Artis ex rel. S.A. v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 20 March 2008
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 07-0932 (JDB).
• Citation: 543 F.Supp.2d 15
• Parties: Sharon ARTIS, for S.A., a minor, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

543 F.Supp.2d 15

Sharon ARTIS, for S.A., a minor, et al., Plaintiffs, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 07-0932 (JDB).

United States District Court, District of Columbia.

March 20, 2008.

Roxanne D. Neloms, James E. Brown & Associates, Washington, DC, for Plaintiffs.

Eden Ilene Miller, Office of the Attorney General for the District of Columbia, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN D. BATES, District Judge.

Twenty-five parents, on behalf of their minor children, initiated this action against the District of Columbia and Clifford Janey in his official capacity as Superintendent of D.C. Public Schools (collectively "the District"). Plaintiffs seek to obtain reimbursement of attorney's fees incurred in administrative hearings conducted pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq. The District has now filed a motion for partial dismissal of the complaint, arguing that fifteen students were not "prevailing parties" in the underlying administrative hearings and that they are therefore not entitled to attorney's fees. After the District's motion was filed, plaintiffs voluntarily withdrew the claims of seven minors, and hence the "prevailing party" status remains contested for only eight students.¹ Upon careful consideration of the District's motion, the parties' memoranda, plaintiffs' complaint and exhibits,² the applicable law, and the entire record, and for the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant in part and deny in part the District's motion.

BACKGROUND

I. Statutory Background

Under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA" or "the Act"), all states that receive federal educational assistance must establish policies and procedures to ensure that "a free appropriate public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State...." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A). A free appropriate public education is provided through the development and implementation of an Individualized Education Program for each disabled student, which describes the student's present academic level, determines the student's educational goals, and sets out required educational and related services, including the extent of the student's participation in a regular classroom. 20 U.S.C. § 1414(d)(1)(A). If a parent objects to the educational placement of their child, they have a right to a "due process hearing" before an impartial hearing officer, which shall be conducted by a State or local educational agency. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(f)(1).

If the parent prevails at the administrative hearing, he or she may be entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B); see Moore v. District of Columbia, 907 F.2d 165, 166 (D.C.Cir.1990) (en banc) (IDEA authorizes parent who prevails in administrative hearing to recover attorney's fees). "It is well-established in this Circuit that section 1415(i)(3)(B) also authorizes a parent who prevails in an IDEA administrative hearing to recover attorney's fees by filing suit for the fees in federal court." Abarca ex rel. C.A. v. District of Columbia, 2007 WL 1794101, at *1 (D.D.C. June 19, 2007) (quoting Kaseman v. District of Columbia, 329 F.Supp.2d 20, 23 (D.D.C.2004)).

II. Factual Background

Because a determination of prevailing party status is dependent upon a review of the administrative hearings, the Court will briefly describe the relevant facts related to the claims of the seven students remaining at issue.³

A. S.A.

S.A. is a fifteen-year old District of Columbia resident who is currently enrolled at the Mamie D. Lee School. Compl. Ex. A, Decision and Order at 3.⁴ In a January 13, 2006, administrative due process complaint, S.A. argued that she "had been denied access to free and appropriate education when [the District] failed to complete a neuropsychological evaluation." Pls.' Opp. at 6. For relief, she asked the hearing officer to order the District to fund an independent neuropsychological evaluation and to reconvene a meeting to review her placement. After the due process hearing, the hearing officer determined that the District had sustained its burden of proof on the "essential issue [of] whether [it] failed to perform a Neuropsychological Evaluation for this student." Ex. A, Decision and Order at 5. The hearing officer determined that "a preponderance of the evidence supports the contention of [the District] that a Neuropsychological Evaluation was not warranted for this student, as the student was extensively evaluated and she did not manifest any significant or traumatic brain injury." Id. Accordingly, the hearing officer concluded that the District had not denied S.A. a free appropriate public education. Id. Notwithstanding these conclusions, however, the hearing officer ordered the District to fund an independent neuropsychological evaluation of S.A. and to reconvene a team meeting to review her placement for the 2005-2006 school year. Id. at 5-6.

