Treacy v. State

• Decision Date: 17 April 1986
• Docket Number: No. 70516,70516
• Citation: 131 Misc.2d 849,501 N.Y.S.2d 1005
• Parties: Michael TREACY, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 1005

501 N.Y.S.2d 1005

131 Misc.2d 849

Michael TREACY, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 70516.

Court of Claims of New York.

April 17, 1986.

Prisoners' Legal Services of N.Y., Albany, for claimant; (John D. Charles, of counsel).

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany, (Frederick H. McGown, III., Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel).

MEMORANDUM-DECISION

HAROLD E. KOREMAN, Presiding Judge.

Claimant, an inmate in defendant's correctional system, brings this action sounding in malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, violation of statutory rights, and negligent investigation, all of which are premised on his confinement and punishment pursuant to an Inmate Misbehavior Report and subsequent Superintendent's Hearing.

On October 13, 1983 an Inmate Misbehavior Report charging claimant with possession of escape paraphernalia and contraband was issued, and claimant was thereupon placed in a special housing unit. A Superintendent's Hearing was convened on October 19, 1983 and was completed on October 26, 1983. The officer in charge found claimant guilty and assessed a penalty of 180 days confinement to special housing unit and a loss of good behavior allowance. This disposition was reviewed and affirmed by the Departmental Review Board on December 29, 1983. On March 28, 1984 claimant brought an article 78 proceeding seeking judicial review of the Superintendent's determination. On December 12, 1984 the Commissioner of the Department of Correctional Services administratively reversed the Superintendent's disposition, restored claimant's lost good behavior allowance, and expunged all references to the misbehavior from claimant's records. ^* On January 22, 1985 the Appellate Division granted the Commissioner's motion to dismiss the petition on the ground of mootness.

The rules of the Department of Correctional Services permit the confinement of an inmate to a cell where there are "reasonable grounds to believe that an inmate ... represents an immediate threat to the safety, security or order of the facility" (7 NYCRR 251-1.6[a]; see Collins v. Coughlin, 83 A.D.2d 657, 658, 442 N.Y.S.2d 191). As was the case here, confinement to a special housing unit may commence with the issuance of a misbehavior report (7 NYCRR 251-1.6, 251-3.1, 251-5.1, 304.1[c], 304.4). "[T]he construction given statutes and regulations by the agency responsible for their administration, if not irrational or unreasonable, should be upheld" (Gunn v. Ward, 71 A.D.2d 856, 857, 419 N.Y.S.2d 182 [citing Matter of Howard v. Wyman, 28 N.Y.2d 434, 438, 322 N.Y.S.2d 683, 271 N.E.2d 528], affd. 52 N.Y.2d 1017, 438 N.Y.S.2d 302, 420 N.E.2d 100). In this Court's opinion the more restrictive confinement here complained of, imposed under department rules, will not give rise to a common law action for false imprisonment. While the law does recognize an action for money damages for the intentional and malicious segregation of an inmate (see Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158), such an action is predicated on the malicious conduct of corrections officers or officials. In contrast, the presence of malice is not an essential element of a common law action for false imprisonment (Broughton v. State of New York, 37 N.Y.2d 451, 457, 373 N.Y.S.2d 87, 335 N.E.2d 310). To hold the Corrections Department liable for actions sounding in false imprisonment would subject it to a higher standard than heretofore required. This threat of civil liability, even in the absence of malice or bad faith, would place a severe limitation on the ability of the Commissioner to control and operate correctional facilities, a limitation which this Court should not and will not occasion (see Wilkinson v. Skinner, 34 N.Y.2d 53, 62, 356 N.Y.S.2d 15, 312 N.E.2d 158 supra).

Turning to the claim for malicious prosecution, we do not believe that a Superintendent's Hearing is the type of proceeding which will form the basis for a subsequent malicious prosecution claim. Although claimant correctly points out that certain administrative proceedings are sufficiently akin to judicial proceedings so as to permit actions for malicious prosecution (see Groat v. Town Board of Glenville, 73 A.D.2d 426, 426 N.Y.S.2d 339) it must be noted that this rule applies to administrative proceedings which provide for a "hearing and trial of the issues on evidence and testimony under oath, with the right of cross examination" (supra, at p 429). In contrast, a Superintendent's Hearing is not a full-scale adversarial hearing. The only requirements of said proceeding are that the inmate be (1) apprised of the charges against him in writing at least 24 hours prior to any hearing, (2) accorded an opportunity to respond to said charges, and (3) given a written...