In re Appeal of Staley

Decision Date24 April 2007
Docket NumberNo. A06-894.,A06-894.
PartiesIn re APPEAL OF Jonnie Sue STALEY.
CourtMinnesota Court of Appeals

James T. Hanvik, Bassford & Hanvik Law Firm, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for appellant Staley.

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, Kristen M. Olsen, Assistant Attorney General, St. Paul, MN, for respondent Minnesota Department of Health.

Considered and decided by KLAPHAKE, Presiding Judge; SHUMAKER, Judge; and COLLINS, Judge.

OPINION

COLLINS, Judge.*

This is an appeal from a district-court judgment affirming the final order of the Minnesota Commissioner of Health, which concluded that appellant abused a vulnerable adult, in violation of Minn.Stat. § 626.5572, subd. 2(b) (2006). We agree with the district court that the commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence, was not arbitrary and capricious, and was not reached in violation of appellant's right to procedural due process. But because we conclude that the commissioner's decision is based on an error of law, we reverse.

FACTS

Appellant Jonnie Sue Staley started working for Trevilla of New Brighton, a nursing facility, as a nursing assistant in 1997. This dispute involves appellant's interaction with a Trevilla resident, R.J., who qualified as a vulnerable adult under Minn.Stat. § 626.5572, subd. 21 (2000). R.J. was diagnosed with Korsakoff's Psychosis, dementia, depression, and adjustment disorder in 2001. These conditions affected R.J.'s short-term and long-term memory. R.J. required assistance using the toilet and often became agitated and anxious when nursing assistants performed personal-care services for him.

On April 11, 2002, appellant allegedly orally abused R.J. At midmorning that day, while her co-workers were on breaks, appellant was left alone to staff one of the units of Trevilla. When R.J. needed assistance in the bathroom, appellant was upset that she was the only nursing assistant on the floor. While assisting R.J., appellant reportedly yelled, "I forgot to put my [f-cking] gloves on and it's your fault, now you're going to [sh-t] all over my hands, you dumb [f-cker]." Within a few minutes, R.J.'s roommate, R.L., reported the incident to a nurse. R.L. was lying on his bed reading when the incident occurred. A curtain dividing the room prevented R.L. from seeing the bathroom, but the door to the bathroom was partially open, and R.L. could clearly hear what was said. R.L. also claimed that he heard a slapping sound and reported to the nurse that appellant slapped R.J. No one else is known to have overheard the incident.

R.J. was interviewed on the same day and replied that "no one was mean to him and no one slapped him." There were no signs of injury to R.J. But according to the nurse who interviewed R.J., he was very confused and did not remember bowel movements during the day even though he had had two. The nurse and Department of Health investigator attributed R.J.'s conflicting memory of the incident to his dementia. Appellant was terminated for oral abuse the following day.

The Minnesota Department of Health conducted an investigation of the reported abuse as required by federal regulations and Minnesota's Vulnerable Adults Act, Minn.Stat. § 626.557 (2006). A special investigator, who is also a registered nurse, examined relevant medical records and Trevilla's documentation of the incident. The investigator also personally interviewed R.J. and R.L., as well as appellant and others of Tevilla's staff. The investigator concluded: "The preponderance of [the] evidence indicates verbal and mental abuse did occur in connection with the [appellant] using a loud voice to call resident [R.J.] a `dumb [f-er]' at approximately 10:45 a.m., on 4/11/02." But the investigator also reported that the evidence "did not conclusively establish that [appellant] slapped [R.J.]" The department submitted its finding of abuse to the Nursing Assistant Registry and the Minnesota Department of Human Services. Under federal law, this finding renders appellant ineligible for employment in a nursing facility.

Appellant's request for reconsideration of the department's finding of abuse was denied. Appellant then requested a fair hearing to appeal the department's decision, and on December 10, 2004, a hearing was held before an agency referee. Both R.J. and R.L. died prior to the date of the hearing. Following the hearing, the referee concluded: "[T]here is not a preponderance of the evidence that the appellant verbally abused the vulnerable adult." The referee recommended reversal of the department's determination of vulnerable-adult abuse.

