Arrington v. Sneed

Decision Date01 January 1856
Citation18 Tex. 135
PartiesCLAIBORNE ARRINGTON v. SEBRON G. SNEED.
CourtTexas Supreme Court
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

The relation of attorney and client is confidential and implies a mutual trust, confidence and good will, and where such mutual trust, confidence and good will is destroyed, by the act of the attorney, the client is justified in terminating the relation, by notice to the attorney to that effect.

A contract between attorney and client, the consideration of which was such advice to a party as was calculated to enable, if not to induce him, to elude the process of the law, and such advice to the officer, entrusted with the execution of process, as was calculated to induce him to violate his duty, cannot be sustained.

Whatever (legal) services were rendered were mixed with others, so contrary to public policy, that the law will not imply a promise to pay for them.

Where there was a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff below, but it manifestly appeared that the plaintiff's cause of action was not such as the law would permit a recovery upon, the court reversed the judgment and dismissed the suit.

Appeal from Travis. Tried below before the Hon. Thomas H. DuVal.

Suit, July 25, 1854, by appellee, against appellant. Petition as follows:

That heretofore, to wit: on the ____ day of May, A. D. 1854, the said Claiborne Arrington retained the services of your petitioner, as an attorney at law, to defend him, the said Arrington, and his son Joseph Arrington, against an indictment, preferred against each of them by the grand jury of the county of Caldwell, at the spring term of the district court of said county, A. D. 1854, for the crime of murder.

Your petitioner further states that being so retained, the said defendant, in consideration thereof, became indebted to your petitioner in the sum of five hundred dollars, which sum is due your petitioner from the said defendant, but which he has failed to pay.

Plaintiff further states that the said Claiborne Arrington secretes himself so that the ordinary process of law cannot be served upon him, and he is informed and believes, and therefore states the fact to be, that the said defendant is about to remove his property beyond this state, and that thereby your petitioner will probably lose his said debt of $500.

The premises considered, your petitioner prays that an original attachment may issue to be levied on the property of the said defendant, and that, on the final hearing hereof, he may have judgment against the said Arrington for the said sum of $500, and as in duty bound, etc. Sworn to.

Bond filed and attachment issued same day; returned levied. Property replevied. Answer, November 1, 1854, denying the fact of retainer, and alleging that as soon as defendant heard that plaintiff considered himself retained by him, he gave him notice to the contrary in writing; for further answer, denial of all and singular, etc.

November 15, 1854, amended petition filed, the first paragraph of which was the same as that of the original, and balance as follows:

And your petitioner being so retained did, on the day and year first aforesaid, counsel and advise the said Claiborne Arrington, in reference to said prosecution, and has since then and before the institution of this suit, been at great labor and trouble in investigating the law, applicable to the defense in the said prosecution, and in preparing the defense of said cause for trial, all of which was, and is, reasonably worth the sum of five hundred dollars, which sum the said Claiborne Arrington is justly indebted to your petitioner, and which the said Claiborne Arrington has failed and refused to pay.

Petitioner further states that on the 4th day of September, A. D. 1854, the said Claiborne Arrington voluntarily disclaimed and denied having retained and engaged your petitioner to defend against said prosecutions, and released your petitioner from all obligation and responsibility connected with said prosecutions. Prayer accordingly.

Amendment of the answer, denying the allegations of the amended petition, except as to the notice to plaintiff that he was not retained by defendant; allegations also of new matter, covering the evidence afterwards introduced by defendant at the trial.

The evidence introduced by the plaintiff at the trial, was as follows:

W. S. Oldham, witness for plaintiff, said that he, and the plaintiff and the defendant and his son Joseph, had an interview in the spring of 1854, and that said defendant told him, witness, and said Sneed, that he wanted them to defend him and his son Joseph against the indictment which had been found against them in Caldwell county, for murder; that he hoped they would be merciful, or words to that effect; that witness and said plaintiff thereupon advised said defendant how to proceed to procure the testimony for his defense against said charge of murder; that the interview took place on the south side of the river, near Judge Sneed's rancho; that witness, plaintiff, defendant, and his son Joseph, came on to Austin together, with the understanding that said plaintiff should see George Scott, sheriff of Travis county, and get him to agree not to serve the capias on the said defendant and his son Joseph until just before court at Lockhart; that witness has a suit pending against defendant for the same amount as the one now on trial, founded on said contract to defend said defendant and son; that witness was not at home when said suits were instituted against said defendant, and that he regretted at any time that they had been brought, but that he told his partner that, inasmuch as defendant had...

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10 cases
  • Mandell and Wright v. Thomas, B--1214
    • United States
    • Texas Supreme Court
    • April 16, 1969
    ...not leave Mrs. Thomas without a remedy. Thigpen v. Locke, 363 S.W.2d 247 (Tex.1962); Flanagan v. Pearson, 42 Tex. 1 (1874); Arrington v. Sneed, 18 Tex. 135 (1856); Bell v. Ramirez, 299 S.W. 655 (Tex.Civ.App., 1927, writ ref'd); Jinks v. Whitaker, 195 S.W.2d 814 (Tex.Civ.App., 1946, writ ref......
  • Texas Commerce Bank-New Braunfels, Nat. Ass'n v. Townsend
    • United States
    • Texas Court of Appeals
    • February 21, 1990
    ...on a premise that the bank had a duty to disobey the command given in the writ. Public policy would preclude such an action. Arrington v. Sneed, 18 Tex. 135 (1856) (attorney cannot recover value of legal services consisting of advice calculated to frustrate execution of court process). We h......
  • In re Boone
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of California
    • December 7, 1897
    ...more rigorously enforced than this one. The relation of attorney and client is one of mutual trust, confidence, and good will. Arrington V. Sneed, 18 Tex. 135. The attorney must use all the care, skill, and diligence his command on behalf of his client. The relation being, in the highest de......
  • Musser v. Adler
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • April 30, 1885
    ...and assume facts in issue. (5) Defendants' first and second instructions should have been given. R. S. U. S. 1878, sec. 1782; Arrington v. Sneed, 18 Tex. 135; Goodenough v. Spencer, 46 How. 347. (6) The verdict is insufficient, indefinite and uncertain. “The amount of the recovery” is not a......
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