B. R.F.

R.F. is a seventeen-year old student at Spingarn Senior High School in the District of Columbia. Ex. H, Decision and Order at 2. On August 7, 2006, he filed a due process complaint alleging that he was denied a free appropriate public education based upon the District's failure to perform a triennial reevaluation. Id. at 3. His student evaluation plan indicated that a Vineland Adoptive Scales evaluation and a vocational assessment should have been conducted, but the evaluations were never performed. Thus, the hearing officer determined that the District "did not meet its procedural obligations" under IDEA. Id. at 5. However, the hearing officer also took into account the fact that the violation was procedural. He noted that R.F. did not challenge the appropriateness of his current Individualized Education Program, and that he had already received the maximum allowed thirty-two hours of specialized instruction. Thus, the hearing officer concluded that R.F. had not been denied a free appropriate public education. The officer also ordered the District to perform the two assessments within thirty days and to convene a team meeting to revise R.F.'s Individualized Education Program, if necessary. Id. at 5-8.

C. A.H.

A.H. is a nine-year old student who filed his due process complaint after he transferred to the Moten Center from Webb Elementary School. Ex. M, Hearing Officer's Determination at 1. A compensatory education plan had previously been developed for him establishing that he was entitled to "255 hours of specialized instruction and 8.5 hours of counseling services. The services were to begin during summer school 2005-2006. Remaining hours were to be provided in one on one tutoring during the 2006-2007 School Year." Id. at 2. When A.H. filed his due process complaint on July 5, 2006, he argued that the District had failed to implement his compensatory education plan.

The hearing officer determined that the District had provided the counseling services and specialized services that were owed during summer school, but that the District had not yet started to provide the required one-on-one tutoring during the academic year. Id. Because A.H. had recently transferred to the Moten Center, the District requested additional time to provide the tutoring and represented that it could begin to provide the services in two weeks at the student's home. The hearing officer granted the District the additional time it requested and ordered the tutoring services to commence by December 15, 2006. Id. at 3.

D. J.G.

J.G. is an eight-year old student at Davis Elementary School. Ex. K, Hearing Officer's Determination at 1. On June 6, 2006, he filed a due process complaint alleging that the District had "failed to convene an [Individualized Education Program] team meeting upon the parent's request." Ex. K, Due Process Compl. at 3. On the very day that J.G. filed his due process complaint, the District had attempted to convene a team meeting. However, the meeting had to be cancelled based upon the absence of the special education teacher. At the administrative hearing, the hearing officer noted the District's previous attempt to hold the meeting and determined that J.G. was not denied any educational benefit because the meeting could still be held over the summer recess. The hearing officer's order stated as follows: "DCPS agrees to convene [a multi-disciplinary team] meeting by August 24, 2006 to review and revise the student's [Individualized Education Program] and discuss any parent's concerns." Ex. K, Hearing Officer's Determination at 2.

J.G. filed a second due process complaint on July 6, 2006, arguing that the District had denied him a free appropriate public education by failing to implement his compensatory education plan in a timely manner. Ex. L, Due Process Compl. at 3. It had previously been determined that J.G. was entitled to thirty-three hours of occupational therapy to be provided by an occupational therapist. Id. The District responded that it was implementing the plan and that there was no specific deadline for its completion. Ex. L., Decision and Order at 3.

The hearing officer's determination stated as follows:

In this matter, [the District] has sustained its burden of proof. The critical and sole issue in this case is whether [the District] timely implemented the student's Compensatory Education Plan, which required [occupational therapy] services. A preponderance of the evidence supports the contention of [the District] that the [occupational therapy] services were being provided to J.G. Undisputed evidence on the record clearly indicated that [the District] implemented the Compensatory Education Plan for J.G. by providing [occupational therapy] services required by the Plan.... Under this set of circumstances, [the District] has provided a free appropriate public education (FAPE).

Id. at 5. Hence, the hearing officer merely ordered the District to...