Velasquez v. Senko

• Decision Date: 31 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. C-84-20723.,C-84-20723.
• Citation: 643 F. Supp. 1172
• Parties: Tony VELASQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John SENKO, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of California

643 F. Supp. 1172

Tony VELASQUEZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. John SENKO, et al., Defendants.

No. C-84-20723.

United States District Court, N.D. California.

March 31, 1986.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Juan Uranga, California Rural Legal Assistance, Migrant Project, Salinas, Cal., David Grabill, California Rural Legal Assistance, Santa Rosa, Cal., for plaintiffs.

Larry J. Gallagher, Asst. U.S. Atty., San Francisco, Cal., Mark C. Walters, Office of Immigration Litigation, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Civil Division, Washington, D.C., for defendants.

ORDER RE DEFENDANTS' MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

AGUILAR, District Judge.

This amended class action complaint ("Complaint") alleges violations of plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights resulting from a series of raids conducted by the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), Border Patrol, and local police.¹ The named plaintiffs, who are eight Hispanic and non-Hispanic persons arrested during the raids, seek declaratory and injunctive relief, and damages. The defendants are various directors, agents, and commissioners of the INS and Border Patrol. Presently before the Court are defendants' motions to dismiss and for partial summary judgment.

The Complaint describes seven raids, and the attendant detentions and interrogations, undertaken by defendants in Northern California over the past one and one half years. As part of an alleged pattern and practice, the defendants target predominantly Hispanic towns, neighborhoods, and businesses for warrantless dragnet searches and seizures of suspected illegal aliens. Although the precise circumstances of each raid differ, the underlying rights violations alleged by plaintiffs are the same.

Two of the alleged INS raids involved night-time invasions of the small, predominantly Hispanic towns of Parlier and Sanger in Fresno County. On April 6, 1984, armed INS agents and local police equipped with helicopters, bullet-proof vests, and police dogs sealed off a two-block area of Parlier that contained Hispanic business establishments. They entered eight such businesses, positioned themselves at all exits, segregated patrons according to language spoken, interrogated patrons as to their immigration or citizenship status, and forbade anyone from leaving until every patron had been questioned. The interrogations lasted about two hours at each establishment. Suspects were then ordered onto awaiting INS buses.

On September 8, 1984, armed INS agents and local police allegedly employed helicopters, floodlights, and barricades to seal off a section of Sanger that contained Hispanic businesses. The agents entered sixteen such establishments and ordered the arrest of all patrons, including U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents. Each patron was searched and interrogated, and agents prohibited unauthorized movement, including trips to the bathroom. Some patrons were ordered up against the wall. Others were required to sit on the floor with legs spread so that another person could sit between their legs, and to place their hands on the shoulders of the person in front of them. These interrogations lasted approximately two hours at each establishment.

Three of the alleged actions occurred in Hispanic residential neighborhoods. In Calistoga on the evening of October 4, 1983, INS agents and local police conducted a door-to-door sweep in a predominantly Hispanic neighborhood, ostensibly to serve outstanding traffic warrants. INS agents acted as interpreters. Only one warrant was served, but many Hispanics were detained, questioned, and arrested for immigration violations. On July 10, 1984, INS agents and local police allegedly secured a two-block area of Menlo Park with road blocks and stopped all cars entering or leaving that area. Defendants removed Hispanic males from those automobiles and ordered them into an alley to be interrogated about their citizenship or immigration status. Other agents systematically approached Hispanic households, ordered Hispanic males outside, and then forced them to an alley where an INS agent questioned them. On November 9, 1984, INS agents allegedly conducted a door-to-door sweep in Santa Cruz, demanded entry and forcibly entered private residences, detained and arrested passers-by, and raided a food line operated by the St. Francis Catholic Kitchen.

The two remaining events took place in Hispanic business establishments. It is alleged that on October 4, 1984, INS agents appeared at the Diaz Garage in Watsonville, a meeting place for Hispanic farmworkers, and detained and arrested those farmworkers who were present. On March 11, 1985, in Gilroy, a Border Patrol agent entered the El Charito Market, which serves an Hispanic clientele. The agent approached an Hispanic customer, twisted his arm behind his back, ordered him to produce his immigration papers, and finally arrested him and another Hispanic customer whom the agent had ordered over.

Plaintiffs' first and second claims allege that defendants detained, arrested, and interrogated class members without warrants or reasonable cause to believe that they were unlawfully present in the United States, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1357 and the fourth amendment.

Plaintiffs' third and fourth claims allege intentional discrimination against Hispanics on the basis of race, national origin and language, and against the Non-Hispanic class members on the basis of their association with Hispanics, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and the equal protection clause of the fifth amendment.

The fifth claim asserts a violation of plaintiffs' first Amendment right of freedom of association. The sixth claim asserts a 42 U.S.C. § 1985 conspiracy to violate plaintiffs' civil rights. The seventh claim alleges that defendants acted in excess of statutory and regulatory authority as prohibited by the Administrative Procedures Act. The eighth claim alleges inadequate training and supervision. The ninth and last claim is for declaratory relief.

QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Plaintiffs sue all but two of the defendants in their individual as well as official capacities.² Those defendants named in their individual capacities move for partial summary judgment on the ground that they enjoy qualified immunity from personal liability for damages.³ Defendants' sole argument in support of their qualified immunity defense is that none of them had any personal involvement with the raids, detentions, interrogations, or arrests alleged in the complaint. Most of the defendants offer sworn declarations to the effect that they neither participated in nor had foreknowledge of these events.

The qualified immunity defense serves to reconcile two oft-competing goals: vindication of constitutional guarantees and the vigorous exercise of official discretion. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504-06, 98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909-11, 57 L.Ed.2d 895 (1978); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 239-42, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 1687-89, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). The Supreme Court struck a new balance between these two interests in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982), by eliminating the subjective element of the qualified immunity test.

The objective standard announced by the Harlow Court provides that

government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.

Id. at 818, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39, 73 L.Ed.2d 396. On summary judgment, the Court instructed, the judge may determine

not only the currently applicable law, but whether that law was clearly established at the time an action occurred.... Until this threshold immunity question is resolved, discovery should not be allowed. If the law was clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should know the law governing his conduct. Nevertheless, if the official pleading the defense claims extraordinary circumstances and can prove that he neither knew or should have known of the relevant legal standard, the defense should be sustained. But again, the defense would turn primarily on objective factors.

Id. at 818-19, 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39 (footnote omitted).⁴

In Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985), the Supreme Court interpreted Harlow to provide an "immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability," id., 105 S.Ct. at 2816 (emphasis in original). The Court explained:

Unless the plaintiff's allegations state a claim of violation of clearly established law, a defendant pleading qualified immunity is entitled to dismissal before the commencement of discovery. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 102 S.Ct. at 2738-39. Even if the plaintiff's complaint adequately alleges the commission of acts that violated clearly established law, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment if discovery fails to uncover evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue as to whether the defendant in fact committed those acts.

Id. at 2816 (emphasis added).

Read together, the Harlow and Forsyth cases require a two-step approach to the question of qualified immunity. First, a district court should determine whether the complaint on its face alleges a violation of clearly established law. This is akin to stating a claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).⁵ If the complaint fails in this regard, a defendant is entitled to dismissal on the ground of qualified immunity. If the facts alleged support a claim of a violation of clearly established law, however, the district court must allow sufficient discovery to support a ruling on any defense motion for summary judgment.

Although defendants acknowledge that Harlow and Forsyth govern qualified immunity cases, they decline to apply the requisite analysis...