But the Minnesota Commissioner of Health did not adopt the referee's recommendation. Instead, the commissioner credited R.L.'s statement, determined that vulnerable-adult abuse was proved by a preponderance of the evidence, and concluded that the department's initial determination should be affirmed. Appellant then appealed the decision to the Ramsey County District Court, which affirmed the commissioner's determination. This appeal follows.

ISSUES

I. Is the commissioner's decision supported by substantial evidence?

II. Was the commissioner's decision arbitrary and capricious?

III. Was appellant deprived of procedural due process?

IV. Does the commissioner's determination violate public policy?

V. Is the commissioner's decision affected by an error of law?

ANALYSIS

Minn.Stat. § 256.045 (2006) authorizes judicial review for a party aggrieved by an order of the Commissioner of Health. After review by the district court, we review the commissioner's decision independently, giving no deference to the district court's decision and being governed by the standards prescribed in the Minnesota Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Zahler v. Minn. Dep't of Human Servs., 624 N.W.2d 297, 300-01 (Minn.App. 2001), review denied (Minn. June 19, 2001). The APA provides:

In a judicial review under sections 14.63 to 14.68, the court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the administrative finding, inferences, conclusion, or decisions are:

(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or

(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or

(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or

(d) affected by other error of law; or

(e) unsupported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted; or

(f) arbitrary and capricious.

Minn.Stat. § 14.69 (2006). Agency decisions "enjoy a presumption of correctness." Reserve Mining Co. v. Herbst, 256 N.W.2d 808, 824 (Minn.1977). Upon review, a court must exercise judicial restraint, lest it substitute its judgment for that of the agency. In re Excess Surplus Status of Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Minn., 624 N.W.2d 264, 277 (Minn.2001).

Ordinarily, our construction of a statute that resolves an issue on appeal does not necessitate addressing other issues presented. However, before reaching the dispositive issue in this case, we choose to address appellant's other arguments.

I.

The first issue is whether the commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence in view of the entire record. The definition of "substantial evidence" is elusive; Minnesota courts have employed several formulations. In its oft-cited formulation, our supreme court defined "substantial evidence" as: "(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; or (5) the evidence considered in its entirety." Minn. Ctr. for Envtl. Advocacy v. Minn. Pollution Control Agency, 644 N.W.2d 457, 464 (Minn.2002). "If an administrative agency engages in reasoned decision-making, the court will affirm, even though it may have reached a different conclusion had it been the factfinder." Cable Commc'ns Bd. v. Nor-West Cable Communications P'ship, 356 N.W.2d 658, 669 (Minn.1984).

The question here is whether there is substantial evidence to support the commissioner's finding that appellant actually said to R.J.: "I forgot to put my [f-cking] gloves on and it's your fault, now you're going to [sh-t] all over my hands, you dumb [f-cker]." Appellant contends that more than R.L.'s uncorroborated statement is needed to find substantial evidence to support the commissioner's decision. We disagree.

R.J.'s roommate, R.L., reported appellant's outburst within minutes after appellant assisted R.J. in the bathroom. What R.L. heard appellant say was documented the day of the incident, while the statement was fresh in R.L.'s memory. Medical records and interviews with a number of Trevilla employees who had personal and regular experience interacting with R.L. indicated that he was "oriented, reliable, and [did] not have a history of making false allegations." R.L. was in close enough proximity to overhear appellant's speech. Because R.J. was not competent to recall the event due to his memory impairment, R.L. was the only person to relate the incident. The commissioner found that R.L. had no reason to fabricate an allegation of abuse and did not credit appellant's evidence offered to establish such a motive. "We defer to an agency's conclusions regarding conflicts in testimony . . . ." Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 624 N.W.2d at 278.

Furthermore, the record contains evidence of appellant's propensity for swearing, including a Trevilla disciplinary measure signed by appellant and documented interviews with Trevilla employees. At the evidentiary hearing, appellant conceded her regular use of swearwords while on the job. The record shows that appellant was previously warned for directing offensive language toward a resident (not R.J.). Appellant was also disciplined numerous times for disrespecting her supervisor. Although not conclusive, appellant's documented history of swearing, insubordination,...

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