People v. Kohrig

• Decision Date: 01 October 1986
• Docket Number: 63075 and 63224,62799,Nos. 62719,s. 62719
• Citation: 498 N.E.2d 1158,101 Ill.Dec. 650,113 Ill.2d 384
• Parties: , 101 Ill.Dec. 650, 55 USLW 2209 The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois et al., Appellants, v. Elizabeth J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 1158

498 N.E.2d 1158

113 Ill.2d 384, 101 Ill.Dec. 650, 55

USLW 2209

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois et al., Appellants, v. Elizabeth J. KOHRIG et al., Appellees.

Nos. 62719, 62799, 63075 and 63224.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 1, 1986.

Robert L. Stern, Stephen M. Shapiro, Mayer, Brown & Platt, Chicago, for brief amicus curiae for The Illinois Ass'n of Chiefs of Police, The Illinois Ass'n of Health Maintenance Organizations, The Chicago Committee on Trauma of The American College of Surgeons, The Greater Chicago Safety Council-Illinois Safety Council, The Illinois Nurses Ass'n, The Illinois Head Injury Ass'n, The Illinois Public Health Ass'n, and The Illinois Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics.

William J. Harte, Ltd., Chicago, for amicus curiae State Representative John Cullerton; William J. Harte, of counsel.

Philip W. Tone, Jerold S. Solovy, Sp. Asst. Attys. Gen., Chicago, for appellant; Glenn K. Seidenfeld, Barry Levenstam, Kristen E. Lehker, Jenner & Block, Chicago, of counsel.

R. Edward Veltman, Jr., John A. Guzzardo, Centralia, Ill., for appellee, Elizabeth J. Kohrig.

James J. Hagle, Zimmerly, Gadau, Selin & Otto, Champaign, for one of the appellees-Regina Greene.

PER CURIAM:

The defendants in these four consolidated cases were issued traffic citations for failure to wear seat safety belts while operating their motor vehicles on a street or highway in violation of section 12-603.1 of the Illinois Vehicle Code (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1 (hereinafter the section)). In each case, the trial court concluded that the section was unconstitutional and dismissed the charge. The State appealed each case directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (94 Ill.2d R. 302(a)), and the cases were consolidated for purposes of appeal. Only two of the four defendants--Elizabeth J. Kohrig and Regina L. Greene--have filed briefs in this court; however, various parties have been permitted to file briefs as amicus curiae.

At issue is whether the section, which requires drivers of motor vehicles and their front-seat passengers to wear safety belts when driving on a public highway or street, violates the due process guarantees of the State and Federal constitutions. Ill. Const. 1970, art. I, sec. 2; U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1.

The section, which became effective on July 1, 1985, provides in part:

"(a) Each driver and front seat passenger of a motor vehicle operated on a street or highway in this State shall wear a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt; except that, a child less than 6 years of age shall be protected as required pursuant to the Child Passenger Protection Act. Each driver of a motor vehicle transporting a child 6 years of age or more, but less than 16 years of age, in the front seat of the motor vehicle shall secure the child in a properly adjusted and fastened seat safety belt." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(a).)

The statute also provides that certain persons are exempt from complying with the seat-belt-use requirement, including persons with a written medical waiver from a physician or government agency; those persons frequently stopping and leaving the vehicle or delivering property from the vehicle if its speed between stops does not exceed 15 miles per hour; and drivers operating a vehicle in reverse. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(1), (b)(4).) Certain vehicles also are exempt from the statute's requirements, including motorcycles, motorized pedalcycles, and vehicles manufactured prior to 1965. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(b)(5), (b)(9).) Violators of the section are guilty of a "petty offense and subject to a fine not te exceed $25." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 95 1/2, par. 12-603.1(d).

