Ashiegbu v. Purviance

• Decision Date: 16 April 1998
• Docket Number: Nos. C-2-98-28.,s. C-2-98-28.
• Citation: 76 F.Supp.2d 824
• Parties: Cletus O. ASHIEGBU, Plaintiff, v. Penny PURVIANCE, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio

76 F.Supp.2d 824

Cletus O. ASHIEGBU, Plaintiff, v. Penny PURVIANCE, et al., Defendants.

Nos. C-2-98-28.

United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.

April 16, 1998.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Cletus O. Ashiegbu, Columbus, OH, pro se.

Frank H. Cook, Department of Law, Margaret A. Telb, Ohio Attorney General, Columbus, OH, for defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER

KINNEARY, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on two separate motions. First, Plaintiff moves to dismiss Defendant Sandi Bartley-Buzas's Answer. Presumably, Plaintiff moves pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(f). Second, Defendants Penny Purivance, Ike Lively, Randy Headly, Joyce Mitchell, Sue Creagan, Joseph Harper, Sheilba Berger, Judy Jones and Randy Ferguson (collectively, the "Individual State Defendants") move to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons set forth below the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion to dismiss the Answer and GRANTS the Individual State Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. MOTION TO DISMISS DEFENDANT SANDI BARTLEY-BUZAS'S ANSWER

Plaintiff, who is proceeding in this action pro se, seeks dismissal of Defendant Sandi Bartley-Buzas's Answer filed on February 2, 1998. Plaintiff apparently moves pursuant to Rule 12(f). Rule 12(f) allows a court to strike from any pleading "any insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(f). Upon examination of Defendant Bartley-Buzas's Answer, the Court finds that Defendant Barley-Buzas's Answer is proper and comports to the requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Despite Plaintiff's pleas to the contrary, the Court will not strike Defendant Barley-Buzas's Answer and enter a default judgment for Plaintiff. Therefore, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motion.

II. MOTION TO DISMISS BY THE INDIVIDUAL STATE DEFENDANTS

The second motion before the Court is the Individual State Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint against them pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

A. Background

On January 8, 1998, Plaintiff filed a document which the Court interprets as a complaint. Plaintiff brings his complaint against the Individual State Defendants and Sandi Bartley-Buzas in their individual capacities. (Doc. # 2, ¶ 1.) Plaintiff apparently alleges that Defendants conspired against him to deprive his civil rights by denying him employment with the State of Ohio. Plaintiff alleges that all the defendants "occupy high level placement capacity" and "exercise significant placement authorities." (Id., ¶ 2.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants "are not ordinary employees of a mere clerical [routine] duty [sic]." (Id.)

From the Court's reading of Plaintiff's complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he sought work from various governmental agencies. Plaintiff sought work first from the Ohio Governor's Office. (See id., ¶ 7.) The Governor's Office forwarded Plaintiff's application to Defendant Penny Purviance with the Ohio Department of Administrative Services ("ODAS"). (See id., Ex. 5.) Plaintiff apparently feels he was recommended for a job by the Governor's Office but he never received a job. (See id., ¶¶ 7-8.) At some point, Defendant Joyce Mitchell of ODAS "and others" declined to give Plaintiff a job. (Id., ¶ 9.) Furthermore, Defendants Sue Creager and Joseph Harper, both of ODAS, "show no concern [for Plaintiff's situation]. In every instance, they said they would not force employers to employ Plaintiff." (Id., ¶ 11.) Finally, Defendant Judy Jones of the Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") and Sheilba Berger of ODAS allegedly would make "use of police and security officers to scar[e] Plaintiff away." (Id.)

In total, Plaintiff apparently alleges that the Individual State Defendants acted collectively and conspired to violate Plaintiff's rights. In addition, Plaintiff claims that the Individual State Defendants discriminated against Plaintiff by not allowing him to find work with the State. In furtherance of his claim, Plaintiff alleges in his complaint that Defendants violated 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1986 (1996) and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (including 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1996)). The Individual State Defendants now seek dismissal of all the claims against them on various grounds.

