Ashland Hospital Corporation v. Commonwealth, No. 2006-CA-001010-MR (Ky. App. 12/14/2007)
| Decision Date | 14 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 2006-CA-001010-MR.,2006-CA-001010-MR. |
| Parties | ASHLAND HOSPITAL CORPORATION, d/b/a King's Daughters Medical Center, Appellant v. COMMONWEALTH of Kentucky, Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission; Bobbi B. Smyser, Appellees. |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
Leigh Gross Latherow, Natalie E. Hurt, Ashland, Kentucky, Briefs for Appellant.
Tamela A. Biggs, Education Cabinet, Office of Legal Services, Frankfort, Kentucky, Brief for Appellee, Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission.
Before HOWARD1 and WINE, Judges; BUCKINGHAM,2 Senior Judge.
Ashland Hospital Corporation, d/b/a King's Daughters Medical Center (KDMC), appeals from a judgment of the Boyd Circuit Court affirming a decision of the Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission (KUIC) that awarded unemployment insurance benefits to Bobbi B. Smyser. Because KUIC's findings of fact are not supported by substantial evidence and as it misapplied the law to those facts, we reverse and remand for further hearing.
The facts are straightforward and uncomplicated. Smyser was an employee of KDMC from August 1994 until she was fired for misconduct in June 2002. At the time of her termination, Smyser was employed as an Intensive Care Unit nurse, working approximately 36 hours per week at $21.19 per hour.
The first incident of misconduct occurred in December 2001. KDMC claims that Smyser made an inappropriate comment to a family member of a patient. Smyser admitted her misconduct in this regard. As a result of the incident, Smyser was given a disciplinary suspension and placed on "decision making leave." Following the disciplinary action, Smyser was required to "maintain fully acceptable performance in every area of [her] job, whether related to the [inappropriate comment] issue or not, since any further issues [requiring] disciplinary action" would establish sufficient cause for terminating her employment.
In June 2002, another incident occurred involving Smyser and a patient's family members. Smyser requested that the family members leave the room of a terminally ill patient. The family members complained Smyser was rude to them and did not answer their questions. After the incident, the family complained to Smyser's supervisor, Mary Adams. Adams stated that she requested Smyser apologize to the family, but Smyser refused to do so because she felt that they had overacted. Adams also claims Smyser refused her order after the incident to move to another station farther from the family members. Further, Adams testified the family members later complained that Smyser again engaged in misconduct toward them.
Smyser filed a claim for unemployment benefits, which was denied. Following a hearing in August 2002, the referee determined that Smyser was disqualified from receiving benefits and affirmed the denial. Smyser appealed the referee's decision to KUIC, which in turn reversed that decision and awarded benefits to Smyser. When KUIC reversed the referee, the commission found: "Although hearsay testimony is admissible in administrative hearings, the direct, sworn testimony of the claimant must be assigned greater weight than the hearsay testimony offered by the employer." In September 2003, KDMC filed an appeal of the KUIC decision in the Boyd Circuit Court pursuant to Kentucky Revised Statute (KRS) 341.450. In October 2003, the court remanded the case to the KUIC for a new hearing before another referee because the audiotape recording from the first referee hearing had been damaged and was inaudible.
In March 2004, a different referee conducted a new hearing. KDMC introduced testimony from Adams, who testified as to what she claimed the patient's family told her and what actions Smyser took in her presence, and from Elizabeth Loan, an ICU nurse, who testified that she was aware that the patient's family was upset with Smyser and that she could hear Smyser tapping her pen while in the hallway, although Loan was in the patient's room. Smyser testified on her own behalf. During the hearing, the referee stated hearsay evidence "[is] not going to be any amount of weight at all."
The second referee likewise awarded benefits to Smyser. In April 2004, the KUIC entered its order affirming the referee's decision. The commission adopted the referee's report which included the following statement:
The evidence regarding the claimant was hearsay evidence because it was based on the account of the patient's family members. Hearsay is admissible but cannot be assigned greater weight than the claimant's direct, sworn testimony to the contrary.
Shortly thereafter, KDMC filed an amended verified complaint with the Boyd Circuit Court. In April 2006, the court affirmed KUIC's order, finding there was substantial evidence to support KUIC and stating:
[KDMC] offered hearsay testimony of its Director of Intensive Care in support of the disciplinary action taken against the claimant, Bobbi Smyser. While the employer also offered the testimony of a second witness, such witness did not witness nor was able to substantiate misbehavior by the claimant. In Bowling v. Natural Resources and Environmental Protection Cabinet, 891 S.W.2d 406 (Ky.App. 1994) the Kentucky Court of Appeals stated: "In weighing the subtantiality of the evidence supporting an agency's decision, a reviewing court must hold fast to the guiding principle that the trier of facts is afforded great latitude in its evaluation of the evidence heard and the credibility of witnesses appearing before it. . . ." In weighing the testimony provided by [KDMC's] witnesses and the claimant, the [KUIC] was correct in finding that the employer failed to substantiate the allegations of misconduct.
This appeal by KDMC followed.
Upon review of an administrative agency's adjudicatory decision, our authority is somewhat limited. See American Beauty Homes Corp. v. Louisville and Jefferson County Planning and Zoning Commission, 379 S.W.2d 450 (Ky. 1964) (). The judicial standard of review of an unemployment benefit decision is whether the KUIC's findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence and whether the agency correctly applied the law to the facts. Burch v. Taylor Drug Store, Inc., 965 S.W.2d 830, 834-35 (Ky.App. 1998), citing Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 437 S.W.2d 775, 778 (Ky. 1969); Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission v. Stirrat, 688 S.W.2d 750, 751-52 (Ky.App. 1984); Tackett v. Kentucky Unemployment Insurance Commission, 630 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Ky.App. 1982).
Substantial evidence is defined as evidence that, taken alone or in light of all the evidence, has sufficient probative value to induce conviction in the minds of reasonable people. See Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp. v. Golightly, 976 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Ky. 1998); Piper v. Singer Co., Inc., 663 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Ky.App. 1984); Barren River Mental Health-Mental Retardation Board, Inc. v. Bailey, 783 S.W.2d 886, 888 (Ky.App. 1990), quoting Kentucky State Racing Commission v. Fuller, 481 S.W.2d 298, 308 (Ky. 1972). If there is substantial evidence to support the agency's findings, a court...
To continue reading
Request your trial