At the outset we note that, in reviewing the constitutionality of Illinois' mandatory-seat-belt law, this court does not join in the debate over whether the law is desirable or necessary. Our nation was founded in large part on the democratic principle that the powers of government are to be exercised by the people through their elected representatives in the legislature, subject only to certain constitutional limitations. Although this court has never hesitated to invalidate laws that it believes to be unconstitutional, we emphasize that our role is a limited one. The issue here in "not what the legislature should do but what the legislature can do." City of Wichita v. White (1970), 205 Kan. 408, 409, 469 P.2d 287, 288.

Defendant Greene contends that the section violates her fundamental right to privacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. (U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 2.) Additionally, both defendants argue that the section is beyond the police powers of the legislature and thus violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal constitutions. We first turn to the issue of whether the section violates defendants' fundamental right to privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment.

Regulations that limit a person's constitutional right to privacy may be justified only by a " 'compelling state interest,' " and the legislation "must be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake." (Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 155, 93 S.Ct. 705, 728, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 178. See also Carey v. Population Services International (1977), 431 U.S. 678, 686, 97 S.Ct. 2010, 2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675, 685.) However, " 'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" [citation]' " (Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2639, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 462, quoting Roe v. Wade (1973), 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705, 726, 35 L.Ed.2d 147, 176), or those liberties " 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition' " (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2844, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, 146; see also Moore v. City of East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 540) are included in the right of privacy guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Supreme Court has selected only a few rights for such an esteemed status: the "privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 65, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2639, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, 462. See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, 148; Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 712-13, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 1166, 47 L.Ed.2d 405, 420-21.

Moreover, recognizing that a court is "most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution," the Supreme Court has emphasized that there should be "great resistance" to further expanding the substantive due process right of privacy. (Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. ----, ----, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 2846, 92 L.Ed.2d 140, 148.) Thus, attempts by litigants to expand the privacy right beyond matters relating to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relations, abortion, child rearing and education have largely been unsuccessful. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick (1986), 478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841, 92 L.Ed.2d 140 (right to privacy does not encompass right to engage in homosexual sodomy); Kelley v. Johnson (1977), 425 U.S. 238, 244, 96 S.Ct. 1440, 1444, 47 L.Ed.2d 708, 714 (police officer does not have privacy right to choose hairstyle); Paul v. Davis (1976), 424 U.S. 693, 96 S.Ct. 1155, 47 L.Ed.2d 405 (no privacy protection of reputation); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973), 413 U.S. 49, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (privacy right does not encompass right of adults to watch obscene movies in places of public accommodation).

In the present case it cannot be said that defendant Greene's claimed right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt on a public highway resembles those liberties identified by the Supreme Court as being included in the right of privacy protected by the fourteenth amendment. Although the section in question implicates a person's interest in "liberty" in the sense that it restricts his freedom of choice, the law here does not regulate those intimate decisions relating to marriage, procreation, child rearing, education or family that have heretofore been recognized as deserving of heightened constitutional protection. (See Wells v. State (1985), 130 Misc.2d 113, 495 N.Y.S.2d 591 (mandatory-seat-belt-use law does not violate right of privacy). Cf. People v. Thomas (1984), 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18, 206 Cal.Rptr. 84 (statute requiring the securing of a child passenger in a seat-restraint system does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right of privacy); State v. Fetterly (1969), 254 Or. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (motorcycle helmet law does not violate defendant's right of privacy).) Nor do we think that the right to decide whether or not to wear a safety belt is "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty" such that "neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed" (Palko v. Connecticut (1937), 302 U.S. 319, 325-26, 58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288, 292), or a liberty "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" (Moore v. East Cleveland (1977), 431 U.S. 494, 503, 97 S.Ct. 1932, 1938, 52 L.Ed.2d 531, 540). The States historically have been given a wide latitude to regulate the use of motor vehicles (Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc. (1959), 359 U.S. 520, 530, 79 S.Ct. 962, 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1003, 1010), and the individual driver's autonomy on the road has, out of necessity for the public safety and welfare, been significantly curtailed by State regulation. Like the court in Bisenius v. Karns (1969), 42 Wis.2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed (1969), 395 U.S. 709, 89 S.Ct. 2033, 23 L.Ed.2d 655, we...