Askin v. State, S–15–0162.
Decision Date | 21 January 2016 |
Docket Number | No. S–15–0162.,S–15–0162. |
Citation | 365 P.3d 784 |
Parties | Kyle Benton ASKIN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Representing Appellant: Office of the State Public Defender: Diane M. Lozano, State Public Defender; Tina N. Olson, Chief Appellate Counsel; Kirk Allan Morgan, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.
Representing Appellee: Peter K. Michael, Attorney General; David L. Delicath, Deputy Attorney General; Christyne M. Martens, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Caitlin F. Young, Assistant Attorney General.
Before BURKE, C.J., and HILL, DAVIS, FOX, and KAUTZ, JJ.
[¶ 1] Appellant, Kyle Benton Askin, claims the district court applied an improper legal standard in denying his request for credit for time served in presentence confinement. He contends the district court made its decision based upon an erroneous understanding that it lacked the discretionary authority to award credit. We agree with Appellant and, accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court.
[¶ 2] Appellant presents the following issue:
Did the district court apply the correct legal standard in determining whether to award Appellant credit for time spent in presentence confinement?
[¶ 3] In 2007, Appellant pled guilty to two counts of failure to register as a sex offender and received concurrent sentences, which were suspended in favor of probation. Askin v. State, 2013 WY 162, ¶ 4, 314 P.3d 1182, 1183 (Wyo.2013). As part of his probation, Appellant was required to complete an adult community corrections program at a community corrections facility.Id. After Appellant left the program prior to completion, the State charged him with escape and petitioned to revoke his probation. Id., ¶ 5, 314 P.3d at 1183. The district court revoked Appellant's probation and re-imposed the suspended sentence of four to six years for failure to register as a sex offender. Id. Appellant pled guilty to the escape charge and was sentenced to three to seven years imprisonment. The district court suspended the new sentence in favor of four years of supervised probation, to be served consecutively to the re-imposed sentence for failure to register. Id.
[¶ 4] In June 2014, the Natrona County Sheriff's Office discovered that Appellant was not living at the address he provided when he updated his sex offender registration in March of that year. As a result, Appellant's probation was revoked and the prison sentence for Appellant's escape conviction was re-imposed. Additionally, on August 6, 2014, while Appellant was incarcerated, the State charged him with one count of failure to register as a sex offender in violation of Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7–19–302 and 7–19–307(c) (LexisNexis 2013). Appellant was subsequently transported from the Wyoming Medium Correctional Institution in Torrington to the Natrona County jail for disposition of the charge of failure to register.
[¶ 5] Pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant pled guilty to the charge of failure to register and the State agreed to recommend a sentence of 18 to 24 months imprisonment. The district court accepted the plea and imposed the recommended sentence. The court denied Appellant's request for credit for time spent in presentence confinement, stating that it did not "believe, at least at this time, that there is sufficient legal authority to award any credit for time served in this case." This appeal followed.
[¶ 6] In his only issue, Appellant claims the district court erred by failing to consider his request for credit for time spent in presentence confinement. Appellant asserts the district court incorrectly believed that it did not have authority to award credit for time spent in presentence confinement where, as in the present case, the defendant was serving time for an unrelated conviction at the same time. Appellant contends that Wyoming law clearly provides that a district court has discretion to award such credit. Accordingly, he requests that we remand to the district court to consider his claim for credit for time served under the appropriate legal standard.
[¶ 7] The State responds that presentence confinement does not include confinement that persists without regard to the defendant's ability to post bond. It contends that, as a result, the time Appellant spent in prison during adjudication of this matter does not meet the definition of "presentence confinement." The State claims there is a "disconnect" between the district court's authority to award credit for presentence confinement and the fact that Appellant's detention does not qualify as presentence confinement.
[¶ 8] According to the State, because Appellant did not object to the district court's refusal to award credit for presentence confinement, we should review for plain error. We do not agree. Appellant raised the issue before the district court when he requested credit for time served in presentence confinement. Accordingly, we find that the plain error standard of review does not apply. We review the district court's refusal to grant the requested credit for an abuse of discretion. Daniels v. State, 2014 WY 125, ¶ 11, 335 P.3d 483, 486 (Wyo.2014).
[¶ 9] We addressed an issue similar to the one presented here in Daniels v. State. In that case, the district court denied the defendant's request for credit for time spent completing an in-patient treatment program. Id., ¶ 5, 335 P.3d at 485. The court based its decision on the belief that it did not have authority to award such credit because the defendant was not subject to a charge of escape. Id. We explained that the district court has discretion to grant or deny credit for time served in presentence custody where such custody is not due to the defendant's indigency and the sum of such time spent plus the sentence does not exceed the maximum allowable sentence:
[¶ 11] The State claims that our decision in Sweets is inconsistent with prior precedent, including Smith v. State, 932 P.2d 1281, 1282 (Wyo.1997), Wayt v. State, 912 P.2d 1106, 1109–10 (Wyo.1996), and Wilson v. State, 896 P.2d 1327, 1328–29 (Wyo.1995). Those cases, however, do not conflict with the decisions in Sweets and Daniels. Rather, they stand for the...
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