Athanason v. Athanason, 834
| Decision Date | 10 March 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 834,834 |
| Citation | 426 A.2d 16,48 Md.App. 231 |
| Parties | Michael T. ATHANASON v. Helene C. ATHANASON. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Andrew W. Dyer, Clinton, with whom were Dyer & Dyer, Clinton, on brief, for appellant.
Marvin E. Perlis, Silver Spring, with whom were Perlis & Pincus, Silver Spring, and Michael B. Schwartz, Rockville, on brief, for appellee.
Argued before MOYLAN, MELVIN and MacDANIEL, JJ.
Michael T. Athanason appeals a Decree of Divorce a vinculo matrimonii entered March 19, 1980, in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County. He asks us to consider whether Title 3, Subtitle 6A of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article (Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment) applies to a Supplemental Bill of Divorce which was filed after the Subtitle's effective date, but which relates to an action instituted prior to that effective date. The chancellor ruled that the statute in question did apply to the supplemental bill, but we disagree and so shall remand for further proceedings.
Appellant and appellee Helene C. Athanason were married July 24, 1966. On April 20, 1978, appellee filed a Bill of Complaint for Divorce a mensa et thoro alleging constructive desertion. 1 On March 15, 1979, in the same case, appellee filed a Supplemental Bill of Complaint for Divorce a vinculo matrimonii. Appellee re-alleged the grounds stated in her original Bill, and in addition alleged that the parties had lived separate and apart, without cohabitation, for the statutorily prescribed twelve-month period. 2 Appellee also prayed for the relief available under Subtitle 6A, "Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment," of Title 3 of the Maryland Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. That is to say, she requested that the parties' residence be declared a "Family Home" and that she and the parties' three minor children be granted use and possession of the home for three years; that the chancellor determine "Family Use Personal Property" and "Marital Property," and that he grant her a "Monetary Award," all in accordance with the statute.
Appellant filed a Motion Raising Preliminary Objection to the supplemental bill, alleging the inapplicability of Subtitle 6A and the consequent lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Appellant's motion came on for hearing on June 22, 1979, and the motion was denied; the chancellor ruled that the issues raised in the supplemental bill would be decided at trial.
Appellant filed his Answer to the Supplemental Bill of Complaint and a hearing was held in the matter on March 7, 1980. Thereafter, by Order of March 19, 1980, 3 the chancellor granted appellee a divorce a vinculo matrimonii on the ground of constructive desertion, awarded her and the children the use and possession of the family home and furnishings for three years and ordered that appellant pay all monthly mortgage installments and taxes on the home during that time. The chancellor then referred the case to the Domestic Relations Master for further proceedings to determine a suitable monetary award, to establish ownership interests in marital property and to supervise the sale of that property and the division of proceeds therefrom. 4
During its 1978 legislative session, the General Assembly of Maryland enacted legislation to alter the law governing the disposition of property in conjunction with grants of divorce or annulment. 1978 Laws of Maryland, Chapter 794. The legislation is codified in Subtitle 6A, "Property Disposition in Divorce and Annulment," of Title 3 of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article of the Annotated Code of Maryland. Section 2 of Chapter 794 provides that the Act shall take effect January 1, 1979, and that it shall apply "only to cases filed after that date."
Appellant contends the language of Section 2 clearly and unambiguously refers to "cases" filed after January 1, 1979; that a supplemental bill is not a "case", and that consequently the Act does not apply here. We agree.
The well-known "cardinal rule" to be followed in applying a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the real legislative intent. In seeking to determine legislative intent, we first look to the language of the statute itself. If the words contained therein are plain and unambiguous, and if they express a definite and sensible meaning, then their meaning is conclusively presumed to be that intended by the Legislature. State v. Fabritz, 276 Md. 416, 421. 348 A.2d 275 (1975). Or, as the Court of Appeals stated in District Land Corporation v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission et al., 266 Md. 301 (1972), at 307, 292 A.2d 695:
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