Ashe v. State, 90-1009
| Citation | 582 So.2d 759 |
| Decision Date | 11 July 1991 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1009,90-1009 |
| Parties | Richard Christopher ASHE, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee. 582 So.2d 759, 16 Fla. L. Week. D1817 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Florida (US) |
Jeffrey P. Whitton, Panama City, for appellant.
Robert A. Butterworth, Atty. Gen., and Suzanne G. Printy, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.
Richard Christopher Ashe has appealed the sentence imposed following his plea of nolo contendere to grand theft, burglary of a conveyance, armed robbery with a firearm, possession of a short-barrelled shotgun, and two counts of battery on a law enforcement officer. We affirm in part and reverse in part.
Following the entry of his plea, Ashe was sentenced to 12 years incarceration followed by 10 years probation, and four 5-year terms of incarceration, all to run concurrently. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court imposed payment of costs and restitution as conditions of probation. Determination of the amount of restitution was left to the probation officer, the court to intervene only if the parties could not agree on the amount. Costs were to be paid under "a payment schedule as directed by the probation officer," and restitution was similarly to be paid "as directed by the probation officer." Another condition, not orally imposed at the hearing, directed the payment of $1.00 per month to a local program.
On appeal, Ashe alleges that the trial court improperly delegated judicial functions by allowing the probation officer to set a payment schedule and determine the amount of restitution. He also alleges that there is no statutory authorization for a sentence in which a period of incarceration is followed by a period of probation with no incarceration withheld. The latter issue has been decided adversely to Ashe in Glass v. State, 574 So.2d 1099 (Fla.1991), and we therefore affirm as to that issue.
However, as to the conditions of probation challenged by Ashe, we must reverse. While Ashe did not object to the delegations of authority by the trial judge, the failure to object does not confer on others the authority to violate the law, i.e. to delegate to a probation officer a purely judicial function. Larson v. State, 572 So.2d 1368, 1371 (Fla.1991). The determination of the amount of restitution is a non-delegable judicial responsibility, as is the determination of the defendant's ability to pay, i.e. by establishing a rate of payment....
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Shaddix v. State
...592 So.2d 767 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). As to a similar discrepancy between verbal and written conditions of probation in Ashe v. State, 582 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we reversed and remanded the provision for the trial court to conform the written order to the conditions as pronounced ......
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Jordan v. State, 91-3609
...schedule is a judicial responsibility rather than a supervisory function properly administered by a probation officer. Ashe v. State, 582 So.2d 759, 760 (Fla. 1st DCA1991); Ballance v. State, 447 So.2d 974, 976 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Consequently, Jordan's probation officer exceeded his autho......
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Armstrong v. State, 92-1893
...did not agree to delegate this authority to his probation officer. See Casto v. State, 615 So.2d 792 (Fla.5th DCA 1993); Ashe v. State, 582 So.2d 759 (Fla.1st DCA 1991); Williams v. State, 507 So.2d 1171 (Fla.2d DCA Additionally, the trial court, in condition 16 of its probation order, requ......
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State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kendrick
...(concluding trial court could not delegate to probation officer authority to perform "a purely judicial function"); Ashe v. State, 582 So.2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (trial court improperly delegated judicial functions by allowing probation officer to set restitution payment schedule and to ......