Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Kings County Water Dist.

• Decision Date: 11 October 1956
• Citation: 302 P.2d 1,47 Cal.2d 140
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner and Respondent, v. KINGS COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, and Elbert Montgomery, Louis Giacomazzi, Louis E. Hansen, Frank J. Martin, and Earle A. Howe, as the Board of Directors of Kings County Water District, and Ralph S. Morgan, Secretary of Kings County Water District, Respondents and Appellants. L. A. 24184.

Page 1

302 P.2d 1

47 Cal.2d 140

ATCHISON, TOPEKA AND SANTA FE RAILWAY COMPANY, a corporation, Petitioner and Respondent, v. KINGS COUNTY WATER DISTRICT, and Elbert Montgomery, Louis Giacomazzi, Louis E. Hansen, Frank J. Martin, and Earle A. Howe, as the Board of Directors of Kings County Water District, and Ralph S. Morgan, Secretary of Kings County Water District, Respondents and Appellants.

L. A. 24184.

Supreme Court of California, In Bank.

Oct. 11, 1956.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing Mov. 8, 1956.

Walch & Griswold and Lyman D. Griswold, Hanford, for appellants.

Robert W. Walker, John J. Balluff, Los Angeles, Sidney J. W. Sharp, Herbert M. Braden and Lawrence W. Clawson, Hanford, for respondent.

George H. Johnston, Willard S. Johnston and Johnston & Johnston, San Francisco, as amici curiae on behalf of respondent.

SPENCE, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment ordering the issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate requiring the board of directors of the Kings County Water District to exclude therefrom certain property constituting a right-of-way owned by the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company. The board, following an extended hearing, had denied Santa Fe's petition for exclusion of the property. While mandamus is an appropriate remedy to test the proper exercise of discretion vested in a local board, Walker v. City of San Gabriel, 20 Cal.2d 879, 881, 129 P.2d 349, 142 A.L.R. 1383; Naughton v. Retirement Board of San Francisco, 43 Cal.App.2d 254, 257, 110 P.2d 714, the court's power of review is confined to determining whether there was substantial evidence before the board to support its decision. Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (c); Lindell Co. v. Board of Permit Appeals, 23 Cal.2d 303, 315, 144 P.2d 4; Odden v. County Foresters, etc., Board, 108 Cal.App.2d 48, 49, 238 P.2d 23; Conroy v. Civil Service Commission, 75 Cal.App.2d 450, 457, 171 P.2d 500. Under this settled rule, we have concluded that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed.

The Kings County Water District was organized February 24, 1954, under the County Water District Law, Water Code, §§ 30000-33901. It comprises approximately 150,000 acres. It was organized primarily to protect the underground water supplies of the area from excessive pumping and to guard against the transportation of the underground water to areas outside the district. Its purposes and functioning generally have been in accordance with the aims and methods approved by law for such an organization. Coachella Valley County Water District v. Stevens, 206 Cal. 400, 274 P. 538; Water Code, §§ 31020-31033.

The right-of-way owned by Santa Fe runs through the water district. It is approximately 16 1/2 miles long and 100 feet wide. A center strip, 30 feet wide, contains the track and roadbed proper, and on each side are strips 35 feet wide, which are more or less adaptable for agricultural purposes. Pursuant to section 32200 of the Water Code, Santa Fe petitioned the board of directors of the district for exclusion of the entire 100-foot strip. Section 32222 of said code provides for exclusion of land when the board determines, after hearing, either: '(a) * * * that the land will not be substantially and directly benefited by its continued inclusion in the district'; or '(b) * * * the exclusion to be for the best interests of the district.' The board held an extended hearing and then denied the petition. Santa Fe thereafter successfully sought from the superior court a writ of mandate directing the board to exclude the 100-foot strip right-of-way from the district. The record of the testimony and proceedings at the hearing before the board was introduced in evidence and constituted the record before the trial court.

There were no formal findings of fact by the board in connection with its order denying exclusion of Santa Fe's right-of-way. They are not specifically required when exclusion is denied, Water Code, §§ 32220-32227; cf. the requirement for findings in proceedings for the subsequent inclusion of added land to an existing county water district, Water Code, § 32447, but they would be helpful as an explicit record of the determination of facts by that body. However, the board's decision denying the petition to exclude Santa Fe's land carried with it the implied finding that the prerequisites for exclusion had not been shown; that rather, as contemplated by the statute, Santa Fe's land would be 'substantially and directly benefited' by its continued inclusion in the district.

The controlling question is whether this implied finding of the board is 'supported by substantial evidence in the light of the whole record.' Code Civ.Proc. § 1094.5, subd. (c); Corcoran v. San Francisco, etc., Retirement System, 114 Cal.App.2d 738, 740-741, 251 P.2d 59. The determinative language is the statute's requirement that the land in controversy be 'substantially and directly benefited.' Water Code, § 32222. 'Substantially' means 'in a substantial manner; really; solidly; competently.' 40 Words and Phrases, Substantially, p. 504. Webster's New International Dictionary, Second Edition, defines the word 'substantial,' in part, as follows: '* * * material; * * * not seeming or imaginary; * * * real; true; * * * important; essential; * * * having good substance; strong; stout; solid; firm.' 'Substantial' is a relative term, its measure to be gauged by all the circumstances surrounding the matter in reference to which the expression has been used. In re Scroggin, 103 Cal.App.2d 281, 283, 229 P.2d 489. 'Directly' means 'in a direct way without anything intervening, not by secondary, but by direct, means.' 12A Words and Phrases, Directly, p. 141. The word 'benefit' denotes 'any form of advantage.' 5 Words and Phrases, Benefit, p. 331.

The substantial and direct benefit which must be present to justify retention of land in a county water district means substantial and direct benefit to the land in question. Benefits which might accrue to a railroad through added freight revenues resulting from increased crop production and prosperous agricultural operations in a farming community occasioned by the conservation of water would be indirect benefits and therefore immaterial.

As the basis for exclusion of its 100-foot right-of-way, Santa Fe argues as follows: The 30-foot center strip constitues a roadbed, so dedicated in line with the performance of its duties as a common carrier, and the presence of underground waters would not provide any direct or substantial benefit to maintenance of such structure. On either side of the roadbed is a 35-foot strip, available in varying degrees for agricultural development. Certain portions thereof are leased for cultivation and some crops are actually growing thereon. However, such farm leasing by Santa Fe is not done with the object of gaining revenue, as only nominal amounts...