B. Standard of Review

The Individual State Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Amended Complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The purpose of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) is to test the sufficiency of the complaint. When considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The court will grant a motion for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) only if there is an absence of law to support a claim of the type made, or of facts sufficient to make a valid claim, or if on the face of the complaint there is an insurmountable bar to relief indicating that the plaintiff does not have a claim. See generally Rauch v. Day & Night Mfg., 576 F.2d 697, 702 (6th Cir.1978); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1369 (6th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. Rhodes, 423 F.2d 706 (6th Cir.1970).

In this case, Plaintiff is proceeding pro se. A pro se litigant's pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972); see also Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). A court should make a reasonable attempt to read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, despite the plaintiff's failure to cite proper legal authority, his confusion of various legal theories, his poor syntax and sentence construction, or his unfamiliarity with the pleading requirements. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991). This standard does not mean, however, that pro se plaintiffs are entitled to take every case to trial. See Pilgrim v.. Littlefield, 92 F.3d 413, 416 (6th Cir.1996). Indeed, courts should not assume the role of advocate for the pro se litigant. See Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110.

C. Analysis

The Individual State Defendants seek dismissal from Plaintiff's Complaint on a number of different grounds. The Court will consider their arguments in the order presented in their motion to dismiss. (See Doc. # 11 at 3-6.)

The first ground upon which the Individual State Defendants seek dismissal is that Plaintiff's Title VII complaint fails to state a cause of action. In particular, the Individual State Defendants claim that Title VII does not permit individual employee/supervisors to be sued in their individual capacity. (See id. at 3 (citing Wathen v. General Elec. Co., 115 F.3d 400 (6th Cir.1997)).) The Individual State Defendants are correct. Under the Title VII, "an individual employee/supervisor who does not otherwise qualify as an `employer' may not be held personally liable under Title VII." Wathen, 115 F.3d at 405. An employer is defined as "a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce who has fifteen or more employees ... and any agent of such person." See id. The Sixth Circuit held that an "agent" is "an individual who `serves in a supervisory position and exercises significant control over the plaintiff's hiring, firing or conditions of employment.'" Pierce v. Commonwealth Life Ins. Co., 40 F.3d 796, 803 (6th Cir. 1994) (quoting Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125 (10th Cir.1993)).

In this case, Plaintiff fails to allege that the Individual State Defendants meet the statutory definition of employer. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff can allege no set of facts that would entitle him to relief on his claims against the Individual State Defendants for violations of Title VII.

Second, the Individual State Defendants claim that they are entitled to qualified immunity for their actions for Plaintiff's claims made pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. Accordingly, they argue that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted for violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983.

A plaintiff's § 1981 claim is subject to the defense of qualified immunity. See, e.g., Kiper v. Louisiana State Bd. of Elementary & Secondary Educ., 592 F.Supp. 1343, 1352-53 (M.D.La.1984), aff'd, 778 F.2d 789 (5th Cir.1985); Velasquez v. Senko, 643 F.Supp. 1172, 1178 (N.D.Cal.1986), appeal dismissed, 813 F.2d 1509 (9th Cir. 1987). To establish liability under § 1981 against a defendant, a plaintiff need only show that the officials deprived the plaintiff of a right that, under similar circumstances, would have been accorded to a person of a different race. See Rehbock v. Dixon, 458 F.Supp. 1056, 1063 n. 5 (N.D.Ill.1978).

Generally, state officials have qualified immunity from individual liability for damages that have resulted from exercising discretionary functions. See Mumford v. Zieba, 4 F.3d 429, 432 (6th Cir.1993). This immunity protects these officials only "insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). In their motion, the Individual State Defendants assert that they were all employees of the state government (either with the BWC or with the ODAS). (See Doc. # 11 at 4.)

As the Supreme Court noted, "[u]nless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of trial." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985) (citing Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727). Arguab...