Aspinall v. Thomas

• Citation: 118 F.Supp.3d 664
• Decision Date: 12 January 2015
• Docket Number: CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-699
• Parties: Michael E. Aspinall, Plaintiff, v. Ronald Thomas, Jason Thomas, John Masco, and Kevin M. Bishop, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania

118 F.Supp.3d 664

Michael E. Aspinall, Plaintiff,

v.Ronald Thomas, Jason Thomas, John Masco, and Kevin M. Bishop, Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:15-699

United States District Court, M.D. Pennsylvania.

Signed January 12, 2015

Ankur K. Patel, Frank J. Tunis, Wright & Reihner, PC, Scranton, PA, for Plaintiff.

A. James Hailstone, Michael J. Donohue, Kreder, Brooks, Hailstone & Ludwig Scranton, PA, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM

MALACHY E. MANNION, United States District Judge

Pending before the court is a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's Complaint, (Doc. 1), filed on behalf of defendants Ronald Thomas, Jason Thomas, John Masco, and Kevin M. Bishop, for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 10). For the reasons that follow, the motion to dismiss will be DENIED .

I. RELEVANT BACKGROUND

The plaintiff, Michael E. Aspinall, served as a correctional officer from 1997 to 2007 and then a sergeant until August 2013,¹ for the Wayne County Correctional Facility in Honesdale, Pennsylvania. (Doc. 1, ¶¶ 1, 9, 50). The current action concerns the alleged mistreatment and hostile work environment the plaintiff suffered as a result of defendants Ronald Thomas and Jason Thomas' behavior. Both Ronald and Jason Thomas (the "Thomases") were officers at the Correctional Facility. Jason Thomas is the son of Ronald Thomas. Id. ¶ 3. The Thomases allegedly always disliked and harassed the plaintiff. However, after the plaintiff was reinstated in October 2012, the Thomases continued to dislike and harass the plaintiff, so much that the plaintiff complained to defendant John Masco, the Deputy Warden of the Correctional Facility. Id. ¶ 26. Though the plaintiff was then transferred to a shift "separate and apart from either of the Thomases," the Thomases continued to have contact with and harass the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 29-30. The harassment included "belittling Plaintiff in front of staff," telling new officers about the plaintiff's past criminal trial, and shouting insults and threats at the plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 30-31.

The plaintiff again complained about the harassment, this time to both defendant John Masco, the Deputy Warden, and defendant Kevin Bishop, the Warden. (Doc. 1, ¶ 32). The Thomases then escalated their harassment against the plaintiff. Id. ¶ 33. One specific incident of the escalated harassment occurred when Ronald Thomas followed the plaintiff into his office and then yelled threats at him. Ronald Thomas refused to leave the office, and ultimately the plaintiff was forced to leave his own office. Id. ¶ 34. The plaintiff then wrote "a memo detailing the incident to both Mr. Masco and Mr. Bishop," but "no action was taken." Id. ¶ 35. Instead, Jason Thomas became aware of the memo and entered the plaintiff's office to verbally harass and threaten him. Id. ¶ 36. Other incidents of harassment occurred, but the plaintiff "continued to fight back, speak out and challenge the abuses ... to both Mr. Masco and Mr. Bishop." Id. ¶ 38. During this time, the Thomases' as well as defendant Bishop's conduct undermined the plaintiff's authority, decision-making, and experience as a correctional officer. (Doc. 1, ¶ 39). Specifically, the Thomases told other correctional officers working during the plaintiff's shift to "ignore him and instead listen to them and do things their way," affecting the plaintiff's ability to delegate tasks and exercise his authority. Id. ¶¶ 40-41. The plaintiff submitted over a dozen verbal and written complaints to defendants Masco and Bishop, and the two took no action in response. Id. ¶¶ 46-47. Ultimately, the plaintiff was allegedly "forced to involuntarily resign in or around August, 2013," as a result of the harassment and hostile work environment. Id. ¶ 50.

The plaintiff filed a Complaint in this court on April 9, 2015 alleging a violation of his First Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a result of the defendants' retaliatory conduct. (Doc. 1). In Count I of the Complaint, the plaintiff claims that the Thomases' harassment constitutes retaliation in violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment right to free speech. Count II includes allegations against defendants Masco and Bishop under a theory of supervisory liability for their knowledge and acquiescence of the Thomases' alleged First Amendment retaliation. On May 1, 2015, the defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. (Doc. 10). The plaintiff filed an opposition to the motion on May 28, 2015. (Doc. 13). The motion is now ripe for the court's review.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

The defendants' motion to dismiss is brought pursuant to the provisions of Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). This rule provides for the dismissal of a complaint, in whole or in part, if the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The moving party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d 744, 750 (3d Cir.2005), and dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all of the facts alleged in the complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1974, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (abrogating "no set of facts" language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) ). The facts alleged must be sufficient to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. at 1965, 167 L.Ed.2d 929. This requirement "calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of" necessary elements of the plaintiff's cause of action. Id. Furthermore, in order to satisfy federal pleading requirements, the plaintiff must "provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief," which "requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir.2008) (brackets and quotations marks omitted) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. at 1964–65, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 ).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the court generally relies on the complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir.2007). The court may also consider "undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the [attached] documents." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir.1993). Moreover, "documents whose contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered." Pryor v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir.2002). However, the court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O'Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir.1994).

Generally, the court should grant leave to amend a complaint before dismissing it as merely deficient. See, e.g., Fletcher – Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 252 (3d Cir.2007) ; Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir.2002) ; Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 116-17 (3d Cir.2000). "Dismissal without leave to amend is justified only on the grounds of bad faith, undue delay, prejudice, or futility." Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 236 (3d Cir.2004).

III. DISCUSSION

The defendants move to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim on several grounds. First, the defendants move to dismiss Count I of the complaint stating that the plaintiff failed to allege facts to support all required elements of a § 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim. They next move to dismiss Count II on the ground that the facts do not establish Defendants Bishop and Masco's involvement in the alleged constitutional violation. Finally, the defendants move to dismiss the entire complaint because all defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. (Doc. 12, p.13). Each ground will be discussed in turn.

A. Count I—First Amendment Retaliation Claim

The Supreme Court has long established that a citizen's ability to participate in free debate on matters of public importance is "the core value of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment." Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 573, 88 S.Ct. 1731, 20 L.Ed.2d 811 (1968) ; see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145, 103 S.Ct. 1684, 75 L.Ed.2d 708 (1983) ; NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913, 102 S.Ct. 3409, 73 L.Ed.2d 1215 (1982). While a citizen who enters government service must forfeit the scope of some of his freedoms, he is "nonetheless a citizen" who deserves protection from restriction of liberties he enjoys in his capacity as a private citizen . Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951, 164 L.Ed.2d 689 (2006). "So long as employees are speaking as citizens about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively." Id. at 419, 126 S.Ct. 1951. Therefore, "a public employee has a constitutional right to speak on matters of public concern without fear of retaliation." Baldassare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 194 (3d Cir.2001) (citing Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 383–84, 107 S.Ct. 2891, 97 L.Ed.2d 315 (1987) ).

In order to establish a First Amendment retaliation claim, the plaintiff must first demonstrate that "the conduct which led to the alleged retaliation was constitutionally protected." Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir.2001). The plaintiff must next demonstrate that he suffered an "adverse action" by the government officials such that "a person of ordinary firmness" would be deterred from exercising his rights. Id. ; Lauren W. v. DeFlaminis, 480 F.3d 259, 267 (3d Cir.2007). Fi...