Aseptic Packaging Council v. State

• Decision Date: 17 February 1994
• Parties: ASEPTIC PACKAGING COUNCIL, et al. v. STATE of Maine.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 457

637 A.2d 457

38 ERC 1514

ASEPTIC PACKAGING COUNCIL, et al. v. STATE of Maine.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Sept. 10, 1993.

Decided Feb. 17, 1994.

Joseph Ferraro (orally), Shea & Gould, New York City, John M.R. Paterson, Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson, Robert E. Mittel, Mittel, Asen, Eggert, Hunter & Altshuler, Portland, for plaintiffs.

Lucinda White (orally), Asst. Atty. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.

COLLINS, Justice.

Aseptic Packaging Council and Tetra Pak, Inc. (collectively, the "Council") appeal from entry of a summary judgment in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.) in favor of the State of Maine. The Council's complaint asserted that 32 M.R.S.A. § 1868(4) (Supp.1992), which bans the sale of aseptic beverage containers, violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Maine Constitutions, violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and violates 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). The Council argues that the trial court committed an error of law by granting the State's motion for a summary judgment. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In 1989, the Maine Legislature amended the "bottle bill," 32 M.R.S.A. §§ 1861-73 (1988 & Supp.1992), to provide:

No beverage may be sold or offered for sale to consumers in this State: ... Aseptic and composite material beverage containers. In a container composed, in whole or in part, of aluminum and plastic or of aluminum and paper in combination where those materials are for practical reasons inseparable. No milk or dairy-derived products in liquid form to which additional flavoring ingredients have been added may be sold in containers prohibited under this subsection.

32 M.R.S.A. § 1868(4) (Supp.1992). ¹ This amendment was part of a scheme that added juice containers to the deposit and redemption system. The statement of facts that accompanied the amendment asserted that "aseptic packages, ... because of the wide variety of materials used in their construction, are unrecyclable." Comm.Amend. A to L.D. 1931, No. H-640 (114th Legis.1989).

The Council filed a complaint against the State asserting that 32 M.R.S.A. § 1868(4) violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the U.S. and Maine Constitutions, the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In opposition to the State's motion for a summary judgment, the Council submitted seven affidavits demonstrating that "aseptic packages were actually being collected and recycled together with gable top cartons in more than 1000 school programs in 15 states, and in curbside programs serving more than 850,000 households in six states, including 270,000 households in western Massachusetts." The trial court granted the State's motion for a summary judgment in a written opinion. The Council filed a timely appeal.

Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." ... We review the evidence before the Court in the light most favorable to the party against whom the judgment was granted to determine if the trial court committed an error of law. "Summary judgment in a defendant's favor is proper when the plaintiff has the burden of proof on an essential element at trial and it is clear that the defendant would have been entitled to a directed verdict at trial if the plaintiff presented no more evidence than was before the court at the hearing on the motion for summary judgment."

Dube v. Homeowners Assistance Corp., 628 A.2d 1040, 1041 (Me.1993) (citations omitted).

"All legislative enactments are presumed constitutional, and the party challenging the constitutionality of a statute bears the burden of proof. This presumption, however, is not absolute; legislation which violates an express mandate of the constitution is invalid even though it is expedient or is otherwise in the public interest." Maine Beer & Wine Wholesalers v. State, 619 A.2d 94, 97 (Me.1993) (citations omitted); e.g., Spiller v. State, 627 A.2d 513, 515 (Me.1993). "... [S]tatutes ... will be construed, where possible, to preserve their constitutionality [and the] ... party attacking the constitutionality of a state statute ... carries a heavy burden of persuasion." Maine Milk Producers v. Com'r. of Agriculture, 483 A.2d 1213, 1218 (Me.1984) (citations omitted); see Eastler v. State Tax Assessor, 499 A.2d 921, 925 (Me.1985). A statute's unconstitutionality "must be established to such a degree of certainty as to leave no room for reasonable doubt." Orono-Veazie Water Dist. v. Penobscot Cty. Water Co., 348 A.2d 249, 253 (Me.1975); e.g., Small v. Gartley, 363 A.2d 724, 732 (Me.1976).

