Ashford v. Comm'r of Human Servs., A16-0902
| Decision Date | 10 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | A16-0902 |
| Parties | Audrey Melody Ashford, Relator, v. Commissioner of Human Services, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2016).
Minnesota Department of Human Services
License No. 1063920 CD CS
Affirmed
Samantha Clawson, Meghan R. Scully, Charles H. Thomas, Law Offices of Southern Minnesota Regional Legal Services, Inc., St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator)
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, James Clark, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)
Considered and decided by Kirk, Presiding Judge; Reilly, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges the Minnesota Commissioner of Human Services' decision denying a request to set aside relator's disqualification from providing direct care services for her sister in a state-licensed program. Relator does not dispute that a 2014 theft conviction disqualifies her, but argues the set-aside decision must be reversed because it is not supported by substantial evidence and is arbitrary and capricious, and that she was denied procedural-due-process rights to an evidentiary hearing. We affirm the commissioner's decision because her determination that relator failed to prove no risk of harm to program participants is supported by substantial evidence and is not arbitrary and capricious. Additionally, relator was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing because she was disqualified based on a conviction, for which she received ample due process.
In September 2015, Community Involvement Programs (CIP) submitted a background request to the Minnesota Department of Human Services (DHS) for relator Audrey Ashford, who had been conditionally approved to provide paid care for her sister, B.A. Ashford has physical and legal custody of B.A., who is 14 years old.
On February 10, 2016, the commissioner notified Ashford that she was disqualified from serving in direct-contact positions for persons receiving services from DHS-licensed programs because of her 2014 misdemeanor-theft conviction.
Ashford requested reconsideration, asking the commissioner to set aside her disqualification and limiting the scope of her request to provide services only for B.A. Ashford acknowledged she pleaded guilty to and was convicted of theft, she received a stayed sentence of one year of probation, and she was discharged in August 2015. Ashford also stated that she took "full responsibility" for her actions, explaining in her affidavit that she attributed her "poor decisions" to a "very stressful time" during which she lost her onlysource of income, she was behind on rent and lacked money for food, and the county had removed B.A. from her home to a residential treatment facility, where B.A. was unhappy. Ashford submitted two letters of support: one from B.A.'s social worker/therapist and the other from Ashford's daughter, both stating that Ashford's home was safe and that Ashford was "considerate and responsible" and provided good care for B.A, who is like a sister to Ashford's daughter.
On April 5, 2016, the commissioner denied Ashford's set-aside request, noting that she was required to consider nine statutory factors. While the commissioner discussed all nine factors, she gave four reasons for the denial: (1) the nature of the disqualifying event was that the 2014 theft was an intentional act; (2) CIP participants are "very vulnerable" due to mental and/or physical disabilities; (3) while two years had passed since the theft conviction, it was "too soon" to conclude whether Ashford would commit another "similar act" because she was previously convicted of theft and forgery in 1995; and (4) Ashford's written request to the commissioner attempted to justify the theft, which indicated Ashford was "less likely to change [her] behavior."
Also, regarding the statutory factor for "other information," the commissioner stated that Ashford's support letters did not indicate whether the authors were aware that, in 2013, Ramsey County had determined that Ashford "maltreated [her] sister." The commissioner added that the county had also determined that "someone sexually abused [her] sister" and Ashford would not allow B.A. to return to her home because Ashford was concerned that B.A. "would lie" about the abuser being in her home. The commissioner concluded thatthe maltreatment determination and Ashford's failure to protect her sister from the abuser were "relevant to [Ashford's] risk of harm."
Finally, the commissioner stated that CIP caregivers "work unsupervised in the client's home and have unfettered access to the client's property, including money." The commissioner noted that, even though Ashford had narrowed the scope of her reconsideration request to serving B.A., a set aside would allow Ashford to provide services "to anyone receiving services from the program without any restriction." In summary, the commissioner cited the statutory requirement that she must give "preeminent weight to the safety of each person to be served by the program" over other interests, and concluded that Ashford had failed to demonstrate she did not pose a risk of harm.
On April 6, 2016, Ashford submitted four additional support letters. Like the support letters initially provided, the additional letters stated that Ashford was an attentive caregiver who provided a safe home for B.A and put B.A.'s best interests first.1
On May 3, 2016, Ashford challenged the commissioner's denial of her set-aside request in a letter, disputing the facts regarding the maltreatment and sexual-abuse allegations, which Ashford described as false and unsubstantiated. Ashford included a Ramsey County Community Human Services letter stating, "it has been determined that the finding of maltreatment was incorrect and you did not neglect the child" and that thecounty "did not meet the burden of proof necessary to substantiate the allegation [of maltreatment]." Ashford also included the county's "case closing plan," which stated that B.A's sexual-abuse allegations "were fabricated and the real issue was her mental health." Ashford also requested a hearing, stating that the commissioner had made findings about maltreatment and abuse without notice and an opportunity to dispute the evidence.
The commissioner responded on June 3, 2016, stating that she reviewed Ashford's additional evidence, including the information from the county and support letters. While the commissioner revised the analysis of the statutory factors to consider "new information," the commissioner reaffirmed Ashford's disqualification and the decision to deny a set aside, in part by noting that Ashford only challenged one statutory factor but "any one" of the statutory factors discussed in the April 5, 2016 letter may be determinative. The reasons given were the same as those listed in the April 5, 2016 letter, with the exception that there was no reference to maltreatment or sexual abuse. The commissioner stated that Ashford was not entitled to a hearing because her disqualification was based on a conviction. This certiorari appeal follows.2
This court may reverse an agency decision denying a set aside if it is not supported by substantial evidence or is arbitrary and capricious. Rodne v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 547 N.W.2d 440, 444-45 (Minn. App. 1996). Substantial evidence is (1) "relevant evidence that reasonable mind[s] might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," (2) "[m]ore than a scintilla of evidence," (3) "[m]ore than some evidence," (4) "[m]ore than any evidence," and (5) "[e]vidence considered in its entirety." White v. Minn. Dep't of Nat. Res., 567 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Oct. 31, 1997). A decision is not arbitrary and capricious if there is a "rational connection between the facts found" and the agency's decision. In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn. 2001). Stated somewhat differently, an agency's decision is arbitrary and capricious if the agency (a) relied on factors not intended by the legislature; (b) "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem"; (c) offered an explanation that runs counter to the evidence; or (d) the "decision is so implausible that it could not be" explained as a difference in view or the result of the agency's expertise. In re Appeal of Staley, 730 N.W.2d 289, 295 (Minn. App. 2007).
The DHS must complete a background study on any person who seeks to provide direct-contact services to clients served in programs administered by DHS. Minn. Stat. § 245C.03-.04 (2016). In completing a background study, DHS must review records fromthe Bureau of Criminal Apprehension, other law enforcement agencies, and the courts. Minn. Stat. § 245C.08, subd. 1(a)(1)-(6) (2016). The department also reviews its own "records relating to the maltreatment of minors . . . as indicated through the social service information system." Id., subd. 1(a)(2). A person who has been convicted of any crime listed in Minn. Stat. § 245C.15 is automatically disqualified from providing direct-contact services. Minn. Stat. § 245C.14, subd. 1(a)(1) (2016). The disqualification period varies in length from seven years to permanent. Minn. Stat. § 245C.15 (2016).
A disqualified individual may request reconsideration. Minn. Stat. § 245C.21, subd. 1 (2016). Upon receiving a reconsideration request, the commissioner may affirm or rescind the disqualification, or may "set aside" the disqualification, which allows the individual to work in a specified program, "if the commissioner finds that the individual has submitted sufficient information to demonstrate that the individual does...
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