rutherford, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, State of California, Respondent, The PEOPLE of the State of California, By their attorney, Michael D. BRADBURY, District Attorney of Ventura County, Real Party in Interest. Civ. 64684, Civ. 64685.

Page 529

188 Cal.Rptr. 529

139 Cal.App.3d 108

Juana ARREOLA, John Callahan, Arthur Cervantez, Jose Cervantes, Jose Pedro Chaires-Beltran, Anthony T. Fay, Richard J. Hamblin, Michael J. Limon, James Brian Peters, Enrique O. Reyes, Robert E. Robinson, II, Phyllis Taylor, Albert T. Zepeda and Julian G. Zepeda, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, State of California, Respondent, The PEOPLE of the State of California, By their attorney, Michael D. BRADBURY, District Attorney of Ventura County, Real Party in Interest.

John E. BROWN, Ted A. Curry, Juana F. Diaz, Jose D. Dominguez, Michael D. Edwards, Mark E. Figueroa, Baltazar Hernandez, Daniel H. Jackson, Joyce L. Lee, Everett R. Lopez, Matina M. Lozano, Roberta Norberg, Hugo Ordonez, Daniel T. Ormsby, Phillip Ortega, Jose A. Perez, Terry L. Powell, Timothy Robertson, Ronnie L. Rodriguez, Tony Roybal, Dennis Smith, Gregory A. Walthius, Alfred J. Zarate and Ronald N. Rutherford, Petitioners, v. MUNICIPAL COURT OF the COUNTY OF VENTURA, State of California, Respondent, The PEOPLE of the State of California, By their attorney, Michael D. BRADBURY, District Attorney of Ventura County, Real Party in Interest.

Civ. 64684, Civ. 64685.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 3, California.

Jan. 13, 1983.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Feb. 10, 1983.

Hearing Denied March 10, 1983.

[139 Cal.App.3d 110] Richard E. Erwin, Public Defender, Ventura, for petitioners.

Dorothy L. Schechter, County Counsel, and Dennis L. Slivinski, Asst. County Counsel, Ventura, for respondent.

Michael D. Bradbury, Dist. Atty., Raymond J. Sinetar, Asst. Dist. Atty., Douglas P. Smith and Michael D. Schwartz, Deputy Dist. Attys., Ventura, for real party in interest.

Wilbur F. Littlefield, Public Defender, Laurence M. Sarnoff and John Hamilton Scott, Deputy Public Defenders, Los Angeles, as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Quin Denvir, State Public Defender, Charles M. Sevilla, Chief Deputy State Public Defender, as amicus curiae on behalf of petitioners.

Ira Reiner, City Atty., Jack L. Brown, Deputy City Atty., Supervisor Appellate Section and Greg Wolff, Deputy City Atty., as amicus curiae for real party in interest.

KLEIN, Presiding Justice.

An alternative writ of mandate was issued directing respondent Municipal Court of the County of Ventura (Municipal Court) to dismiss the misdemeanor cases against petitioners or to show cause why dismissal was not proper.

Dismissal would not be required although no trial occurred during the time set by Penal Code section 1382, ¹ if good cause could be shown for the delay.

Because the People have not met their burden of establishing good cause in the instant case, we reluctantly mandate the Municipal Court to dismiss the pending cases.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND ²

Petitioners are a group of 38 defendants who were charged with misdemeanors, and who were to be tried by jury in the Municipal Court. None remained in custody pending trial. Each petitioner answered ready for trial before the last day set by section 1382, and each moved for dismissal when that date passed and trial had not commenced. All motions were denied. Each petitioner then waived time for further proceedings until January 6, 1982, preserving, however, the section 1382 issue raised earlier.

Between April 9, 1981, the earliest date any petitioner was ready for trial, and June 1, 1981, the latest date any petitioner could be brought to trial without a showing of good cause for delay, the Municipal Court had an unprecedented backlog of criminal cases. Several factors contributed to the backlog.

First, the Municipal Court had a policy of returning all defendants who plead guilty in any court other than the master calendar court to the master calendar judge for sentencing From October 1, 1980, to January 30, 1981, the master calendar judge was the Honorable Bruce Clark. Judge Clark's sentencing practices differed from his recent predecessor-judges in that he refused in most cases to state intended sentences in the event of a guilty plea and also imposed heavy long-term jail sentences where probation violations were found.

even when another judge had been assigned to hear the case.

At the same time and throughout the relevant period, the district attorney's office maintained a rigid sentencing policy for misdemeanor cases, which hampered plea bargaining.

