Atkinson v. Lafayette College, CIVIL ACTION No. 01-CV-2141 (E.D. Pa. 1/29/2002)
| Decision Date | 29 January 2002 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 01-CV-2141. |
| Parties | Eve Atkinson, Plaintiff, v. Lafayette College and Arthur J. Rothkopf, Esquire, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
Plaintiff Eve Atkinson ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Lafayette College ("the College") and its President, Arthur J. Rothkopf ("Rothkopf") (together, "Defendants"), alleging unlawful employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. ("Title VII"), Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. ("Title IX") and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Act, 43 P.S. § 951, et seq. ("PHRA"), as well as breach of contract. Plaintiff seeks "declaratory, injunctive, monetary and other appropriate relief." Presently before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Partial Dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). For the reasons stated below, Defendants' Motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
According to the complaint, Plaintiff was appointed by the College as "Director of Athletics and Professor and Department Head of Physical Education and Athletics" on December 28, 1989. Plaintiff's appointment was for an initial term ending June 30, 1992, after which she became a tenured member of the faculty at the College. In January 1996, Plaintiff began raising issues of gender equality in the context of the College's athletic budget by submitting various plans to ensure compliance with Title IX to a committee of the College's Board of Trustees.1 Plaintiff alleges, inter alia, that on November 18, 1998, as a direct result of the tensions raised by public discussion and debate of these issues, she was physically threatened by the College's Dean of Students. Plaintiff further alleges, inter alia, that on November 4, 1999, she was notified by Rothkopf that her employment with the College would be terminated on June 30, 2001. Plaintiff alleges her termination was based on her gender and in retaliation for her insistence that the College comply with Title IX. Plaintiff also alleges that her termination, as well as the College's failure to provide her with the opportunity to be heard on the matter, violated her contractual rights as a tenured professor at the College.
Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the party moving for dismissal has the burden of proving that no claim has been stated. Kehr Packages, Inc. v. Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1409 (3d Cir.), cert.denied, 501 U.S. 1222 (1991). To prevail, the movant must show "beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, (1957). In considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must only consider those facts alleged in the complaint. See ALA, Inc. v. CCAIR, Inc., 29 F.3d 855, 859 (3d Cir. 1994). The reviewing court must take all well pleaded facts in the complaint as true and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 (1969). The pleader must provide sufficient information to outline the elements of the claim, or to permit inferences to be drawn that these elements exist. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). A complaint should be dismissed if "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984).
Count I of the complaint alleges a claim for sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. Defendants argue that Count I must be dismissed against the College for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies because (1) she initiated this suit before receipt of a right-to-sue notice from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") and (2) her claim of retaliation and certain factual claims of sex discrimination were not within scope of her EEOC complaint.2
In support of their Motion, Defendants attach: (1) Plaintiff's administrative complaint, (2) her letter from her attorney forwarding the administrative complaint, (3) her right-to-sue letter, and (4) her employment contract. Defendants urge the Court to consider these materials on this Motion to Dismiss, since a court may properly consider any "undisputedly authentic document that a defendant attaches as an exhibit to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff's claims are based on the document." Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1042 (1994).
A plaintiff under Title VII must file a timely charge with the EEOC before initiating suit in federal court. Howze v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 750 F.2d 1208, 1210 (3d Cir. 1984). In addition, a plaintiff may not bring suit without having first received a right-to-sue notice. Burgh v. Borough Council of Montrose, 251 F.3d 465, 470 (3d Cir. 2001). Receipt of the right-to-sue notice indicates that a complainant has exhausted administrative remedies. Id. Plaintiff must exhaust the administrative scheme of Title VII because it was "designed to correct discrimination through administrative conciliation and persuasion if possible, rather than by formal court action." Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze Co., 541 F.2d 394, 398 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977). For this reason, "the aggrieved person is not permitted to bypass the administrative process." Id. However, as the duty to exhaust administrative remedies is not jurisdictional in nature, it is subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982).
