Ass'n Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Comm'r MA Dept. Envtl. Prot.
| Decision Date | 08 May 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. 98-1036,N,98-1036 |
| Parties | (1st Cir. 2000) ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, INC., DAIMLERCHRYSLER CORPORATION, FORD MOTOR COMPANY, GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION AND MASSACHUSETTS STATE AUTOMOBILE DEALERS ASSOCIATION, INC., PLAINTIFFS, APPELLEES, v. COMMISSIONER, MASSACHUSETTS DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, DEFENDANT, APPELLANT. ALLIANCE OF AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS; ASSOCIATION OF INTERNATIONAL AUTOMOBILE MANUFACTURERS, INC., PETITIONERS, v. UNITED STATES ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RESPONDENT. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, INTERVENOR. o. 99-2245 Heard |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Thomas F. Reilly, Attorney General of Massachusetts and William L. Pardee, Assistant Attorney General, Environmental Protection Division on supplemental brief, for the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection.
Edward W. Warren, Robert R. Gasaway, Jeffrey Bossert Clark, Daryl Joseffer, Kirkland & Ellis, Robert F. Sylvia, Eric F. Eisenberg, Hinckley, Allen & Snyder, Julie C. Becker and Charles H. Lockwood on supplemental brief, for Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Association of International Automobile Manufacturers, Inc., DaimlerChrysler Corporation, Ford Motor Company and General Motors Corporation.
Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Cyr, Senior Circuit Judge, and Stahl, Circuit Judge.
These consolidated appeals present an important issue of federal preemption under the Clean Air Act. Pursuant to § 177 of that act, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts adopted a set of automobile emission standards in 1993. Plaintiff-appellees (the "Manufacturers") brought suit claiming that the Massachusetts regulations were preempted by the Clean Air Act. While that action was pending, Massachusetts amended its standards, and the Manufacturers amended their complaint. The district court eventually held for the Manufacturers, and Massachusetts appealed to this Court (No. 98-1036). Invoking the primary jurisdiction doctrine, we referred a number of questions to the Environmental Protection Agency for its views. See American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Massachusetts Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 163 F.2d 174 (1st Cir. 1998) ("AAMA V"). The resulting EPA opinion gave rise to its own litigation, which was transferred to this Court (No. 99-2245) and consolidated with the original appeal. Now, after some delay and procedural confusion (for which we accept some, perhaps most, of the responsibility), we dismiss the petition for review in No. 99-2245 and affirm the district court's decision in No. 98-1036, holding that the Massachusetts regulations at issue are preempted by the Clean Air Act.
The factual background and procedural stance of the Manufacturers' original appeal, No. 98-1036, are set forth in detail in the district court's opinion of October 15, 1997, see American Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep't of Envt'l Protection, 998 F. Supp. 10 (D. Mass. 1997) ("AAMA III"), and summarized in our most recent opinion, see AAMA V, 163 F.2d 174. We will again briefly summarize the most relevant facts and update them to reflect the events since our last opinion.
When Congress enacted the Clean Air Act ("CAA"), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401 et seq., it expressly preempted all state regulation of new motor vehicle emissions. See id. § 7543(a) (codifying § 209(a) of the CAA). However, as an exception to this general preemption, Congress allowed California alone among the states to implement its own vehicle emissions standards, subject to certain conditions. See id. § 7543(b) (codifying § 209(b) of the CAA). Under § 209 of the act, California may request a waiver of preemption from the EPA for its emissions standards once it (California) has determined that those standards are no less protective of public health than federal regulations. See id. The EPA must grant the waiver unless it finds that California's "no less protective" determination was arbitrary and capricious or that the standards are not necessary to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions. See id.
In 1977, Congress added another limited exception to the general preemption stated in § 209(a) of the CAA. Section 177 of the act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 7507, permits any state to adopt emissions standards if (1) the standards are "identical to California standards for which a waiver has been granted" and (2) such standards are adopted at least two years before commencement of the particular model year to which they apply. As we noted in our previous opinion, "both the statutory language and the legislative history suggest that section 177 was the result of a compromise between the competing interests of the states and the automakers, giving states greater flexibility without overburdening automakers with too many separate emissions-control standards." AAMA V, 163 F.3d at 78.
In 1990, California adopted emissions standards specifically targeting "zero emissions vehicles," or ZEVs, as part of a larger "low emission vehicle," or LEV, program. The program was granted a § 209(b) waiver by the EPA in 1993, and that same year Massachusetts copied the program pursuant to § 177 of the CAA. In 1996, however, California determined that the ZEV portion of its LEV program was counterproductive and repealed its ZEV requirements for the model years 1998-2002. At about the same time, California entered into memoranda of agreement ("MOAs") with seven major automakers by which the manufacturers agreed to nevertheless develop ZEV technology and introduce a limited number of ZEVs into the California market during the years 1998-2002; for its part, California agreed to provide infrastructural support for ZEV implementation.1 In response, Massachusetts amended its ZEV mandates to reflect the automakers' obligations under the MOAs, although the reciprocal obligations undertaken by California were not included in the amended Massachusetts regulations.
