Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County
Decision Date | 03 December 1969 |
Citation | 223 Tenn. 535,1 Pack 535,448 S.W.2d 408 |
Parties | , 223 Tenn. 535 Anately A. ARUTANOFF, Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN GOVERNMENT OF NASHVILLE AND DAVIDSON COUNTY, Tennessee, Appellees. |
Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
Edward Sisk and William R. Willis, Jr., of Willis, Knight, Chambers & Barr, Nashville, for appellant.
John P. Branham, Asst. Metropolitan Atty., Nashville, for appellees.
Appellant Anately A. Arutanoff was found guilty of violating Metropolitan Ordinance No. 67--255, § 16, in that he operated a motorcycle in Metropolitan Nashville without a protective helmet. He has appealed on the ground the ordinance is unconstitutional.
The State Statute and the Metropolitan Ordinance based thereon are as follows:
'T.C.A. § 59--934. (formerly § 59--944) 'Crash helmet required for driver and passenger.--The driver of a motorcycle or motor driven cycle and any passenger thereon shall be required to wear a crash helmet of a type approved by the commissioner of safety.'
The contention the ordinance and the statute are unconstitutional rests on four propositions: (1) That the statute and ordinance are invalid attempts to exercise the State police power, because the requirement that motorcycle operators wear helmets bears no reasonable relationship to the safety of the public. (2) That the statute is so vague as not to meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Law of the Land Section of the Tennessee Constitution, Article 1, Section 8, in that no standard is set for the helmet to be worn, except that adopted by the State Commissioner of Safety. (3) That the statute and ordinance in requiring appellant to protect himself when the safety of others is not affected is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy in violation of the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. (4) That the statute and ordinance, in regulating apparel of motorcycle operators only, makes an unreasonable classification in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Article 11, § 8 of the Tennessee Constitution.
We have considered these contentions and find them to be without merit.
The nature of police power and the role of the courts in case of its application by the legislature is discussed in Motlow v. State, 125 Tenn. 547, 145 S.W. 177, L.R.A.1916F, 177, as follows:
125 Tenn. 589--590, 145 S.W. 188.
Appellant's argument on his first proposition runs along this line: The police power derives from the maxim sic utere tuo alienum non laedas, 1 the true meaning of which has come to be accepted as 'So use your own property as not to injure the rights of another.' Jeffries v. Williams, 5 Exch. 797. That, since riding without a helmet will hurt no one except the motorcycle operator, the 'rights of another' are not involved. The rights of another not being involved, the statute has no reasonable relationship to the public safety.
This argument is predicated on an erroneous premise. The police power is not derived alone from the maxim mentioned. In the particular regard involved in this case it is derived from the maxim, salus populi suprema lex. 2
The first maxim justifies the use of police power in relation to an owner's property rights. The latter maxim concerns among other things limitation of personal rights, such as conduct. Concerning this maxim it has been written, 'From the principle under consideration, and from the very nature of the social compact on which municipal law is theoretically founded, and under which every man, when he enters society, gives up part of his natural freedom, result those laws which, in certain cases, authorize the infliction of penalties, the deprivation of liberty, and even the destruction of life. * * *' Broom's Legal Maxims, 8th Ed., H. Chitty, p. 7.
The police power being based on the Salus Populi maxim, as well as the Sic Utere maxim, this power may be exercised by the enactment of prohibitory or restrictive measures directed to the end of fostering the public welfare by securing the safety of an individual as a class member. And when a law is enacted to secure the safety of the members of a class, the test of constitutionality is not limited to the question whether the conduct of a member of the class will probably result in harm to others outside the class, the test includes, whether there is danger to the safety and well-being of the class members by the practice sought to be regulated, and whether the regulation is reasonably designed to guard against this danger.
The validity of this statement is recognized in State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, R.I., 241 A.2d 625. Although that case was decided primarily on the proposition the exposure of the motorcyclist to road hazards could reasonably be expected to increase the danger of operating other motor vehicles on the highways, that court did say:
' * * * we are not persuaded that the legislature is powerless to prohibit individuals from pursing a course of conduct which could conceivably result in their becoming public charges.'
The correctness of this view is also recognized in cases to be cited.
Since the police power of this state is at least co-extensive with that of any other state of the union, being limited here by Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution of Tennessee, which has been said to be equivalent in effect to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Motlow v. State, supra, the holdings of the courts of other states are particularly persuasive, and we find that in all of the states where the question of the constitutionality of such regulations has come up, only two states hold for unconstitutionality. These are Illinois and Michigan. 3 On the other hand, similar statutes have been held to be constitutional by the Louisiana Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Supreme Court, the North Carolina Supreme Court, the North Dakota Supreme Court, the Rhode Island Supreme Court, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. 4
These cases sustain regulations like that here involved on the ground the regulations are designed to secure both the safety of the motorcyclist as a class and the safety of the public generally. With respect to the safety of the public generally, the approving cases recognize the possibility of loss of control of the motorcycle to the harm of the motoring public, because of the unprotected and thus unsafe condition of the motorcyclist. We also recognize this possibility.
We are satisfied the conclusion reached by the majority is the correct one, so we hold the statute is valid on the grounds that it is a proper exercise of the police power in behalf of the safety of the motorcyclist as a class, and the safety of the motoring public generally.
As to the contention the statute is unconstitutional for vagueness, we agree with those...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Buhl v. Hannigan
...Kautz 341 Pa.Super. 374, 491 A.2d 864; State v. Lombardi (1972) 110 R.H. 776, 298 A.2d 141; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969) 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; State v. Acker (1971) 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038; State v. Solomon (1969) 128 Vt. 197, 260......
-
Planned Parenthood v. Sundquist
...phrases meaning one and the same thing," see, e.g., Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 312; "are equivalent in effect," see, e.g., Arutanoff, 223 Tenn. at 541, 448 S.W.2d at 411; "are identical," see, e.g., Nichols, 640 S.W.2d at 16; "is the exact equivalent," see, e.g., Maloney, 108 Tenn. at 88, 65 S.W. ......
-
Planned Parenthood v Sunquist
...phrases meaning one and the same thing," see, e.g., Hale, 840 S.W.2d at 312; "are equivalent in effect," see, e.g., Arutanoff, 223 Tenn. at 541, 448 S.W.2d at 411; "are identical," see, e.g., Nichols, 640 S.W.2d at 16; "is the exact equivalent," see, e.g., Maloney, 108 Tenn. at 88, 65 S.W. ......
-
People v. Kohrig
...374, 491 A.2d 864; State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi (1968), 104 R.I. 28, 241 A.2d 625; Arutanoff v. Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County (1969), 223 Tenn. 535, 448 S.W.2d 408; Ex Parte Smith (Tex.Crim.App.1969), 441 S.W.2d 544; State v. Acker (1971), 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.......