Equal Protection

Section 1868(4) involves neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class. Thus, it will survive an equal protection challenge if its classifications are rationally related to some legitimate governmental purpose. "A party alleging that a legislative classification violates equal protection 'must show "by clear and irrefutable evidence its arbitrariness and irrationally discriminatory nature." ' " State v. Eaton, 577 A.2d 1162, 1166 (Me.1990) (citations omitted); e.g., State v. Chapin, 610 A.2d 259, 261 (Me.1992).

The legislative statement of fact which accompanied 32 M.R.S.A. § 1868(4) stated that "aseptic packages, ... because of the wide variety of materials used in their construction, are unrecyclable." However, the rationality of a statute is not determined solely by looking to the legislative statement of fact. Instead, we consider whether any conceivable state of facts either known, or which can reasonably be assumed, supports the legislative action. F.C.C. v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. 2096, 2101-02, 124 L.Ed.2d 211 (1993); National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Smith, 376 A.2d 456, 460 (Me.1977); see State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 753 (Me.1974). The State has no burden to come forward with such "conceivable state of facts," but rather, it is the contestant who retains the burden of proving that no conceivable state of facts exists. F.C.C., 508 U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2101-02; National Hearing Aid Centers, 376 A.2d at 460.

The U.S. Supreme Court has recently stated:

On rational-basis review, a classification in a statute ... comes to us bearing a strong presumption of validity, and those attacking the rationality of the legislative classification have the burden "to negative every conceivable basis which might support it[.]" Moreover, because we never require a legislature to articulate its reasons for enacting a statute, it is entirely irrelevant for constitutional purposes whether the conceived reason for the challenged distinction actually motivated the legislature. Thus, the absence of " 'legislative facts' " explaining the distinction "[o]n the record," has no significance in rational-basis analysis. In other words, a legislative choice is not subject to courtroom fact-finding and may be based on rational speculation unsupported by evidence or empirical data. " 'Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function.' " (citations omitted).

F.C.C., 508 U.S. at ---- - ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2101-02. The Council argues that a court has a right and an obligation to go beyond the face of a statute to examine all of the facts and circumstances surrounding its enactment and effect. This statement is correct insofar as it implies that a court, in performing a rational basis analysis, may go beyond the face of the statute to determine whether any conceivable state of facts exists to support the statute. However, in performing such a review, a court is not the guarantor of the accuracy of legislative facts. Even statutes based upon mistaken legislative facts may withstand constitutional challenge. ² Recently, in F.C.C., 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2102, the United States Supreme Court has taken a broader stance by indicating that the existence or non-existence of legislative fact finding has no significance in a rational basis analysis. In other words, a court, in performing a rational-basis analysis, is not limited to the face of the statute and may go beyond its face in determining whether any conceivable state of facts exists to support a statute. However, this analysis does not require a court to conduct an independent examination of the actual legislative facts that underlie a statute in order to ensure their correctness. It is for the legislature, not the courts, to judge the wisdom of legislative action and to evaluate legislative facts. F.C.C., 508 U.S. at ----, 113 S.Ct. at 2109 (1993); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. at ----, 112 S.Ct. at 2332.

The Council presented evidence aimed at proving that the legislature's statement of fact, that declared aseptic containers not recyclable, was mistaken. Even assuming that the legislature's statement of fact was mistaken, such a mistake is insufficient, in itself, to negate any conceivable state of facts which exist to support the statute. The Council failed to demonstrate that the legislature could not rationally conclude that recycling, although technically possible, was not practical in the State of Maine. Thus, we hold that the trial court did not commit an error of law in finding that the State was entitled to a judgment on this issue.

Due Process

[T]he requirements of due process in the exercise of the State's police power [are] as follows:

1. The object of the exercise must be to provide for the public welfare.

2. The legislative means employed must be appropriate to the achievement of the ends sought.

3. The manner of exercising the power must not be unduly arbitrary or capricious.

In order to successfully challenge the...