The Manufacturers amended their complaint (originally filed in 1993) to challenge the Massachusetts regulations as amended in 1996. The district court, in a thorough and well-reasoned opinion, granted summary judgment in favor of the Manufacturers, holding that the Massachusetts regulations were preempted by the CAA. See AAMA III, 998 F. Supp. 10. On appeal, we opted to stay our determination of the matter pending a referral of several questions to the EPA under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, including whether the Massachusetts ZEV mandates were "standards" for purposes of § 177, whether the California MOAs were "standards" for purposes of §§ 209 and 177, and whether the ZEV mandates were otherwise "identical to California standards for which a waiver had been granted" as required by § 177. See AAMA V, 163 F.2d 74. Pursuant to our opinion, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts notified the EPA and requested its opinion on these matters.
The EPA responded in a letter dated September 15, 1999. The EPA stated several opinions in support of its general conclusion that the Massachusetts regulations were not preempted by the CAA. First, the EPA opined that the Massachusetts ZEV mandates are "standards" within the meaning of the CAA, and thus subject to the identicality requirements of § 177. Second, the EPA concluded that, under the particular circumstances of this case, the California MOAs should be considered "standards," notwithstanding the EPA's position that voluntary agreements generally are not standards subject to §§ 209 and 177. Third, the EPA opined (with little analysis) that the Massachusetts standards were "identical" to the California "standards" set forth in the MOAs. Finally, the EPA gave a preliminary opinion that the MOAs fell within the scope of the original § 209(b) waiver granted to the California LEV program in 1993, although the agency noted that a more detailed discussion of the issue would accompany a forthcoming decision on California's 1996 request for a "within the scope" determination.
Shortly after the EPA issued its September 15, 1999 opinion letter, the Manufacturers challenged the agency's authority to issue that opinion in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. The Manufacturers argued that the EPA did not have jurisdiction to decide the issues set forth in the opinion letter, and that the EPA's positions were in any event incorrect on the merits. On November 15, 1999, the D.C. Circuit transferred the Manufacturers' petition for review to this Court (No. 99-2245), and we consolidated it with the original appeal (No. 98-1036).
After the two cases were consolidated, we requested a final round of supplemental briefing from the parties. We have received those briefs, and we now proceed to a decision.
We hold that the EPA's September 15, 1999 opinion is not reviewable final agency action, and we therefore dismiss the petition for review in No. 99-2245. In No. 98-1036, we hold that the Massachusetts ZEV mandates are "standards" within the meaning of the CAA, but that they are not "identical to California standards for which a waiver has been granted." Consequently, the Massachusetts regulations are preempted by the CAA, and we affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Manufacturers.
The litigation in Appeal No. 99-2245 is an unfortunate consequence of our previous decision to stay the appeal in No. 98-1036 pending a primary jurisdiction referral to the EPA. While our intentions in making that referral reflected an appropriate respect for the policies underlying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, in retrospect our referral to the EPA was somewhat inartful.
As is fairly clear from our prior opinion, it was our intention to allow the EPA to issue binding rulings or...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Engine Mfrs. Ass'n v. South Coast Air Quality
...Fleet Rules constitute unlawful standards: Am. Auto. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Cahill, 152 F.3d 196 (2d Cir.1998) and Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.2000). These cases hold that an attempt to limit the sale of vehicles is preempted. In Cahill and Commissioner, th......
-
Wells v. Chevy Chase Bank
...Scis. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 479, 109 S.Ct. 1248, 1255-56, 103 L.Ed.2d 488, 500 (1989); Ass'n of Int'l Auto Mfrs. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 7-8 (1st Cir.2000); ProCd, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1454-1455 (7th Cir.1996); Cent. States Health & Welfare F......
-
United Parcel Service, Inc. v. Flores-Galarza
...Accordingly, summary judgment is proper if the Court concludes that a challenged statute is preempted. See International Auto. Mfrs. v. Commissioner, 208 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir.2000) (affirming grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs because federal law preempted challenged state regul......
-
Verizon Wireless (Vaw) v. City of Rio Rancho, Nm
...a local law is preempted by federal law is within the expertise of courts, not agencies. See Ass'n of Int'l Auto. Mfrs. v. Comm'r, Mass. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir.2000); Nat'l Tank Truck Carriers v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 821-23 (1st Cir. 1979). More particularly, courts i......
-
Black Carbon
...to public 176. CAA §177, 42 U.S.C. §7507. 177. Id .; Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs., Inc. v. Commissioner, Mass. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000). 178. Association of Int’l Auto. Mfrs ., 208 F.3d at 4. 179. See DieselNet, Emissions Standards: Canada , https://www.dieselne......
-
Mobile Source Air Pollution Control
...21, 1996, at A-2. 537. Mass. Regs. Code tit. 310, §7.40 (1996). 538. Id. §7.40(c). 539. American Auto. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Comm’n Mass. DEP, 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000), No. 93-10799-MA (U.S. Dist. Ct. Mass., 1996); Automakers Renew Legal Battle Against Massachusetts ZEV Mandates , 7 Clean Air Re......
-
Table of Cases
...Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945), 3, 71, 72, 241, 242 Association of Int’l Auto Mfrs. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., 208 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2000), 186 Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932), 14 Atlantis Express v. Ass’d Wholesale Grocers, 989 F......
-
The Doctrine Of Primary Jurisdiction
...take such other action as it deems appropriate.”), aff’d sub nom. Association of Int’l Auto Mfrs. v. Comm’r, Mass. Dep’t of Envt’l Prot., 208 F.3d 1 (1st. Cir. 2000); Access Telecomms. v. Sw. Bell Tel., 137 F.3d 605, 608 (8th Cir. 1998) (“We are always reluctant, however, to invoke the doct......