Reacting to the policies of the Municipal Court and the district attorney, the public defender, attorney for each petitioner, counseled clients to plead not guilty and to request a trial instead of attempting to plea bargain.

The backlog of criminal cases awaiting jury trials began to build at a sharply increased rate so that by April 20, 1981, approximately 100 such cases were trailing for trial.

On January 6, 1982, the Municipal Court set each case for hearing over the objection of counsel. Some petitioners (hereafter the Brown Group) received trial dates within ten days, and others (hereafter the Arreola Group) did not. Motions for dismissal were renewed and denied.

All petitioners sought an alternative writ of mandate, which petition was denied.

The Brown and Arreola Groups separately petitioned this court for alternative writs of mandamus, during which period of time all proceedings were stayed. On March 5, 1982, this court denied both petitions together.

A joint appeal was taken to the Supreme Court and a hearing was granted. The case was then retransferred to this court with directions to issue an alternative writ of mandamus/prohibition, upon which we now proceed.

ISSUE

Article 1, section 15, of the California Constitution guarantees criminal defendants the right to a speedy trial. The Legislature by the enactment of section 1382 quantified and implemented this right by establishing specific limits on the time during which a trial must take place. (People v. Johnson (1980) 26 Cal.3d 557, 563, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)

Under the terms of the section, a defendant not in custody is entitled to have a misdemeanor charge dismissed if the case is not tried within 45 days of the date of arraignment, unless good cause for the delay is shown. The issue before this court is whether the circumstances existing from April to June in Ventura County amounted to good cause not to dismiss the cases against petitioners.

DISCUSSION

Deciding whether the prosecution has met its burden of proving good cause is within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only for abuse. (Owens v. Superior Court (1980) 28 Cal.3d 238, 250-253, 168 Cal.Rptr. 466, 617 P.2d 1098; Sanchez v. Superior Court (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 884, 889, 182 Cal.Rptr. 703.) In reaching its decision, the trial court should consider all relevant factors. (Ibid.) General rules have evolved which limit this discretion.

1. Chronic congestion provides no basis for good cause.

One of the most important of the limiting parameters is that delay caused by chronic court congestion and overcrowding is not good cause. People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at 571, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738. ³ If the contrary were true, "[a]

                defendant's right to a speedy trial may be denied simply by the failure of the state to provide enough courtrooms or judges to enable defendant to come to trial within the statutory period." 4  (Ibid.)   Insufficient allocations of admittedly[139 Cal.App.3d 114]  limited public funds should not justify the deprivation of the right to speedy trial.  (Barker v. Wingo (1972) 407 U.S. 514, 538 [92 S.Ct. 2182, 2195, 33 L.Ed.2d 101, 121] (J. White concurring);  see also ABA Project on Standards for Crim.  Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, at pp. 27-28.)   To permit chronic congestion to excuse delay removes an important incentive for the Legislature to provide adequate court funding and puts fulfillment of a significant constitutional right at the mercy of budgetary politics
                

2. Exceptional circumstances not present.

While chronic congestion will not constitute good cause, court backlogs caused by exceptional circumstances will excuse delay in bringing a defendant to trial. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 571-572, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.) "Although it is fair to expect the state to provide the machinery needed to dispose of the usual business of the courts promptly, it does not appear feasible to impose the same requirements when certain unique, nonrecurring events have produced an inordinate number of cases for court disposition." (ABA Project on Standards for Crim. Justice, Standards Relating to Speedy Trial, supra, at p. 28.)

While the Municipal Court urges that the congestion here was caused by a unique and nonrecurring event--an unprecedented demand for trial, we do not believe that the demand herein constituted an exceptional circumstance.

The term "exceptional circumstance" has not been expressly defined. The ABA Standards illustrates its statement with a mass arrest example implying reference to unusual events outside the control of judicial administrators. An extraordinary increase in case load was also mentioned as an example in Lewis v. Superior Court (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 494, 498, 176 Cal.Rptr. 80, ⁵ as was an extraordinary circumstance which caused the absence of available judges. Whether it is foreseeable that the circumstance itself would impair speedy trial is also one factor to be considered. (See People v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 572, 162 Cal.Rptr. 431, 606 P.2d 738.)

Here, the delay was not caused by an abrupt increase in the number of criminal filings. Indeed, the number of criminal filings during this period actually decreased by 7.8 percent. Nor was there a sharp and unexpected decrease in the number of available judges. Although two judges were missing, a number of extra judges were assigned by the Judicial Council. Rather, the backlog occurred because an increased number of defendants perceived it in their best interest to exercise...