National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc. v. Smith
Decision Date | 27 July 1977 |
Citation | 376 A.2d 456 |
Parties | NATIONAL HEARING AID CENTERS, INC. v. David E. SMITH, Commissioner, Department of Health and Welfare of the State of Maine. |
Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Bernstein, Shur, Sawyer & Nelson by Eric F. Saunders, Gregory A. Tselikis, Portland, for plaintiff.
Michael A. Feldman, James Eastman Smith, Asst. Attys. Gen., Augusta, for defendant.
Before DUFRESNE, C. J., and POMEROY, WERNICK, ARCHIBALD, DELAHANTY and GODFREY, JJ.
National Hearing Aid Centers, Inc., filed a complaint in Superior Court which attacked the constitutionality of certain provisions contained within P.L. 1975, ch. 463, subsequently codified in 32 M.R.S.A. § 1658 et seq., effective October 1, 1975. The defendant is the Commissioner of the Department of Health and Welfare of the State of Maine, the agency charged with enforcement of the challenged statute, who moved to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b) (6), M.R.C.P., for "failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted". Following a hearing on both the complaint and the motion to dismiss, the Justice below ordered the action dismissed. The reasons listed for this ruling were that the complaint fails "to allege a justiciable controversy" and also "fails to show that any of the events and conditions it mentions have invaded or threaten to invade any legally protected interest of the plaintiff." The plaintiff has appealed.
We sustain the appeal and remand for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion.
Although the plaintiff brought this action under Maine's Declaratory Judgments Act, 14 M.R.S.A. § 5951 et seq., it was not thus excused from properly establishing a justiciable controversy.
Lund ex rel. Wilbur v. Pratt, 308 A.2d 554, 559 (Me.1973). See also Berry v. Daigle, 322 A.2d 320, 325 (Me.1974); cf. Hazzard v. Westview Golf Club, Inc., 217 A.2d 217, 224 (Me.1966); Drummond v. Inhabitants of Town of Manchester, 161 Me. 376, 212 A.2d 701 (1965).
In determining justiciability we must ascertain whether the complaint alleged a claim of right justifying relief and whether a sufficiently substantial interest is asserted to warrant judicial protection. Berry v. Daigle, supra at 326; Jones v. Maine State Highway Commission, 238 A.2d 226, 229 (Me.1968). The claim asserted is the right to conduct business freely without undue legislative interference. We have previously recognized the constitutional guarantee 1 against unjustifiable impairment of one's property rights.
State v. Union Oil Co. of Maine, 151 Me. 438, 446-47, 120 A.2d 708, 712 (1956).
In support of this claim of right plaintiff alleged that it is a Maine corporation doing business within the State and, therefore, subject to the provisions of the statute. Generally speaking, those persons who are engaged in a business directly affected by a statute are considered to have a sufficient interest to create a justiciable issue when contesting that statute's validity. Portland Pipe Line Corp. v. Environmental Improvement Comm., 307 A.2d 1 (Me.1973); Hoagland v. Bibb, 12 Ill.App.2d 298, 139 N.E.2d 417, 420 (1957); see Ace Tire Co. v. Municipal Officers of Waterville, 302 A.2d 90 (Me.1973); 174 A.L.R. 558.
Moreover, plaintiff alleges that it "will suffer immediate and irreparable harm upon the effective date of the Act." Although the complaint does not allege in nonconclusory form the specific injury that will result, the complaint cannot be fatally defective on that basis alone. See Field, McKusick & Wroth, Maine Civil Practice, § 12.11 (2d ed. 1970). A complaint is sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss if from a liberal construction of the pleadings and possible amendments thereto, the court can determine that a plaintiff can prove a set of facts to support his claim. Nelson v. Maine Times, 373 A.2d 1221 (Me. opinion June 3, 1977); Ace Ambulance Service, Inc. v. City of Augusta, 337 A.2d 661, 662 (Me.1975); Richards v. Ellis, 233 A.2d 37, 38 (Me.1967).
We conclude that plaintiff's complaint alleges sufficient interest to give rise to standing. Assuming proof of the alleged facts, as a hearing aid dealer the plaintiff corporation is in the business that the challenged statute licenses and regulates.
The commencement of this action for a declaratory judgment before the effective date of the statute poses no problem. The statute is certain to become effective. It is to be presumed that the Department of Health and Welfare will take steps to enforce the provisions of the statute. The issue raised is ripe for decision. Maine Sugar Industries, Inc. v. Maine Indus. Bldg. A., 264 A.2d 1, 5 (Me.1970); Hoagland v. Bibb, supra, 12 Ill.App.2d 298, 139 N.E.2d at 420; Department of Financial Institutions v. General Finance Corp., 227 Ind. 373, 86 N.E.2d 444, 446 (1949); Acme Finance Corp. v. Huse, 192 Wash. 96, 73 P.2d 341 (1937).
It is apparent that a sufficiently justiciable claim was pleaded and that the Justice erred in dismissing the action. The plaintiff sought protection from an allegedly unreasonable exercise of the State's police power, buttressed by the assertion of sufficient interest in the plaintiff as one engaged in the business regulated and licensed under the challenged statute. All the elements were present to give rise to a right to an adjudication of the claim presented.
Having determined that the Court below improperly dismissed the action, we normally would remand the case for further proceedings. However, since the case comes before us with a complete record, we believe this is an appropriate time to entertain this claim for declaratory relief as an original matter. Berry v. Daigle, 322 A.2d 320, 324 (Me.1974). By remanding to the Superior Court we could reasonably expect the issue of constitutionality to be immediately referred to us for decision. Therefore, we now reach the question of the statute's constitutionality.
32 M.R.S.A. § 1658-B provides:
As we turn to consider the constitutionality of § 1658-B, we are guided by certain well established precepts. The legislature, in the exercise of the police power of the State, does not violate substantive due process if its exercise of that power is reasonable. State v. Rush, 324 A.2d 748, 752 (Me.1974); West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S.Ct. 578, 81 L.Ed. 703 (1937); Nebbia v. People, 291 U.S. 502, 54 S.Ct. 505, 78 L.Ed. 940 (1934).
"Too much significance cannot be given to the word 'reasonable' in considering the scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restrictions it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not whether it imposes restrictions on such rights. . . ."
Jordan v. Gaines, 136 Me. 291, 296, 8 A.2d 585, 587-88 (1939).
Reasonableness in the exercise of the State's police power requires that the purpose of the enactment be in the interest of the public welfare and that the methods utilized bear a rational relationship to the intended goals. 2 State v. Rush, supra at 753. The reasonableness of a legislative enactment, however, is presumed. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938); Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Emerson, 345 A.2d 504, 507 (Me.1975).
It is the burden of the person challenging a statute to demonstrate the lack of any state of facts supporting the need for the challenged enactment, and thus demonstrate its unreasonableness. The State has no initial duty to come forward with a justification of its finding that an evil exists, which the statute is designed to correct. As we said in Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Emerson, supra at 507:
"All acts of the legislature are presumed to be constitutional and the burden of proof is on the party who asserts an infirmity."
The nonexistence of a statement of purpose within the Act is not in itself determinative of the issue, as the plaintiff suggests. The question that we consider is whether any state of facts either known, or which can reasonably be assumed, lends support to the legislative action. Union Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Emerson...
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