Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cnty.
| Decision Date | 28 March 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. 788, Sept. Term, 2016,788, Sept. Term, 2016 |
| Citation | 236 Md.App. 139,181 A.3d 834 |
| Parties | O'Brien ATKINSON, IV, et al. v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
236 Md.App. 139
181 A.3d 834
O'Brien ATKINSON, IV, et al.
v.
ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY
No. 788, Sept. Term, 2016
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.
March 28, 2018
Argued by: Joel A. Smith (Christopher Ryon, Kahn Smith & Collins on the brief), Baltimore, MD, for Appellant.
Argued by: Hamilton F. Tyler (Kelly C. Lovett, Nancy McCutchan Duden, County Attorney on the brief), Annapolis, MD, for Appellee.
Panel: Nazarian, Leahy, Beachley, JJ.
Leahy, J.
This is the second case in recent years in which public safety employees in Anne Arundel County have challenged the County Council's legislative restriction on collective bargaining. See Atkinson v. Anne Arundel Cty. , 428 Md. 723, 53 A.3d 1184 (2012) [hereinafter " Atkinson I "]. The Charter for Anne Arundel County ("Charter") grants public safety employees the right to bargain collectively and submit to binding arbitration any resulting labor disputes concerning the "terms and conditions of employment." In 2014, the Anne Arundel County Council ("County Council" or "Council") adopted Bill 85–13. Certain provisions of the Bill, enacted as § 6–1–308(b)(2)–(4)
and (i)(4)–(6) of the Anne Arundel County Code ("Code"),1 exclude employee health insurance benefit options and health insurance plans from collective bargaining and arbitration.
After the County Administrator, relying on the new law, declined to negotiate employee health insurance benefit options and plans, aggrieved members of the public safety unions affected by Bill No. 85–13 ("Appellants")2 filed a declaratory judgment action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County against Anne Arundel County ("County" or "Appellee"). Appellants alleged that the County Council exceeded its legislative authority in enacting Bill 85–13. The County filed a counterclaim for declaratory judgment, asserting that the County Council's passage of Bill 85–13 was a lawful exercise of its legislative powers. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the circuit court denied Appellants' motion and granted summary judgment in favor of the County. Appellants noted a timely appeal to this Court on June 24, 2016, and shortly after, petitioned for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. By order dated September 29, 2016, the Court of Appeals denied Appellants' petition and the County's conditional cross-petition.
Appellants ask us to consider whether laws enacted pursuant to Bill 85–13 that prohibit collective bargaining and arbitration over employee health insurance benefit options and plans violate the form and structure of the County's annual
budget and appropriation process established under Charter Article VIII, §§ 811 and 812.3 Appellants also ask whether the circuit court erred when, rather than apply the
plain meaning of the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" contained in Charter § 812, it deferred to the County Council to define the scope of the law.
According to the County, Charter § 812 does not actually require that it bargain over any terms and conditions of employment. Moreover, the County argues that Appellants' reading of Charter §§ 811 and 812 as limiting the County's authority to define the scope of terms and conditions of employment "would lead to an unconstitutional result" under Article XI–A, § 3 of the Maryland Constitution because it would impermissibly limit the County Council's legislative authority.
We hold that under Charter §§ 811 and 812, the terms and conditions of employment are subject to the two-step process of collective bargaining and arbitration. We also hold that the circuit court erred when it decided that it was the County Council's legislative function, exclusively, to resolve any ambiguities in the phrase "terms and conditions of employment" contained in Charter § 812. We conclude that "terms and conditions of employment," as employed in Charter § 812, is a term of art that includes healthcare insurance benefits. We hold, therefore, that the provisions of Bill 85–13 that effectively render meaningless Appellants' right to bargain collectively over the cost of their healthcare insurance benefits are invalid under Charter §§ 811 and 812. However, because this appeal
is from the erroneous grant of summary judgment, the record is not developed sufficiently to define the scope of collective bargaining rights intended under Charter §§ 811 and 812. Accordingly, we remand the case for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
A. The Run Down: Collective Bargaining in the County
The citizens of Anne Arundel County amended their Charter during the 1988 election to provide for collective bargaining between the County and certain county employees' union representatives. Section 811 of the Charter mandates that "[e]mployees in the classified service shall have the right to organize and bargain collectively through representative employee organizations of their own choosing as provided by ordinance of the County Council." Consistent with Charter § 811, County Code § 6–4–108(a) provides that "[a]n exclusive representative may negotiate collectively with the Administration in matters related to wages, hours, working conditions, and other terms of employment of employees[.]"
In 2002, at the recommendation of the Charter Revision Commission, the County Council proposed a resolution to provide for binding arbitration to resolve disputes over police, fire, and other public safety contracts that may arise during labor negotiations pursuant to Charter § 811. Atkinson I , 428 Md. at 734–35, 53 A.3d 1184. Voters adopted the 2002 amendment, enacting Charter § 812, which states:
(a) In addition to the right granted to County employees in Section 811 of this Article to organize and bargain collectively, the County Council shall provide by ordinance for binding arbitration with authorized representatives of the appropriate employee bargaining unit in order to resolve labor disputes with the
County's law enforcement employees. The ordinance shall provide for the appointment of a neutral arbitrator by the parties to the arbitration who shall issue a binding decision to be implemented as part of the following year's budget process and which shall take into account the financial condition of the County and the
reasonable interests of the law enforcement employees and the county relating to the terms and conditions of employment....4
The following year, the County Council adopted Bill 1–03, codified at County Code § 6–4–111, to implement § 812 of the Charter. The Court of Appeals explained the effect of Bill 1–03 in Atkinson I :
Under Bill 1–03, if an impasse exists on March 15 of any fiscal year, the parties may agree to a non-binding confidential mediation but must commence arranging for binding arbitration as well. Provision is made for selecting an arbitrator and an alternative arbitrator. The powers and duties of the neutral arbitrator are set forth, time limits are established, and a "baseball" type of award is to be rendered.[ ]5 Subsection (m) provides, in relevant part, as follows:
"The final written award issued by the neutral arbitrator ... and the memorandum of agreed issues shall be final and binding upon the County and the Uniformed Public Safety Exclusive Representative and shall be implemented as part of the budget process for the appropriate fiscal years."
Either party may move to vacate the award by an action in the Circuit Court for Anne Arundel County.
428 Md. at 736, 53 A.3d 1184.
Then, in 2011, the County Council enacted Bill 4–11 to amend § 6–4–111 by removing language requiring that the
arbitrator's decision "shall be implemented as part of the budget process for the appropriate fiscal years." The bill also provided that the County Council "shall not be required to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award." Id. at 739, 53 A.3d 1184. In effect, Bill 4–11 created a system by which, if the arbitrator chose the employees' final offer, the County Council could then choose whether or not to fund the final award. Id. at 742, 53 A.3d 1184.
In Atkinson I , public safety employees challenged several features of the legislative enactment embodied in Bill 4–11, arguing that it offended § 812 of the Charter. Id. at 741, 53 A.3d 1184. The County, on the other hand, contended that "Bill 4–11 simply construed Charter § 812 to retain the Council's power [under Charter § 709] to reduce or delete appropriations and that construction [wa]s necessary to avoid rendering Charter § 812 unconstitutional." Id. at 742, 53 A.3d 1184.
The Court of Appeals addressed the constitutionality of Charter §...
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