In this case, the right-to-sue letter was not issued to Plaintiff until May 7, 2001, five days after the complaint was filed on May 1. However, EEOC administrative remedies may be considered fulfilled when a right-to-sue letter is issued before trial. See, e.g., Lozada v. Reading Hosp. & Med. Ctr., Civ. No. 00-4081, 2001 WL 438418 at *2 (E.D.Pa. Apr. 27, 2001); Page v. ECC Management Servs., Civ. No. 97-2654, 1997 WL 762789 (E.D.Pa. Dec. 8, 1997) at *3 (citing Molthan v. Temple Univ., 778 F.2d 955, 960 (3d Cir. 1985)); Lantz v. Hospital of the Univ. of Pennsylvania, Civ. No. 96-2671, 1996 WL 442795 (E.D.Pa. July 30, 1996) (same). Furthermore, there is no record in this case of Plaintiff's wholesale failure to obtain such a letter or to make any attempt to do so, which mark the cases cited by Defendants. See, e.g., Dollinger v. State Ins. Fund, 44 F. Supp.2d 467, 474 (N.D.N Y 1999); Styles v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., Civ. No., 93-4593, 1994 WL 245469 (E.D.Pa. June 6, 1994). As a result, Defendants' Motion is denied on this point.
The scope of any ensuing federal court action is generally defined by that of the EEOC charge. However, when a claim is not specifically presented to the EEOC, the test for whether that claim can be presented to the district court is "whether the acts alleged in the subsequent Title VII suit are fairly within the scope of the prior EEOC complaint, or the investigation arising therefrom." Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1295 (3d Cir. 1996) (citing Waiters v. Parsons, 729 F.2d 233, 237 (3d Cir. 1984)).
On the relevant record before the Court, consisting solely of the administrative charge and the complaint filed in this Court, Defendants fail to meet their burden of demonstrating that Plaintiff "can prove no set of facts in support of [her] claim which would entitle [her] to relief." Conley, 355 U.S. at 45-46. Furthermore, the principal cases upon which Defendants rely dismissed claims on motions for summary judgment. See, e.g., Watson v. SEPTA, Civ. No. 96-1002, 1997 WL 560181 (E.D.Pa. Aug. 28, 1997); Fakete v. Aetna, Inc., Civ. No. 00-1391, 2001 WL 541086 . Therefore, Defendants' Motion is denied on this issue. The Court will consider exhaustion arguments regarding the scope of the administrative charge and subsequent investigation at the summary judgment stage.
Therefore, Defendants' Motion is denied as to Count I of the complaint against the College. As explained in note 2 supra, Defendants' Motion is granted as to Count I of the complaint against Rothkopf.
Defendants argue that Count II must be dismissed for failure to exhaust her administrative remedies because (1) Plaintiff initiated this suit before waiting one year from when she filed her administrative complaint; (2) Plaintiff failed to plead Rothkopf's liability under the PHRA with particularity; and (3) both her claims of retaliation and certain factual claims of sex discrimination were not within the scope of her administrative complaint.
Pennsylvania law requires that a plaintiff exhaust her administrative remedies under the PHRA before maintaining a civil suit under that act. 43 P.S. § 962(c). See Woodson v. Scott Paper Co., 109 F.3d 913, 925 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 914 (1997). The PHRA also reflects a legislative intent "to make administrative procedures under the PHRA a mandatory rather than discretionary means of enforcing the rights created thereby." Clay v. Advanced Computer Applications, 522 Pa. 86, 90, 559 A.2d 917, 919 (1989). A plaintiff must exhaust her remedies by waiting one year after the filing of an administrative complaint to seek redress in court. See 43 P.S. § 962(c). The PHRA also allows that "[t]he time limits for filing under any complaint or other pleading under this act shall be subject to waiver, estoppel and equitable tolling." 43 P.S. § 962(e).
In this case, Plaintiff filed suit on May 1, 2001, one day before the required...
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